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Little empirical evidence is available on the determinants o f wages at the level o f  the indivi­
dual for Ireland and to the author’s knowledge no such evidence is available for young 
workers. One objective o f this thesis, therefore, is an examination of the determinants of 
wages at the micro level using data from a national survey o f young workers recently un­
dertaken in Ireland. The effects of education, training, region, industry and occupation are 
assessed. More importantly, gender wage differentials are calculated for the sam ple under 
a number of alternative assumptions concerning the treatment o f occupations. In the ap­
plied econometric literature relating to the estimation o f both wage equations and gender 
wage differentials little emphasis has focused on the appropriate treatment of occupations. 
In view of this, an econometric objective o f this thesis is an analysis o f how the gender wage 
differential is affected by altering the econometric assumptions underlying occupations. 
The sensitivity o f the gender wage differential to occupational endogeneity is examined in a 
dichotomous framework using two contrasting econometric methods. Statistical tests for 
occupational exogeneity are provided and their results reported. Structural occupational 
models are also estimated. To assess the effects of occupational segregation on the gender 
wage differential a five-way occupational categorisation is employed and an effort is made 
to disentangle inter and intra occupational wage effects. Occupations are agained treated as 
endogenous and a consistent estimator designed to correct for selectivity bias is employed. 
In both the dichotomous and the polychotomous frameworks the estimated gender differen­
tials appear sensitive to occupational endogeneity. Finally, the issue o f segregation is again 
addressed but this time in the context o f the dual labour market. An empirical dual labour 
market model is estimated using an endogenous switching model with partial observability 
in the latent dependent variable. Sectoral differentials are calculated and the results of an 
informal test of rationing, a basic tenet o f dual labour market theory, tentatively suggest 
that primary sector rationing, to the extent it exists, falls disproportionately on the young 
females in the sample.
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C hap ter O ne
Introduction
This thesis is motivated by economic and econometric considerations. The economic ob­
jective is the analysis o f wage determinants at the level of the individual in the labour market for 
young workers in Ireland. Particular emphasis is placed on quantifying the residual gender wage 
gap that may be determined by, among other factors, the exercise of discriminatory power. The 
existence o f discrimination has clear policy implications and implies that female wages are con­
ditioned unfairly on the basis of their gender. The particular focus on young workers is also of 
some interest since it could be argued that both males and females have had relatively homogene­
ous and uninterrupted labour force experiences.
To the author’s knowledge the above has been the subject of no attention to date in the Irish 
context. Even for the adult labour market in Ireland little research effort has been expended on 
analysing the determinants of adult earnings1. An exception in this regard is Walsh and Whelan 
(1976) who used a sample of redundant adult workers to estimate human capital earnings func­
tions in an attempt at analysing gender differentials in earnings. As pointed out above the em­
phasis in this thesis is on young workers using a data set derived from a relatively recent national 
survey (1982). A full description o f the data set used is reserved until chapter three but suffice for 
it to state here that is more general than that of W alsh and Whelan (1976) and could be interpret­
ed as containing fewer o f the biases associated with their data.
The absence of a body of research is a clear motivation in itself. However, it should not be 
interpreted as the sole justification for embarking on such an exercise. Though the results report­
ed in chapters four to seven possess a clear Irish relevance the econometric methodology em- 
1 Thii i t  in large pan explained by either the unavailability o r  lack o f  a cceu  to suitable data m u .
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ployed has a much broader relevance. Though this is to be addressed more extensively in chapter 
two the standard approach2 to the estimation of the discrimination effect involves the estimation 
of earnings or wage equations by O LS. The discrimination estimate is obtained as the residual 
difference in observed wages that persists having controlled for a standard set of productivity and 
compensating variables. The earnings or wage equations are invariably reduced form and the 
discrimination estimates are interpreted as unconditional. Three broad econometric problems are 
invariably ignored when such an approach is adopted. The first is to some extent dictated by data 
considerations and the lack o f adequate female labour force information. Potential rather than ac­
tual labour force experience is used for females and this has been shown to lead to an over­
statement o f the discrimination estimate (see chapter two).
The second problem concerns the fact that the observed sample o f females may not be a 
random sample of females drawn from the population as a whole. This truncation effect has clear 
implications for the wage equation estim ates and hence the discrimination estimates. Some au­
thors have attempted to deal with this problem by examining only single male and female indivi­
duals. However, these may not be the appropriate comparator group. Furthermore, focusing ex­
clusively on this group provides a relatively narrow definition of gender wage discrimination. 
Consistent estimators (see chapter two) have been used in a number of studies to account for the 
selectivity bias associated with participation.
The third problem is the treatment o f occupations. Failure to explicitly account for it in 
wage equations allocates the com pensating differential effects to the residual. This leads to a 
higher discrimination effect than may actually exist. Allowing occupational levels to enter exo­
genously may lead to biased wage coefficient estimates if, in fact, occupations are endogenous.
In the context of the data set used in this thesis the first two issues are not interpreted as be­
ing problematic. Since the survey questionnaire allows the precise calculation of labour force ex­
perience (see chapter three) no artificial constructs are required for this key variable. The selec­
tivity bias effects that may come through participation is not deemed an important issue since the 
1 Thi* approach owe* a lot lo Oaxaca (1973) and is termed the "index number” approach.
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vast majority o f the young workers (male and female) surveyed are unmarried. Furtherm ore, all 
those surveyed described themselves as either working or actively searching for w ork and though 
no results are presented here no statistical evidence to suggest that the sample of workers are sys­
tematically different from the population o f workers and non-workers as a whole was found3.
The issue of potential occupational endogeneity provides the second and perhaps more im­
portant econometric motivation for the thesis. Little research has been directed at analysing the 
effects of occupational endogeneity on the discrimination estimates. The inadequate treatment of 
occupations as exogenous intercept shifts in wage equations fails to account for a channel through 
which discrimination may in fact operate. If females are sample selected by employers or self­
select themselves into certain occupations then the treatment of occupations as exogenous is 
clearly invalid 4. Thus a major thrust o f this study is an investigation of how occupational en­
dogeneity affects discrimination estimates with a particular application to the labour market for 
young workers in Ireland. Statistical tests for occupational exogeneity are also provided.
How this study proposes to achieve this twin set o f objectives may best be elucidated by 
briefly outlining the layout o f the remainder of the thesis. The following chapter, chapter two, 
provides a separate theoretical and empirical survey of the relevant discrimination literature. 
Though for the most part economic theoretical considerations play a peripheral role in the subse­
quent analysis the importance o f a theoretical framework inside which to analyse the results 
should not be under-stated. Nevertheless, without pre-judging matters it is clear that the 
phenomenon o f discrimination (like many other economic phenomenon) fails to provide a dom­
inant theoretical paradigm that can be conveniently invoked. Therefore, o f more importance
3 There are a  number o f  channels through which selectivity bias could potentially operate. The observed 
sample of workers could be a  non-random sample as a consequence of participation selectivity bias. Futher- 
rnore. given the terminal age of twenty-four for inclusion in the sample those still in higher education are ex ­
cluded thus providing another potential source o f  selectivity bias. To simultaneously model these different 
form s of selectivity bias would be an immense and complex task. It is for this reason that these form s o f  
selectivity bias are conveniently ignored allowing attention to focus exclusively on the effects of occupational 
endogeneity. Though no evidence is presented the effects o f participation and education selectivity bias a te  
thus assumed negligible.
4 Rational expectations may be invoked to explain the behaviour o f  both the self-selecting females and  the 
sample-selecting employers. If females anticipate absence from the labour force they may optimally choose 
occupations with relatively low-skill levels. O n the other hand, employers may optimally choose to  invest in 
those workers whose attachment to  the labour force is more permanent in character. This will be particularly
so ini
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from the point of view of the analysis presented is the survey o f the empirical evidence which 
also surveys the relevant econometric issues and places the issues to be presently addressed in 
context.
Chapter three provides an extensive description o f the sample survey and data set used in 
the analysis pointing out some o f its advantages and its potential limitations. The Irish labour 
market context inside which the survey took place is also briefly sketched.
Chapter four3 presents the first analysis o f the data. In this chapter the traditional "index 
number" methodology is outlined along with its limitations. Standard reduced form wage equa­
tions are estimated allowing inferences to be made regarding the returns to educational and voca­
tional qualifications and labour force experience etc. Occupations are treated as exogenous inter­
cept shifts in this chapter. Gender wage differential estimates (with associated standard errors) 
conditional and unconditional on occupations and industries are reported. Mean and base gender 
wage differential estimates and deviations from the base are also reported.
Chapter five explicitly treats occupational attachment as endogenous where the occupation­
al categorisation is on the basis o f  a manual/non-manual dichotomisation. Two consistent esti­
mators (the Heckman two-step estimator) and a distribution-free estimator based on instrumental 
variables (IV) are contrasted with the standard OLS estimator. Tests of occupational exogeneity 
are provided within both the Heckman and the IV framework. Unexplained gender wage dif­
ferentials are reported for each o f  the two occupational categories. The estimates are shown to be 
sensitive to both occupational endogeneity and the manner in which the endogeneity is accounted 
for. Results based on the estimation of structural occupational attachment models are also report­
ed.
The gender wage differential and the influence exerted on it by the occupational segregation 
of females into low-paying occupations has been recently examined in the literature (see chapter 
two). In both the US and the UK evidence has been presented to suggest that the female wage
5 A version o f  chapter four has already been published in the Economic and Social Review (see bibliogra­
phy)-
disadvantage is explained more by their intra-occupational wage disadvantage than by their 
segregation into certain occupational categories. Chapter six examines this particular issue in the 
context of young workers in Ireland. The econometric innovation that distinguishes this chapter 
from previous studies of Its kind is that the occupational wage equations are conected for selec­
tivity bias. The findings, however, are broadly in line with what has been discovered in both the 
US and UK.
The final empirical chapter, seven, departs to some extent from the framework used in 
chapters four to six and focuses on the dual labour market phenomenon. However, a linking 
theme still remains since the issue of gender is very much to the fore. One objective of this 
chapter is to establish the extent to which gender is used as a mechanism to allocate workers 
between primary and secondary sectors. Occupations are also used to allocate some individuals 
to primary and secondary sectors. A stochastic switching model with partial observability in the 
latent dependent variable is used to estimate the parameters o f the dual labour market model and 
wage gaps between the sectors are estimated with special reference to gender. A tentative test of 
primary sector rationing is also proposed.
Finally, chapter eight attempts to draw the diverse strands of chapters four to seven together
in an attempt at presenting conclusions.
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Chapter Two
Discrimination and the Gender W age Gap: A Theoretical and Empirical Survey
2.1 Introduction
The existence of a gender based wage differential has exercised the interest o f theoretical 
and empirical economists alike over the past number of decades. Even at the start o f this particu­
lar decade a sizable gender wage differential still existed in the twelve industrialised countries 
surveyed by Mincer (1985). Though the wage gap has closed it still remains a strong statement to 
say that most o f the remaining differential is linked to gender differences in life-time work ex­
perience. Invariably two competing explanations are invoked to explain the persistence o f the 
gender wage gap. The human capital explanation places emphasis on differentials in the accumu­
lation of human capital investments which leaves women less productive than men and hence 
through marginal productivity conditions with lower wages than men. The second explanation 
focuses on the payment of differential wages to workers of comparable productivity where the 
differential is determined by gender.
This survey is divided between a theoretical and an empirical survey of the relevant litera­
ture. The theoretical models that have been suggested in the literature can broadly be assigned to 
either supply side or demand side explanations. The theoretical section sub-divides into a brief 
survey of the supply side explanations and a more comprehensive survey of the demand side ex­
planations. The demand side section is itself divided into a number of sub-sections that focus 
separately on neoclassical, institutional and Marxian paradigms6. It is within this section that 
both the economics of discrimination and the theory of dual labour markets are explored. The
4 The allocation o f  the Marxian paradigma to  Dni particular category is more a convenience than a suae-
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empirical survey section concentrates more extensively on the direct and indirect tests o f discrim­
ination and the econometric problems of estimating both the gender wage gap and testing for the 
existence o f dual labour markets.
The Gender W age Gap: A Theoretical Survey
2.2 Supply S ide Explanations
The supply side explanations have their origin in the human capital theory as developed by 
Becker (1975) and Mincer (1974). Using a human capital explanation Mincer and Polachek 
(1974) attempt to  explain observed gender differentials in life-cycle earnings in terms o f gender 
differentials in the volume of accumulated human capital investments. The labour force intermit- 
tency of females dictated by the timing profile of child birth etc. has implications for the incen­
tives and opportunities available to females in acquiring productivity enhancing human capital in­
vestments.
The above explanation has been criticised, however, for its failure to treat human capital in­
vestments as heterogeneous. Polachek (1981) outlines a theoretical model that allows for dif­
ferent types o f  human capital investments. The "hedonic price" approach outlined in Rosen 
(1974) is used to embed occupational choice into the human capital framework. Thus, human 
capital theory is used to explain the determinants of occupational structure. Crucial to the Po­
lachek (1981) account is the role played by the atrophy rate or depreciation rate associated with 
different skill levels. In the utility maximising framework, females are assumed to optimally 
choose both the volume and type of human capital in order to maximise life-cycle earnings. Fe­
males are assum ed, in anticipation o f labour force interruption, to choose those occupations that 
are characterised by low atrophy or depreciation rates. This may eventuate in their segregation 
into low skill and low wage occupational categories.
More intim ately linked to both the supply side and to human capital theory described above 
are the explanations described in terms of the allocation o f time. Originally introduced in
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response to deficiencies identified in the traditional theory o f  labour supply (see Killingsworth 
(1983)) they have been used to explain gender differences in labour supply and hence gender 
differences in earnings and wages. The seminal contribution in this area is again due to Becker 
(1963) and central to the analysis is the concept of the household production function. The for­
mulation is in line with the characteristics approach of Lancaster (1966) where time and market 
goods are treated as inputs in household production. Gronau (1977) provides applications in the 
particular context of female behaviour. More, recently B ecker (1983) integrates the human capi­
tal explanation with the allocation of time in the household context in order to explain the lower 
hourly earnings experienced by married women. As he points out the increasing returns from 
specialised human capital provide a powerful force for the division of labour in terms o f the allo­
cation o f time and the accumulation of woric experience w ithin the household. Becker (1985) ar­
gues that the allocation of responsibilities (in a household utility maximising framework) to the 
married female for child care and housework (in which the female is assumed to possess a com­
parative advantage) has implications for earnings and occupational differences between men and 
women. A women's assumed comparative advantage in child-rearing and household chores is as­
sumed by Becker to explain the sexual division of labour. T h is  division of labour has clear impli­
cations for the accumulation of specific human capital in the labour market and, hence, life-cycle 
earnings’ differeentials.
Theories explaining the existence of a gender wage differential that focus on the demand 
side also fall into a number of broad categories. Three strands can be identified in the literature,
(i) neo-classical theories of economic discrimination,
(ii) institutional and efficiency wage theories.
(Ui) Marxian.
The separate treatment of neo-classical and efficiency wage theories may antagonise some pur­
ists. However, since most of the efficiency wage theories to be surveyed here are readily applica­
ble to the concept of the dual labour market it seems more appropriate to group the institutional
- 17 -
literature with the efficiency wage literature while bearing in mind the latter's antecedents. There 
could also be an argument for making no distinction between (ii) and (iii) since the institutional 
writings have much in common with the Marxian writings. However, though the Marxian writ­
ings are only briefly alluded to it was deemed more appropriate to consign them to a distinct 
category.
2 3  Neo-Classical Theories
It is clear that neo-classical theories of discrimination expressed both in terms of race and 
gender have commanded significant attention in the literature. In general, the neo-classical 
theories are set in either a deterministic or a stochastic framework with the former sometimes in­
volving assumptions concerning the structure of the product market i.e. whether it is perfectly 
competitive or monopolistic etc. A significant portion of the seminal work in this area again 
owes its origins to Becker (1971). In Becker’s work the abstract concept of prejudice is translat­
ed into a taste for discrimination. This taste is rendered economically operational by its introduc­
tion as an exogenous argument in a firm 's or an Individual's utility function. According to 
Becker’s analysis discrimination by race or gender may be employee, employer or consumer 
motivated. Each o f these three channels are examined in turn.
In the context o f the consumer based discrimination discriminating consumers are assumed 
to offer a price p -  d for the services of an individual where p reflects the price paid in a discrimi­
nation free environment and d measures the intensity of the consumer's taste for discrimination. 
Consumer motivated discrimination is most likely to impinge upon the earnings of the self- 
employed and in the service industries where a large proportion of female labour is located. In 
the long-run and in response to this discrimination one would expect females to either segregate 
into those occupations characterised by minimum consumer contact or cater exclusively for the 
female sector.
Discrimination as practiced by employees may also lead to labour force segregation or par­
tial segregation along race or gender lines. The employee discrimination model may again be 
derived from a utility based framework where employees (or their representative organisations)
• 18-
trade off wages for the ability to work in exclusively male work environments. A logical predic­
tion of the model is the segregation o f females into firms' whose employees possess no taste for 
discrimination. A motivation for the discrimination may come as a consequence o f the threat 
posed to males by the influx of women in terms of job security and earnings. As a consequence 
trades unions, for example, may in order to protect the interests of their members impose restric­
tive practices on female entry that are discriminatory. In practice, however, it seems difficult to 
accept that firms are characterised by the degree of flexibility implied by the above theory7. It 
could, however, be conceded that in the context of race the above employee model o f discrimina­
tion is more applicable if  discrimination is Arm or establishment based. There is evidence that 
this is actually the case for race. If, on the other hand, sex discrimination is occupation based the 
above analysis is seen to have limitations in its application to gender discrimination.
A more common taste for discrimination model is expressed in terms of an employer’s taste 
for discrimination. The employer's positive taste for discrimination manifests itself in terms of 
the discriminating firm that sacrifices profit levels in order to indulge in its taste for discrimina­
tion. Thus when faced with a wage w  for the female it behaves as t f  w(l + d )  is the net wage rate 
where d  again reflects the Arms' taste for discrimination.
As Chiplin and Sloane (1976) show this neoclassical model may be expressed more formal­
ly. The following assumptions are made:
(i) All firms possess identical utility and production functions.
(ii) Only one commodity is produced and males and females are perfect substitutes.
(iii) The supply of male and female labour are perfectly inelastic.
(iv) The analysis is exclusively short-run with capital given to  each firm and output is assumed a 
variable function of employment levels.
(v) Employers are assumed to maximise a utility function which is described in terms of profit 
and employment
7 Malei and female« are aaaiimed perfect substitute! in production.
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More formally profits for the firm may be expressed as
u - G i M  + D - W M - w ' F ( 2. 1)
where *  is profits,
G( ) is a strictly concave and increasing function.
M and F are levels of male and female employment respectively, 
and *■ and w* are the equilibrium male and female wages respectively.
The firm’s utility function is described in terms of some of the above arguments
U -U l« .r .M ]  (2-2)
where U is the firm’s level o f utility.
(2.2) may be re-expressed as :
Under the assumptions that males and females have identical productivity then setting 
G ' = G a  = G'r and solving for the marginal productivity condition yields
U -  U[ G(M + F) -  w -  M -  w* F), M. F] (2.3)
Maximising (2.3) with respect to M and F yields
¿q - -  U«(G'a -  W ) ♦ U . -  a (2.4)
| ^ - U ^ G ' , - w ' )  + U, -  0. (2.3)
and hence
U ^ G 'a  - w - )  + U a  -  UB(G 'r -  w 0 + Uf (2.6)
(2.7)
-2 0 -
Setting -  = da and -  = 4  and substituting into (2.7) yields
G ' * w“  + dm = w* + 4 (2 .8)
In the absence of discrimination against females (or in favour o f males) U . =* Ur = 0 and 
hence do, * dr -  0. Thus males and females are paid a wage commensurate with their marginal 
product. Under the assumption o f discrimination against females Ur < 0 and dr > 0 which implies 
that the female equilibrium wage is below the marginal product by the amount of the discrimina­
tion effect which in each firm is determined by the negative marginal utility to the firm o f em­
ploying females. Thus in terms of Becker’s employer discrimination model with a discrimination 
coefficient of dr > 0 then G ' ■ w* > w*. This can be reflected in the market discrimination 
coefficient which may be expressed as
where D is the market discrimination coefficient and *■ and wr are the equilibrium market wages.
The assumption concerning males and females being perfect substitutes again is deemed re­
latively unrealistic. The "physical distance" aspect of the taste model could also be deemed more 
than slightly unrealistic. It could be argued that some firms possess a d o f  zero for secretaries but 
a significantly positive d for the professional and skilled occupational categories. Thurow (1973) 
among others attempts to re-express the problem in terms of "social distance" rather than "physi­
cal distance". Nevertheless, as Cain (1986) points out this re-interpretation does not vitiate the 
main conclusion of the Becker model, that of an equilibrium differential in wages favouring 
males.
In the perfectly competitive context another issue relates to the variance across industry of 
the firms’ d ’s. It can be argued that the wider the dispersion in discrimination coefficients the 
lower is the market discrimination coefficient outlined in (2.9) above. This follows from the fact 
that most workers who are subjected to discrimination choose those firms who possess low 4 ’s. 
Since discriminating Arms with high 4  *• do not bid for female labour (as a consequence o f  the 
negative marginal utility associated with employing females) they end up paying w*. If most fe­
(2.9)
•21 •
males congregate into firms with low d, ’s (or d, -  0) the wage received is closer to their marginal 
product. Hence the market discrimination coefficient o f (2.9) narrows.
A more important aspect o f the variance in the discrimination coefficients is in its implica­
tions for the long run. The additional profits earned by the non-discriminating firms (assuming 
males and females are perfect substitutes) in hiring female workers may act as an incentive for 
these firms to price cu t the discriminators in the product market and expand production at the ex­
pense of these firm s. The demand for labour o f the discriminating firms will consequently be re­
duced. If a constant cost industry structure is assumed to characterise the long-run then the long- 
run equilibrium outcom e will be where firms with low d<'s end up employing all the females and 
all the males with the latter losing their previously advantaged status. Thus in a perfectly com­
petitive economy characterised by constant costs discrimination cannot persist and in Arrow's 
(1972) view a logical prediction o f the Becker model is the "absence of the phenomenon it was 
designed to explain".
The "logical" outcome is however contingent on, among other things, a constant cost indus­
try assumption w hich follows from the fact that factor prices do not alter in response to industry 
expansion. This assumption may not be altogether tenable. Becker (1971) suggests entrepreneur- 
ship as a factor o f  production that is relatively supply inelastic and with the expansion o f industry 
output (as a consequence of price-undercutting by non-discriminating firms) its price would rise 
altering the cost structure of the firm. This could well be the same for other factors. If it was the 
case that the non-discriminating firm 's industry was characterised by increasing costs then higher 
costs would offset profit levels and the opportunities that the non-discriminating firms would 
have relative to the discriminating firms would be eroded. Thus, in an increasing cost context 
there exists no guarantees that a discriminating cost differential would persist in order to be ex­
ploited to the benefit o f  the non-discriminating firms.
Other forms o f  market structure are more amenable to the persistence of discrimination in 
the long-run. A m onopoly in the product market can be cited as an example in this regard. Since 
there exists only one employer and excess profits in the long-run, no variability in the taste for
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discrimination and plenty of latitude to sacrifice some profit to  indulge the taste for discrimina­
tion. However, if a monopolist possesses no power in the input market it cannot influence the 
wage a male or female labour unit receives. Through d the discriminating behaviour o f the 
monopolist would manifest itself in terms of employment segregation. It is equally possible that 
the segregated composition of a monopolist's work-force may have little to do with the discrimi­
natory tastes of the monopolist A monopolist with a d -  0 could  be consistent with a segregated 
work-force derived from the fact that monopolists tend to be both capital and skill intensive 
operations. If through pre-labour market discriminatory processes females fail to gain access to 
skilled training, then, they will also fail to gain access to jobs in  monopolists’ firms. Further­
more. unions tend to organise in those industries with higher potential rents8. If unions adopt 
discriminatory procedures against females in their attempts to protect the earnings and job securi­
ty o f their membership, then a non-discriminating monopolist would again be observed with a 
segregated labour force.
The monopsonist market structure allows for labour market influences to be exerted in the 
labour market by the monopsonist firm. Monopsonists are the so le buyers o f labour in the labour 
market but may or may not possess any monopolistic influence in the product market. Discrimi­
nation in this context may be interpreted in terms of the concept o f monopsonistic exploitation. 
This is measured by *  which is interpreted as the m ark-up of the value of the marginal
product over the equilibrium wage. The discrimination interpretation hinges on a wider monop­
sonistic exploitation o f women relative to men. This is assumed to come about if  the female la­
bour supply elasticity is more inelastic than the male's. How ever, empirical evidence (see Kil- 
lings worth (1983)) suggests that female labour supply is more elastic than male labour supply and 
thus a major tenet of the discrimination thesis is undermined.
Comanor (1973) in an application to racial discrimination view s discrimination as a normal 
consumption good. In the case of an owner-manager higher incomes through profits increase
•  The Marshallian law* of derived demand may be invoked to explain the existence o f  greater potential
istries.
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consumption o f  the discrimination good. Ale hi an and Kessel (1962) argue that utility companies 
in the US operating subject to rate-of-return regulations face an externally imposed profit con­
straint. This allows managers to indulge in discrimination with no concomitant sacrifice of 
profits. Ashenfelter and Hannan (1986) highlight a discriminatory explanation in terms of the 
separation of owners and managers. Under the assumptions of imperfections in the markets for 
capital and managers and the separation of ownership control, discrimination may be practiced by 
managers at no pecuniary cost to themselves. The imperfections associated with the capital 
markets prevents the owners o f capital from distinguishing between observed profits and max­
imum profits. Costly monitoring o f the firm in the context o f owner-separation provides condi­
tions inside which discrimination as exercised by managers can persist
The role o f trades unions in the labour market may also act as a medium to reduce or re­
enforce discriminatory factors. As Sloane (1983) points out a lot depends on the structure of the 
trades union itself, i.e. whether it is organised on an industry-wide basis or on a craft basis. In 
the former case females may have little problem in joining such unions but may encounter prob­
lems in determining its agenda through lack of senior representation. In the latter case females 
may actually encounter discrimination in terms o f their ability to actually join these types of un­
ions. Pre-entry labour market discrimination that exists in terms of female access to skilled train­
ing may explain this particular phenomenon.
In the context o f the deterministic models outlined above marginal revenue product and 
marginal factor cost are known with certainty. Phelps (1972) suggests that the existence o f im­
perfect information in the labour market may force employers to maximise expected profits under 
conditions o f uncertainty. As Phelps (1972) points out gaining information about applicants is 
excessive and costless indices like race or gender may be used by employers as selection criteria.
A central theme of the statistical theory of discrimination is the use o f performance indica­
tors by employers to assess the respective productivities of workers. Average wages are paid in 
terms of group mean performances. I f  labour force experience is used as a performance indicator, 
and married women participate less in the labour force than single women, then, through a pro­
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cess of adverse selection the wage paid to women will be based on an average of both’s perfor­
mance. Single women are thus being discriminated against on the basis of the female group. 
This could be interpreted as a version o f group discrimination. Aigner and Cain (1977) rational­
ise the payment o f a lower average wage in terms o f employer risk aversion. The lower wage is 
treated as a compensation to the firm for bearing the risk associated with the unreliability o f the 
performance indicator. This has clear parallels with the insurance market literature where the 
male/female wage differential could be viewed as a premium paid by the female in order to 
secure a job9. As Cain (1986) argues the statistical theories rest on the differential information 
conveyed by workers concerning their productivity. Discrimination could, in this form, be 
viewed as some form o f market failure the remedies to which may lie in government policy 
aimed at the educating, training and licensing of workers.
A variant of the above type o f model expressed in terms o f signaling theory was developed 
by Spence (1973). Here workers are assumed to invest in a signal ( e g . education) which has no 
intrinsic value ( i.e. it is not productivity enhancing) other than to indicate the worker’s inate pro­
ductivity. The signal is costly to obtain and relatively more so for less able workers. The invest­
ment in signals by workers is on the basis of their perception o f their own ability. Employers are 
assumed to believe the signals and make wage offers in response to these signals. However, there 
is no guarantee that the equilibrium allocation o f signaling investments is socially efficient 
There is a tendency for over investment in signaling and, thus, no guarantee of a unique equilibri­
um. Spence (1973) shows that given similar amounts of signal investment by two comparable 
groups the consequent Pareto inefficient allocation leads to a disadvantaged position for the 
discriminated group.
Stiglitz (1974) has also demonstrated how different equilibria may exist for different groups 
o f workers. Additional assumptions made in the Stiglitz model are that individuals are not per­
fectly certain as to their characteristics and are risk averse. Firms are assumed not to be able to
9 In fact, Dahlby (1983) employs the concept o f  adverse selection in an empirical application to the Cana­
dian automobile insurance industry. The author detects evidence o f  statistical discrimination against young 
single males relative to young single females and suggests that the premium paid by young females would in­
crease in the absence o f  discrimination.
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observe perfectly the individual’s characteristics prior to job placement Under these and some 
other assumptions Stiglitz shows that if firms believe that groups delineated by gender or race 
have different distributions of the imperfectly observable characteristics group membership will 
be used to determine job placements and hence wages. Finally. Lundberg and Startz (1983) in­
tegrate aspects o f both the Phelps model and the Spence model and assume that investments in 
signals are productivity enhancing. Assuming there exists a less reliable signal for one group (fe­
males) relative to another then under-investment will occur in it with the obvious consequences 
for job placement and wages.
It is clear that obvious solutions to discrimination that may occur as a consequence of 
misperceptions lie in trial work periods for or bond posting by applicants in order to assess more 
realistically productivity. However, the implementation o f this type of procedure may prove 
prohibitive from the firm's cost point o f view.
I A  Institutional and Efficiency Wage Theories
The deterministic neo-classical models outlined in the last section attempted to explain the 
phenomenon o f discrimination in terms o f tastes the effect of which was wage differences and oc­
cupational differences for individuals with comparable characteristics. The institutionalist view 
focuses more on differentials that exist for comparable individuals in terms of their access to jobs. 
The historical origins o f institutionalist writings are found in the demands for social reform that 
emerged in the early part o f the twentieth century. Its re-emergence in the US in the 1960’s was 
also coincidental with a period of dramatic social change and upheaval experienced in that coun­
try at that time.
Amsden (1980) suggests institutionalism reaches its fullest expression in addressing ques­
tions of occupational segregation by gender and female low pay. The institutionalist theories10 
could be allocated without much difficulty to the broader category of segmented labour 
market/dual labour market theories (SDLM) and in addressing the issue o f job discrimination as
10 Neo-classical theorisu may dispute the use o f  theory as a term descriptive o f  institutionalist writings.
opposed to wage discrimination build on the seminal work o f Fawcett (1918). Webb (1919) and 
Edgworth (1922).
Nevertheless, a major limitation of the labour market segmentation literature lies in the fact 
that it does not provide a single or unique explanation for the existence of wage differentials. 
This follows from the fact that there exists no consensus as to the appropriate segment upon 
which to concentrate attention. Segmentation may be on the basis o f occupation, industry, firm 
size, unionisation, the firm’s product market or a combination o f any or some of the above. The 
major objective o f the segmentation theories are to provide a dichotomy11 of the labour market 
on the basis o f  jo b  characteristics. Some jobs are characterised by low wages, poor working con­
ditions, unstable employment and no on-the-job training. Other jobs are characterised by high 
wages, good working conditions, stable employment and the provision of various forms of job 
specific training. As Wachter (1974) points out the important distinction is between "good'’ and 
"bad" jobs and not between skilled and unskilled jobs. Skilled workers may be present in the 
secondary labour market but unable to gain access to the primary sector as a consequence o f insti­
tutional or discriminatory barriers to entry.
The primary labour market may be viewed as an internal labour market (see Doeringer and 
Piore (1971)). In this context institutional rules and social custom rather than competitive forces 
are viewed as the important mechanism for the allocation of wage rates and jobs among primary 
workers (see Piore (1983))12. Furthermore, due to the existence o f job  rationing in the primary 
sector the skilled jobs in this sector arc unresponsive to the supply o f skilled workers. The poli­
cy implications that this has for human capital investment is clear. The secondary sector, on the 
other hand, is assumed described by an alternative wage setting mechanism. The returns to hu­
man capital investment are negligible suggesting a relatively flat age-eamings profile. Primary 
sector rationing is assumed to induce over-crowding in the secondary sector and hence lower pro­
ductivity. The sector is also assumed characterised by high turnover and an unstable
11 The dichotomy o f  job* is a theoretical and an empirical convenience that may be viewed as an abstract 
from a  more realistic multi-sectoral world.
12 Williamson, W achter and Harris (1975) argue that the internal labour market concept need not be 
viewed in strictly noo-ccoootnic terms and provide an efficiency rationale for th is particular coocept
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employer/employee relationship. The poor conditions that characterise the secondary sector are 
assumed to imbue the workforce with low morale. Absenteeism and poor attendance are assumed 
rife in this sector.
The theory has much in common with that developed by Thurow and Lucas (1972) (see 
below) where little emphasis is placed on human capital characteristics and the allocation of jobs 
is demand determined. The observed gender wage differential is explained by job discrimination 
and the failure of females through demand side discrimination to access the primary sector jobs. 
Confinement to the secondary m arket is assumed to have adverse effects on worker morale and 
their "taste" for work which is thus rendered endogenous in this framework. Dual labour market 
theory can be seen as possessing both direct and indirect consequences. The direct effect is in 
terms of allocating workers to secondary jobs and the indirect effect comes from a workers de­
moralisation which contributes to the perpetuation of their secondary status.
Albeit from a class perspective Reich, Gordon and Edwards (1973) provide a working 
definition for a segmented labour market. They see the segmentation of the labour market as a 
logical response o f the capitalist to the homogenisation of the labour force and the threat posed 
by a unified labour front It is thus seen as a consequence of the transition from competitive to 
monopoly capitalism. Reich ei al. (1973) define labour market segmentation as the " historical 
process whereby political-economic forces encourage the division of the labour market into 
separate sub-markets or segments distinguished by different labour market characteristics and 
behavioural rules". Segmentation can be by race or gender and can cut horizontally or vertically 
across occupations. The female segments tend to be consistent with the lower wage segments 
when compared to males13. Though this interpretation has a strict Marxian feel about it the 
definition itself provides a working framework inside which to analyse the SDLM theories.
One SDLM theory, the job competition theory, due to Thurow and Lucas (1972) owes 
much to the theory o f "queues”. Job competition is seen to replace wage competition. Technolo­
gy is assumed to determine the num ber and type o f jobs with social custom and institutional fac-
13 Segmentation does not imply tcgregation (see below).
tors determining wages. Screening devices are invoked by employers to allocate workers to jobs 
and this is a potential channel through which discrimination may occur. Wages are assumed 
fixed with macroeconomic fluctuations assumed only to alter the length o f the "queues". The 
theory also emphasises the relative insular position of the firm from external factors thus drawing 
on the much noted intemal/extemal labour market dichotomy.
Zellner (1972) and Bergman (1974) both present models in some sense related to the dual 
theories. Bergman’s model is presented in terms o f the "crowding-out" hypothesis. The argu­
ments presented are comparable to those outlined in terms of the dual theories. The immobility 
that comes as a consequence of the lack of access experienced by females to the higher-paying 
occupations results in an abundance o f females in the lower-paying occupations. This results in a 
lower marginal productivity in the "crowded-out” sector and hence lower wages.
As Cain (1976) points out the SDLM theories are, in general, "sketchy, vague, and diverse 
if  not internally conflicting". The orthodox neoclassical theory’s exclusive emphasis on the 
budget constraint (income) and opportunity cost (prices) is replaced in SDLM theories by a 
greater emphasis on institutional and social factors. Cain (1976) concedes that the limitations 
possessed by the orthodox theory are contrasted with some advantages the SDLM theories pos­
sess in the greater emphasis placed on the historical, institutional and qualitative features that 
characterise the economic system.
The Cain (1976) survey is generally felt to have had an adverse effect on the development 
o f the institutionalist ideas cited above. As pointed out these criticisms were aimed at the lack of 
theoretical structure attached to the SDLM concepts. However, with the advent o f  the efficiency 
wage literature the SDLM school of thought has experienced something of an intellectual renais­
sance. Katz (1986) provides a comprehensive review of the efficiency wage literature and atten­
tion here focuses on those studies that embody explicit application to the dual o r segmented la­
bour market concept.
Different variants of the efficiency wage hypothesis can be invoked to rationalise the ex­
istence o f dual labour markets. The basic tenet of the efficiency wage theory is the positive rela-
tionship between an individual’s wage and their productivity14. Firms are assumed to pay an 
equilibrium wage above the competitive wage in order to elicit greater workforce effort, reduce 
shirking, ensure lower turnover costs and higher w orker morale. The equilibrium wage can be 
obtained in a simple profit maximising framework as that wage which minimises wage costs per 
unit o f labour. Thus, the basic efficiency wage theory can be invoked not only to explain real 
wage rigidity and involuntary unemployment but can also provide explanations as to why work­
ers with identical characteristics are paid differently. High wages and job rationing can arise in 
that sector where efficiency wage considerations predominate (the primary sector) allowing com­
petitive market forces to govern the rest o f the economy (the secondary sector).
Efficiency wage models can be classified into three distinct categories:
(i) sociological norm models ( e.g. Akerlof (1982)),
(ii) adverse selection models ( e.g. Malcolmson (1984)),
(iii) shirking models ( e.g. Bulow and Summers (1986)).
Akerlof (1982) provides an efficiency wage theory expressed in terms o f the sociological 
concept of group norms. In part wages are determined by the norms of workers efforts and may 
be above the competitive market-clearing wage. Tw o sectors are delineated on the basis o f the 
existence or non-existence of such wage based norms. However, it’s not clear from A kerlofs 
analysis that there exists any other distinguishing feature o f the primary sector relative to the 
secondary sector above the existence o f  norms. It could well be the case that loyalty and senti­
ment to the firm by the worker group is compatible with low-skill jobs and that on the basis o f the 
traditional taxonomy should belong to the secondary sector. The delineation o f the labour market 
into primary and secondary segments requires something more than the existence o f wage norms.
Using the principal-agent concept in a two-period model Malcolmson (1984) generates five 
features of the labour market some of which are consistent with the SDLM concept. Malcolmson 
(1984) presents a model where contracts with payment are based on the ranking o f an employee’s
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performance. The employee cannot verify an employer’s observation o f his performance. Mal- 
colmson (1984) uses these features to generate a model with a hierarchical wage structure, inter­
nal promotion, wage rates that rise with seniority and experience more than with productivity, 
and wage rates attached to jobs rather than individuals. Some of the features outlined above are 
consistent with the SDLM structures outlined in Doeringer and Piore (1971).
Efficiency wage models based on shirking have also used the principal/agent concept in an 
application to the segmented labour market literature. Since workers have some discretion over 
their performance on the job a clear moral hazard problem emerges. In response to this em ­
ployers may pay an efficiency wage to ensure that the appropriate incentives exist for the worker 
to avoid shirking. The efficiency wage is most likely to be paid in that sector where the monitor­
ing costs associated with the detection o f shirking are high and less likely in the sector where 
monitoring is relatively costless. Bulow and Summers (1986) argue that such a model has a 
ready application to the concept o f the dual labour m arket Primary jobs by their character are 
difficult to monitor in contrast to secondary jobs which are relatively routine and performance is 
easily assessed. Since the cost to the firm in the primary sector o f workers shirking is likely to be 
greater than in the secondary sector (since primary jobs are characterised by greater responsibili­
ty) there exists a clear incentive for the firm to provide the workforce with the incentives to avoid 
shirking. From the workers' point o f view the existence o f an unemployed "queue" o f primary 
workers, while not influencing the wage paid in any sense, acts as a mechanism for discipline (see 
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)). The higher the efficiency wage the greater the cost to the employee 
o f being fired as a consequence of shirking. Higher efficiency wages imply higher productivity 
and, if the secondary sector only pay the market-clearing wage, a productivity gap exists between 
the two sectors.
The shirking model can also be used in an attempt to explain the persistence o f discrimina­
tion. Bulow and Summers (1986) argue that the persistence o f discrimination is related to dif­
ferential turnover propensities. If one group exhibits a higher turnover propensity and hence a 
shorter horizon on the job  it U likely to require greater inducements not to shirk. Thus the higher 
turnover group is more likely to be confined to the secondary sector. Turnover models have also
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featured in the efficiency wage literature and place emphasis on the incentives necessary to en­
sure the long-term attachment of employees to the firm, in particular skilled employees. Since a 
female’s labour force experience is characterised by interruptions profit maximising employers 
would have no reason to pay them an efficiency wage. Thus the sectoral segregation o f  females 
and the wage disadvantaged position of females can be explained by efficiency wage type argu­
ments.
Katz (1986) outlines a basic objection to the dual labour market approach and argues that if 
secondary workers are as productive as primary workers and are enviable o f primary workers then 
primary wages would be bid down to clear the market. This, however, overlooks a basic feature 
o f the institutionalists’ writings that o f the "scarring effects” associated with secondary attach­
ment. The low morale experienced by workers attached to this sector, which manifests itself in 
terms of absenteeism and high turnover, generates characteristics that are unacceptable from the 
point of view o f the primary sector employer.
In a study, separate from the main stream of the efficiency wage arguments outlined above, 
Mc Donald and Solow (1985) analyse the effects of business cycle fluctuations on a segmented la­
bour market where the segmentation is in terms of a primary (union) sector and a secondary 
(competitive) sector. The primary sector wage is not determined as an efficiency wage but a 
Nash solution in an employer/union bargaining model similar to the model outlined in Me Donald 
and Solow (1981). The model has many dual labour market characteristics including immobility 
across sectors and a "transitional" pool o f unemployed who are assumed to "queue" for primary 
jobs and accept the first one offered. Employment in the primary sector is shown to be very 
responsive to exogenous changes in product demand while wages are shown to be more sensitive 
than employment in the secondary sector. Though this theoretical finding conforms to the styl­
ised facts of the US economy it is slightly at variance with some features o f the SDLM model 
where employment instability best characterises the secondary labour market.
It is clear that recent developments in the efficiency and related wage literature have in 
some sense diminished the dismissive views expressed by Cain (1976). The development o f  logi­
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cally consistent theoretical models that are predicated in terms of equilibrium concepts has al­
lowed a certain rigorous structure to be imposed on a relatively nebulous and atheoretical litera­
ture. In so doing some credibility and respectability, certainly in the eyes o f neoclassical 
economists, has been restored.
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2 J  Radical and Marxian Theories
Finally and briefly, turning attention to the radical and Marxian theories of discrimination. 
The general view taken by radical economists is that discrimination is wide-spread and persists. 
The radical explanation is not derived from a taste based model but rationalises discrimination in 
terms of the benefits that accrue to the capitalist. The taste parameter does not enter as an argu­
ment in the capitalist’s utility function. This, o f course, is a  view at variance with the standard 
theory outlined by Becker, for instance. The capitalists’ strategy is based on  a divide and conquer 
precept. This can be achieved by integrating workforces racially or by gender in order that 
conflicts are caused within the workforce and their bargaining power is reduced. The segmenta­
tion thus implied by the Marxian version of events does not imply segregation. However, the 
outcome outlined here does not explain the existence o f a  gender or race wage differential. It 
could be argued that the payment o f  a premium to one type o f worker over another comparable 
worker where the distinguishing difference between the two is in race or gender is one method to 
ensure antagonism within the workforce and thus reduced work-force bargaining strength. Roc- 
mer (1979) presents a model based on a  profit maximising employer and illustrates the incentives 
to the employer o f employing an integrated workforce (over a segregated one) with the existence 
o f a distinct wage preference for one set o f workers over another.
The Gender W age Gap: An E m p irica l Survey
As is obvious from the fore-going analysis discrimination theories differ in their focus o f at­
tention. Though most theories have implications for the gender wage differential others have im­
plications for the occupational segregation of workers. Since the analysis presented in this study 
concentrates on the magnitude o f  the gender wage gap this is reflected in the subsequent empiri­
cal survey. Nevertheless, the effects o f  occupational segregation are not ignored. Indeed, the ef­
fects of occupational
In line with the theoretical m odels outlined in the previous section m uch effort has been ex­
pended on attempting to test both the underlying theories implied by the models and to provide 
estimates of the gender wage gap holding productivity characteristics constant. The sequential
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ordering o f theories surveyed in the last section is roughly adhered to here. The empirical litera­
ture to be surveyed below could be classified into four distinct groups. T he first group of studies 
concentrates on  direct and indirect empirical tests o f the theoretical models themselves. The 
second group o f  studies focuses on methodological and other issues associated with the estima­
tion o f the gender wage gap. The third group of studies are presented in order to assess the em­
pirical strength o f the SDLM models. The final group provides a miscellany o f studies that are 
not conveniently allocated to the first three groups. For the purposes o f  this thesis most emphasis 
is placed on the second and third categories since they more readily capture the context inside 
which the em pirical analysis of the thesis is to be presented.
2.6 Direct and Indirect Tests o f Discrimination
As was outlined in the theoretical survey above, consumer discrimination is most likely to 
impinge upon self-employed earnings. Fuchs (1971) using US data found self-employed earnings 
for females significantly below comparable male earnings. It was also found that fewer women 
than men w ere in this particular category. This latter fact is consistent with Becker’s segregation 
predictions. Nevertheless, it is more likely that certain advantages can accrue to females where 
there exists consum er contact (see Shephard and Levin (1973» and that ethnic minorities are 
more at risk from  this form of discrimination. Most recently Kahn and Shaw (1988) provide evi­
dence of black compensation disadvantage in the context of professional basketball in the US 
which the authors view as being consistent with consumer discrimination.
Employee models of discrimination have been relatively marked by their absence from the 
literature. T he empirical versions of the employee model have concentrated on the relationship 
between work-force integration and wage compensation. Chiswick (1973) provides a study in 
terms of race the results of which are consistent with Becker’s theory. Chiswick’s study was 
state-based and it would seem more appropriate to express the empirical problem  in terms of in­
dustry and/or occupation.
A wider empirical literature is available for the employer based discrimination models. The 
empirical implementation of the employer based model is a test for the existence of an inverse re­
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lationship between the female/male net wage ratio and the female/male employment ratio. This 
may be expressed by the following relative demand curve
where w and E refer to net wages and employment levels respectively with the superscripts m and 
f  denoting males and females respectively.
A negative coefficient on the relative employment term  is shown to be consistent with the 
Becker theory. As the wage difference between males and females (who are assumed perfect sub­
stitutes) widens the employer’s aversion to employing females weakens and more females are re­
cruited. Zabalza and Tzannatos (1983) use such a functional form to assess the effects of anti- 
discrimination legislation (ADL) in the UK with m ixed results. In a number of their 
specifications positive relative employment coefficients are reported. However, on the introduc­
tion o f step-wise dummies to account for the cumulative effects of ADL the coefficient becomes 
statistically significant and negative. The authors provide no interpretation for this result in terms 
of discrimination theory. The result taken at face value suggests that only after controlling for the 
cumulative effects of ADL does a discriminatory result em erge which appears counter-intuitive. 
However, the appropriate level at which to examine the employer model is at the industry level. 
In general studies o f this kind (Ashenfelier (1972)) have provided mixed and unconvincing 
results.
The indirect tests of the employer based discrimination model usually attempt to posit a 
significant relationship between employment ratios or wage ratios and proxies for market power 
such as profits or concentration ratios. The underlying tests are based on the assumption that per­
fectly competitive firms that discriminate cannot persist in the long-run. Cain (1986) has criti­
cised the implicit assumption in such empirical models that monopoly power in the product 
market implies monopsony power in the labour market. He also  offers criticisms on the use o f re­
lative employment variables (as in Os ter (1973) or Luksetich (1979)) as opposed to relative wage
(2.10)
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variables. The criticism stems from the fact that since the focus o f  attention is wage discrimina­
tion the use of segregation indicators is inappropriate. Though this may be interpreted as a rela­
tively valid criticism the use of such indicators is not outside the purview of Becker's theory. 
The theory itself has clear implications for employee segregation and such effects can occur in an 
employer taste for discrimination model. However, the use of relative earnings (as in Chiplin and 
Sloane (1976)) is clearly inappropriate failing as it does to take into consideration variation in 
hours etc. O f the empirical studies cited in Sloane (1983), (pp.100-101) only Haessel and Palmer
(1978) and Luksetich (1979) report a correctly signed significant relationship between discrimi­
nation measures and market structure in the context of gender. However, Ashenfelter and Han­
nan (1986) present results that are consistent with the existence o f a negative relationship 
between market structure defined by market concentration and the firm's employment of women 
in the US banking system. The use o f this firm-specific data overcomes the problem of inter­
industry differences that besets some of the other studies cited above (Oster (1973) and Luksetich
(1979) . Furthermore, Ashenfelter and Hannan (1986) found that an individual bank's share o f the 
market was insignificant in terms of the employment ratio and suggested that the relationship 
between employment and concentration is due to differences across markets rather than across 
banks.
In general from the above brief survey o f empirical work designed to examine gender 
discrimination it is clear that no overall picture supportive of the theoretical models emerges.
2.7 Estimating the Gender Wage Gap
Despite the lack of success in defining a robust empirical model with which to test the 
Becker theories in their various forms no effort has been spared in the empirical attempts aimed 
at quantifying the magnitude of the gender wage gap13. The most enduring methodology that has 
been used extensively in empirical work on both gender and race differentials is the "index 
number" approach first suggested by Oaxaca (1973). This approach involves the estimation of
11 A n explanation of the wage gap concept in the union context is provided by Lewi* (1986) and in the 
context employed here i i  taken to be the cxcets in the wage for a female if male over the actual female wage 
at a  given specification o f  characteristics and work conditions e tc.
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separate gender wage equations. Observed female (male) wages and predicted female (male) 
wages simulated on the assumption of a male (female) wage structure are compared. The differ­
ence between the tw o wages is assumed to provide an estimate of discrimination. Cain (1986) 
cites twenty US studies over a period of eight years (1973-1981) most o f which employed the "in­
dex number" approach.
The methodology, however, is neither an ideal nor an accurate measure of the discrimina­
tion effect. The discrimination coefficient based on Becker (1971) may be expressed as follows:
„  _ E( wj) -  E(wO «  , , v
D------- RV!----  f2-11»
where wj is the simulated female wage on the basis of the male wage structure and w* is the ob­
served female wage and E( ) is the expectations operator. The empirical counterpart for the above 
expression is given by
D « exp ( X/Af)) - 1  (2.12)
where a male wage structure is assumed in the absence o f discrimination and X/ is the set o f 
characteristics for the i*  female individual in the sample and A0 is the difference between the 
male and female wage coefficients from the OLS estimation of the male and female wage equa­
tions. As a summary statistic the discrimination coefficient estimated on the basis of the sample 
means of the female characteristics is usually reported.
This residual measure may include non-discriminatory elements but may also exclude other 
discriminatory elements. For example, i f  female access to certain occupations is restricted as a 
consequence of discrimination then including occupation controls (through exogenous intercept 
shifts) may attribute to the explained portion o f the observed wage difference a potential discrim­
inatory component. Thus, the inclusion o f occupation controls may lower the discrimination esti­
mate. However, their arbitrary exclusion may attribute to the unexplained part o f the observed 
wage difference justified compensating differentials that emerge as a consequence of occupation­
al attachment. The inclusion or exclusion o f occupation controls may depend on the objectives of 
the researcher. Crucial to an accurate measure of the discrimination effect is the correct measure­
ment of all the relevant productivity variables ( e g  education and labour force experience). The
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cruder th e  proxies used for these variables the greater the potential bias in the discrimination 
coefficient Furthermore, the omission of key variables that may influence wages ( e.g. ability or 
motivation) will also bias the discrimination coefficient estimate.
T he "index number" approach takes its name from basic statistical theory and is so called 
because it involves weighting a given set (or basket) o f characteristics by different prices 
(coefficient estimates). Its construction is analogous to the way the Laspeyres or the Paasche in­
dices are constructed. The calculation of the "index number" is contingent on which coefficients 
(or weights) are chosen as the base weights. The Laspeyres and the Paasche pose conceptually 
different questions and this difference follows over into estimating the discrimination effect. The 
discrimination effect can be calculated by simulating a male wage on the basis of a female wage 
structure o r  conversely by simulating a female wage assuming a male structure. Differences 
between th e  actual and the simulated wages provide conceptually different estimates for the 
discrimination effect Alternatively, a geometric average o f both effects can be employed. 
Sloane (1985) graphically illustrates the "index number" problem in its application to estimating 
the discrimination effect and shows under certain assumptions how assuming a female wage 
structure in  the absence of discrimination leads to a larger estimate than in assuming a male wage 
structure. However, b priori it is impossible to state where either estimates lies in relation to the 
other in a  multivariate case.
In the empirical literature Oaxaca (1973), Corcoran and Duncan (1979) and Siebert and 
Sloane (1981) present estimates for both types o f calculation. Blinder (1973) and Reilly (1987) 
assume the male wage structure best characterises the non-discriminating environment and 
Greenhalgh (1980) in presenting discrimination effects provides a geometric average of both. In 
the context o f  the Becker model o f employer discrimination outlined above, the assumption o f a 
male wage best describing the discrimination-free environment appears relatively innocuous. All 
it simply im plies in terms o f equation (2.8) is d .  = 0 i.e. no nepotism or favouritism on the part 
o f employers towards males. One short-coming o f a large number of the empirical papers that 
have attem pted to calculate the differential is their failure to calculate the associated standard er­
rors without which confidence in the estimates may be diminished. All o f the studies cited in the
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last paragraph with the exception o f Reilly (1987) fail to do this. However, the standard errors re­
ported in Reilly (1987) are not based on D but the logarithm o f  one plus D.
Another important issue to be addressed is the appropriate dependent variable to use in es­
timating the gender wage difference. Some studies have used annual earnings e.g. Greenhalgh
(1980), Siebert and Sloanc (1981), Lucifora and Reilly (1988) and of Cain's (1986) twenty cita­
tions mentioned above over half use some form o f incom e or earnings dependent variable. 
Though in many instances this is dictated by data availability it seems more appropriate to use net 
hourly wages since most o f the theoretical stories outlined in particular by Becker are described 
in terms of net wages.
A potentially more important problem is the appropriate explanatory variables and this was 
alluded to above. Since females, in general, possess a markedly different pattern o f labour force 
behaviour than males an obvious problem emerges in attempting a comparison with males. Their 
p>articip>ation rates are lower and their turnover rates are higher. This has clear implications for 
the calculation of the discrimination coefficient. Polachek (1973) outlines the potential biases 
that may occur as a consequence of the opposite effects that family characteristics in particular 
m ay have on male and female wage structures. In Polachek’s view neglecting to take account of 
these structural differences may lead to an overstatement o f the discrimination effect. 
Greenhalgh (1980) suggests that single male and female w orkers, who are assumed to possess a 
similar attitude in the accumulation of human capital investments, provide the appropriate com­
parator group in quantifying the effects o f wage based discrimination.
Nevertheless, this aprproach may be interpreted as a relatively narrow definition for discrim­
ination. The phenomenon of discrimination can impinge upx>n married women as much, if not 
more, than single women. The behaviour of married women must in some way be assessed if an 
adequate estimate o f discrimination is to be provided. The practical problem this creates which is 
highlighted by inadequate work histories for married women probably explains the empirical 
focus o f attention on single workers. The attendant problem o f  selectivity bias that follows from 
the protential existence o f some systematic process that governs the observation of women work­
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ers in the labour market, i.e. women w ho participate may not be a random sample of women 
from the population as a whole, also creates econometric problems. Failure to adequately take 
the selectivity effects into account can lead to biased discrimination coefficients. Few studies 
have explored how this particular form o f  bias effects the discrimination estimates. Zabalza and 
Arrufat (1985) and Dolton and Makepeace (1986 and 1987, a) provide notable exceptions in this 
regard with the latter studies reporting vast differences between corrected and uncorrected esti­
mates of the discrimination coefficient It should be said that few studies in general have 
analysed the effects of any form of selectivity bias on the discrimination coefficient with only 
Reimers (1983) being another notable exception in the context of race discrimination.
A related question to the above is the manner in which the labour force experience variable 
is calculated and in particular for the female group. In most studies (Oaxaca (1973), Blinder 
(1973), Siebert and Sloane (1981) and Greenhalgh (1980)) this is calculated as the difference 
between an individual’s age and years in schooling less six. This is termed a potential experience 
variable and in the particular case o f m arried women is likely to gravely over-state labour force 
experience. Zabalza and Arrufat (1985) and Miller (1987) both show that use of such an in­
correctly measured variable attributes m ore o f the observed gender wage gap to the unexplained 
component leading to an overstatement o f  the discrimination effect. Zabalza and Arrufat (1985) 
using Zabalza's (1983) work on labour supply provide estimates of actual female labour force ex­
perience and home time. This allows for a  more reasonable experience variable and the discrimi­
nation estimates are shown to decline when this is used.
Another potentially serious problem alluded to above concerns the appropriate treatment of 
occupations. Including occupation controls as exogenous intercept shifts in wage equations is 
designed to control for the existence o f compensating differentials across occupations. There are 
two distinct problems associated with this approach. Firstly, if  female access to certain occupa­
tions is prohibited by the exercise of an employer’s discriminatory power the effects of compen­
sation and discrimination are confused. Secondly, the assumption that occupational level can be 
treated as an exogenous variable is a relatively strong assumption and should be statistically test­
ed.
In response to the first problem Brown, Moon and Zoloth (1980) provide a modification to 
the "index number" approach that allows for the wage effects of occupational segregation to be 
isolated. An occupational attachment model is estimated in conjunction with occupational wage 
equations. Occupational wage equations are estimated and thus the compensating differential ef­
fect is explicitly controlled for allowing a "cleaner" discrimination effect to be isolated. Using 
US data Brown el al. (1980) found that gender wage differences within occupations explained 
more of the observed gender wage gap than did the allocation of workers across occupations. 
Miller (1987) using a  similar approach produced comparable findings for the UK. The major 
deficiency in both these studies, however, is their failure to take into consideration the effects of 
occupational selectivity bias which has clear implications for the discrimination coefficient esti­
mate. This is the second problem outlined above and though a few studies have examined occu­
pational attachment or choice (Schmidt and Strauss (1976) and Boskin (1975)). Less attention 
has focused on the effects of occupational endogeneity on wages. Hay (1980) and Dolton, 
Makepeace and Van Der Klaaw (1987)) provide two exceptions in this regard. However, to the 
author’s knowledge no studies to date have examined the issue of occupational endogeneity and 
its effects on wage discrimination estimates.
2.8 Empirical Applications of the SDLM
The two basic tenets of the SDLM hypotheses are:
(i) the existence of two distinct wage-setting mechanisms in the economy characterised by high 
and low wages. It’s further assumed that the returns to education and labour force experience are 
greater in the primary sector than in the secondary sector.
(ii) The absence of intersectoral mobility. Secondary workers are assumed unable to  cross-over 
to primary jobs and primary workers are assumed unwilling to take the more abundant secondary 
jobs even if  rendered unemployed. In response to an exogenous change in product demand 
unemployed primary workers are assumed more likely to join a pool of transitionally unemployed 
workers and join a "queue" for the rationed primary jobs.
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However, the existence of two wage setting mechanisms though consistent with SDLM theories 
is not inconsistent with the predictions of human capital theory. If an individual can move from 
one sector to the other then the existence of a sector with no human capital returns is irrelevant. 
Thus (i) may be regarded as a necessary condition for the existence of dual labour markets with
(ii) providing both a necessary and sufficient condition for its existence.
The first hypothesis has been the subject of some empirical investigation. Industries and/or 
occupations are divided arbitrarily into two sectors on the basis o f job characteristics and/or 
worker characteristics. Statistical tests of the difference between two wage equations are then 
carried out. Osterman (1975) and Camoy and Rumberger (1980) find support for the existence of 
two wage setting mechanisms while Zucker and Rosenstein (1981) find the reverse. The arbitrary 
classification o f industries or occupations into primary and secondary markets on the basis o f cer­
tain characteristics may partly explain the conflicting set o f results obtained. None of the above 
studies address the econometric issue o f sample selectivity bias associated with an individual’s 
sectoral attachment
The existence of rationed primary jobs has been analysed indirectly through an examination 
of worker mobility. Leigh (1976) and Schiller (1977) both provide empirical evidence in support 
o f the proposition of mobility thus violating, as they see it, a basic assumption o f the SDLM hy­
pothesis. Figart (1987) identifies trades unions as being partially responsible for a gender dif­
ferential in mobility. The effects of unions are seen as having both a wage effect and an internal 
labour market effect that operates to the disadvantage o f females. Figart also argues that most of 
the benefits o f unionisation accrue to males.
In the particular context of married woman, there is some evidence that occupational 
behaviour is characterised by a degree of downward mobility. Though Beller's (1985) evidence 
for the US indicates an increasing female representation in traditional male jobs both Stewart and 
Greenhalgh (1984) and Dex and Shaw (1986) provide UK evidence of the consignment of women 
to lower status jobs after labour force interruption. However, the latter authors find little evi­
dence of this for the US. This latter set o f results need not be viewed as either refuting or
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confirming the rationing SDLM hypothesis. Firstly, immobility due to firm specific human capi­
tal investments is consistent with human capital theory and mobility within the primary sector 
does not vitiate the SDLM hypothesis. The downward occupational mobility observed in the UK 
may be explained as much by human capital depreciation as by the existence of a distinct SDLM 
with rationing. However, Piore (1980) argues that rationing is most likely to impinge upon wom­
en and ethnic minorities during recessions. Employers may impose rationing constraints on the 
basis o f  gender and race. Thus in the context of a transitional pool of unemployment employers 
may use race and gender indicators in the allocation o f primary jobs in such a way that women 
and blacks may lose out especially in a recession.
A  clear implication for a gender interpretation o f the SDLM hypotheses is the segregation 
of females into a restricted set o f occupations with a consequent depression of the wage. The fe­
male intensiveness o f a given occupation is likely to impinge upon the wages o f males represent­
ed in these occupations. If male workers in female intensive occupations experience negative 
wage effects then this is consistent with what the SDLM advocates predict for the secondary sec­
tor. The abundant availability of female labour in these occupations lowers the equilibrium 
wage. Johnson and Solon (1984) and Lucifora and Reilly (1988) provide empirical evidence for 
the US and Italy respectively of a well determined negative effect of female occupational intensi­
ty on the male wage.
All of the foregoing studies provided indirect tests of the existence of a dual labour market 
Dickens and Lang (1985) provide an advance on these indirect tests. Their study also overcomes 
the classificatory problem by using an econometric model with endogenous switching. This al­
lows the estimation of two sectoral wage equations where the regime governing an individual's 
wage is unknown ex ante. The Dickens and Lang test16 is based on proportionality between the 
switching coefficients and the difference between the wage equation coefficients. The rejection 
of proportionality constitutes a test o f rationing in the Dickens and Lang framework.
16 T he te n  assumes income as opposed to utility maximising agents, no costs o f  mobility across sectors 
and a know n distribution o f  the wage equation unobservables.
Heckman and H otz (1986) argue that the rejection o f the Dickens and Lang test is uninfor­
mative. The rejection may occur for a number o f reasons e.g. the existence o f more than two 
sectors, the existence o f utility maximising rather than income maximising agents i.e. certain in­
dividuals may prefer the non-pecuniary benefits o f secondary sector employment to the income 
benefits o f primary sec to r employment. The existence o f costs of sectoral mobility and false dis­
tributional assumptions may also explain the rejection. Furthermore, the likelihood ratio test re­
ported by Dickens an d  Lang is in error since under the null o f no dualism (market clearing) sec­
toral attachment probabilities are not defined. Thus according to Heckman and Hotz (1986) the 
dual labour market hypothesis is untestable. However, as Dickens and Lang (1988) argue the 
Heckman and Hotz criticism  is based on an inability to test for market clearing. If this is the case 
the criticism is equally  valid of neo-classical human capital theory.
2.9 Other Studies
ways. Madden (1987) using a survey o f  displaced workers finds that after displacement (due to 
an exogenous macroeconomic shock) women experienced a greater wage loss than comparable 
males. If the hum an capital explanation is correct women, because they undertake less firm 
specific investment than  men, encounter less of a wage loss after displacement than comparable 
males. The finding M adden argues is consistent with a gender wage differential that is discrimi­
nation related. The sm aller set of job  opportunities available to women as a consequence of 
discrimination ensures a  smaller likelihood o f females securing a job with a wage comparable to
their job prior to displacement.
An alternative approach to the estimation o f sex discrimination has been proposed by 
Kamalich and Polachek (1982). In this case the methodology attempts to provide a direct esti­
mate of the effects o f  sex discrimination while avoiding the biases associated with the "index 
number" problem. T h e  method used is referred to as "reverse regression" and concentrates on 
differentials due to jo b  qualifications rather than to earnings or wages. If discrimination exists, 
then in terms of this analysis, one would expect to find higher mean qualifications among the fe­
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males for any given wage level. The conclusions of Kamalich and Polachek (1982) was that 
clear-cut discrimination was not found to ex ist However, it should  be pointed out that the "re­
verse regression" approach is not itself free of bias or criticism. Goldberger (1982) has brought 
the validity of this approach into question and Solon (1983) h as  demonstrated the inconsistency 
o f the "reverse regression" approach in estimating discrimination effects and argues that it is 
biased against detecting discrimination.
Chiplin (1981) suggests concentrating less on the estim ation of wage or qualifications equa­
tions and more on trying to identify a structural demand relationship based on, for instance, firms 
hiring and promotions decisions. Chiplin adopts an "hedonic offers" framework in an attempt at 
examining sex discrimination in the context of university selection procedures. No evidence of 
sex discrimination is found to exist in terms of the data set u sed  by Chiplin (1981) and Dolton 
(1984) using a similar approach and similar data provides evidence supportive of Chiplin (1981).
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2.10 Conclusions
From the above brief theoretical and empirical survey a number of points emerge.
(i) No clear theoretical description o f the discrimination phenomenon dominates and this is a 
view shared by Cain (1986).
(ii) Not surprisingly in the light o f (i) none of the empirical tests of discrimination, either direct 
or indirect, provide convincing evidence one way or the other.
(iii) Some of the econometric issues relevant to the estimation of the gender wage gap have in 
most cases, but certainly not all, been conveniently ignored.
It is the development of the last point that is most relevance to this thesis. As a means of il­
lustrating (iii) table 2.1 reports discrimination estimates based on six relatively recent UK studies. 
The estimates reported represent only a subset o f some o f the cited studies’ estimates. The 
discrimination effects of Greenhalgh (1980), Siebert and Sloane (1981) and Miller (1987) are 
based on OLS and are unconditional (or reduced form) estimates. Zabalza and Amifat (1985) 
and Dolton and Makepeace (1986 and 1987, a) present estimates conditional on the participation 
decision. The selectivity bias effects originating through participation are corrected for using the 
Heckman two-step estimator and in the latter authors' case also through a maximum likelihood 
estimation technique. It is clear from the reported estimates that significant differences attach to 
the choice of estimator. Miller’s (1987) estimates illustrate the problem of using the artificial po­
tential experience variable over the actual experience variable. In using the former variable more 
of the observed differential in wages is allocated to the residual producing a higher discrimination 
effect
In the context of the analysis presented in this thesis neither the issue of potential versus ac­
tual experience nor the issue of participation selectivity bias is deemed a major problem. In the 
former case this follows from the nature o f the data set used (to be described in the following 
chapter) where job information is sufficient to allow the precise calculation of the experience 
variable. The latter is not deemed problematic since most of the young workers (male and fe­
male) are single and the terminal age for inclusion in the sample is twenty-four.
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As mentioned in the introductory chapter a major thrust o f this thesis is an analysis o f an 
econometric issue that to the author’s knowledge has received little attention in the literature. 
From the econometric point o f view the manner in which occupations are treated may be of cru­
cial importance. The standard treatment is to assume exogeneity. However, there is strong evi­
dence to suggest that occupational attachment is endogenous and this has clear implications for 
the wage equation and discrimination estimates. The correct treatment o f occupations is rendered 
all the more important by evidence provided in Brown el al. (1980) and Miller (1987) suggesting 
a significant portion of the unexplained differential is intra-occupational. A finer occupational 
discrimination effect can only be obtained by estimating, for example, one digit occupational 
wage equations and correcting for occupational selectivity bias. Some o f the analysis presented 
below attempts to address this particular issue.
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Table 2.1
Discrimination Estimates
Author Data Estimate Method
Greenhalgh (1980) GHS (1975) 10.0% OLS
Sieben & Sloanc (1981) Establishment Level Data 0%-16% OLS
Zabalza & Arrufat (1985) GHS (1975) 1.3%-12.4% Heckman
Dolton & Makepeace (1986) Graduate Survey (1977) 19.8% OLS
14.4% Heckman
12.4% MLE
Dolton & Makepeace (1987, a) Graduate Survey (1977) 7.6% OLS
4.2% Heckman
5.9% MLE
MUIer (1987) GHS (1980) 33.6% OLS
16.4% OLS
GHS la the General Household Survey. All the above estimates are based 
on assuming a male wage structure in the absence o f discrimination with 
the exception o f Greenhalgh (1980) who calculates a geometric mean esti­
mate based on male and female wage structures. Heckman is the Heck­
man two-step estimator described in Heckman (1979) and MLE is max­
imum likelihood estimation. The selectivity bias corrected for in Dolton 
& Makepeace (1986 and 1987, a) is for participation. The first estimate 
reported for Miller (1987) is based on using potential experience for 
females the latter on actual experience calculated as in Zabalza (1983).
Chapter Three
Description of the Data Set and Background
3.1 Background
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a description of the data set proposed for use in the 
empirical analysis. Prior to this, however, it may be o f some interest to set the overall labour 
market context inside which this analysis should be placed. Throughout its recent history upto 
the early 1960's the Irish demographic experience has been one of emigration and declining po­
pulation. The lowest ever population in the history o f the state was recorded in the 1961 census 
with a population o f 2,818,000. Though a steady increase was achieved upto the 1971 census 
(2,978,000) the most notable increase occurred upto 1981 when the population reached 
3,443,000. By any standards this rate of increase was exceptionally high with a proportionate po­
pulation increase of 13.6% achieved between these two census years. This compares to the Euro­
pean group of OECD countries' proportionate growth rate of 6% over the same period.
Table 3.1 illustrates the major determinant of this particular phenomenon. Between 1931 
and 1971 high rates o f natural increase were off-set by even higher rates o f  net migration 
outflows. Only in the 1971-1981 period was this trend reversed largely due to the net external 
inflow of population in those inter-censal years. Table 3.2 shows the percentage change in popu­
lation by age group with the 13-24 age group characterised by the second largest increase over 
the 1971/81 period. It is clear from both these tables that between the years 1971 and 1981 a 
dramatic change in the pattern o f net migration occurred. A major part o f this change is attribut­
able to the substantial reduction in the migration o f young workers in the 13-29 age group allied 
to a net inflow of migrants in the 30-44 age group (mostly coming from the UK with young fami­
lies). Together both these factors contribute to a population structure in 1981 where nearly 30% 
are under the age of 23 years. The corresponding OECD Europe average is 38%.
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Using the 1981 Census of Population Table 3.3 outlines the main features o f the Irish labour 
market contrasting the youth and adult labour markets. The dramatic feature o f table 3 is the siz­
able proportion of the workforce under the age of twenty-five. Nearly 40% o f those at work are 
in this less than twenty-five category, a fact that provides adequate motivation for concentrating 
attention on this particular segment o f the labour market.
Table 3.1.
Population Change In Inter-Censal Periods.
Period Change in Pop. Natural Increase Net Migration
1951-1961 -142*300 + 266,500 -408,800
1961-1971 4-159,900 +294,500 •134¿00
1971-1981 +465,000 +361,000 +104,000
Source: Censuses o f  Population o f Ireland (1951,1961,1971,1981).
Table 3 Ü
Population Change in Inter-Censal Ye if* by Agt Group..
Age-Group % Changed 961/71) % Change(1971/81)
0-14 46.1 ♦11.5
15-24 ♦23.2 ♦26.0
25-44 -1.4 +34.0
45-64 ♦ 1 J -3.0
265 +4.7 ♦11.6
Total ♦5.7 ♦15.6
Source: Censuses o f  Population o f  Ireland (1951, 
1981).
1961, 1971 and
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Table 3J .
_____  Main Features of the Irish Labour Market in 1981.
Category 15-24 * 2 5 Total
(a) At Work 316.1 834.6 1150.7
(b) Unemployed 33.9 79 .0 112.9
(c) Seeking First Job 18.1 1.6 19.7
(d) Education 199.4 3.7 203.1
(e) Other Activities 40.9 878.3 919.2
(f)*(a)+(b)+{c) Labour Force 368.1 915.2 1283.3
(gW fHW W e) Total 608.4 1797.2 2405.6
Source: Census of Population of Ireland (1981).
3.2 Data Set Description
Attention now turns to a description of the sample survey itself. T he full title of the survey 
study commissioned by the EEC and carried out by the Economic an d  Social Research Institute 
(ESRI). Dublin, is
" A Survey o f Youth Employment and the Transition from Education to  Working Life M.
A more comprehensive description of which appears in Sexton el at. (1982).
The target group covered in the survey was persons aged betw een IS and 24 years o f age. 
All those surveyed had left full-time education and were either gainfully  employed or seeking 
work. No readily available sampling frame exists for this target group. However, the EEC Con­
sumer Attitudes Survey (EECCAS)17 was used to obtain 22.648 households. Each o f  these 
household were visited in three rounds between May 1981 and January 1982. This overall sam­
ple of households were surveyed yielding the 5930 individuals in the target age group of 15 - 24
17 This was a three yearly study conducted in Ireland by the Economic and Social Research Institute and 
An Foras Taluntais (the Irish Agricultural Institute).
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years. The EECCAS, which uses the electoral register as the sampling frame, has a tendency to 
under-represent the smaller households ( i.e. households with a small number of electors). The 
survey o f the target group itself was carried out between the months o f March and June of 1982. 
A similar study, also under the auspices of the EEC, was carried out for the Netherlands at about 
the same time.
Since the interviews were carried out in terms of households, the questionnaires consisted 
of three main parts:
(I) A Household Sheet.
(II) A Person Questionnaire,
(M ) A Job Sheet.
The first part. (I). was concerned with eliciting information about household composition in 
terms of sex, age, relationship to head of household etc. for all the members of the household.
The second part o f the questionnaire, 01). deals with questions relevant to the targeted indi­
viduals in the 15 - 24 age-group. The data here provide information on
(i) demographic characteristics ( i.e. sex, age, marital status and nationality).
(ti) details on educational attainment ( U .  nature and extent of formal full-time education etc.),
(iii) present training ( nature and duration),
(iv) basic training ( nature and duration),
(v) further training ( nature and duration),
(vi) details on the respondent’s parents ( i.e. their economic sum s etc.),
(vii) details on the respondent’s own economic status i.e. at work or unemployed.
The Anal part o f the questionnaire (III) concerns itself with information relevant to the 
individual's job and the characteristics of the job. The information contained here details 
(1) Date Commenced,
(i) Occupation.
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(ii) Industry.
(iii) Location.
(iv) Hours worked.
(v) Gross and Net Earnings,
(vii) If Promoted,
(viii) Date Left
The individual in the target group was responsible for filling in the personal questionnaire. 
Since some of the questions asked could be interpreted as imposing a strain on the interviewee's 
memory, the accuracy o f some of the responses may be brought into question. The problem that 
poor recall poses in eliciting an accurate response to a variable like pay, for example, cannot be 
understated. The problem of poor recall was to some extent mitigated by the fact that inter­
viewers asked to see documentary evidence o f pay in the form of recent pay slips, for example. 
Though this particular problem can be minimised it can 't be eliminated completely and this 
should be borne in mind in interpreting the subsequent empirical analysis.
Though the information contained in the sample survey is comprehensive it should be 
pointed out that in terms of part (II) of this questionnaire no information is available on house­
hold income or on unemployment benefits received by those in the target group who are unem­
ployed. This clearly imposes some limitations on the scope o f the empirical analysis. Though 
most of the target group sampled live at home and thus would be ineligible for unemployment 
benefit o r assistance the lack of information concerning household income is a limitation espe­
cially in the context o f examining occupational attachment. Efforts to obtain tapes for the Irish 
Household Budget Survey of 1980 in order to estimate household income on the basis o f the 
household characteristics o f (I) proved unsuccessful as permission to access was only granted 
under restrictive conditions by the Central Statistics Office in Dublin.
Since the empirical chapters four to seven do not use the identical set o f variables the 
number o f observations for each study differs.18 Thus, each empirical chapter contains a descrip-
11 This ii  due lo to missing values.
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Chapter Four
Gender Wage Discrimination with Exogenous Occupations
4.1 Introduction
The purpose o f this chapter is to analyse some of the determinants o f wages at the individu­
al level in the Irish labour market for young workers. As pointed out in chapter one this has been 
the focus of no attention to date in the Irish context. Even for the adult labour market in Ireland 
little research effort has been expended on analysing the determinants o f adult earnings which in 
large part is explained by either the unavailability or lack of access to suitable data sets. The only 
exception in this regard is Walsh and Whelan (1976) who used a sample o f redundant adult work­
ers to estimate human capital earnings functions in an attempt to analyse, among other things, 
gender differentials in earnings.
The estimation of such equations provides an important insight into some relevant policy is­
sues. For example, the returns to work experience and educational qualifications can be assessed 
and the extent to which they differ across gender groups can also be evaluated. A major focus of 
attention in terms o f this chapter is the magnitude of the gender wage differential and to what ex­
tent it is explained by differing characteristics and/or by differing returns given the same charac­
teristics. Under certain assumptions the latter case has been interpreted in the literature as provid­
ing an estimate of gender wage discrimination.
The major objectives o f this chapter are, firstly, the estimation of individual level reduced 
form wage equations by gender which allows inferences to be made regarding returns to labour 
force experience, educational/vocational qualifications. Within this framework the effects o f oc­
cupation, industry and region can also be assessed. The second and more important objective is 
the estimation of a mean discrimination effect and an examination of how the discrimination ef-
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fect varies across individual characteristics.
The following section outlines th e  methodology employed. Section 4.3 describes the data 
set used and section 4.4, the estimation. Results based on estimating the reduced form wage equa­
tions appear in section 4.3 and section 4.6 provides some statistical tests o f the underlying 
specifications. The gender discrimination estimates are obtained in section 4.7 with conclusions 
presented in 4.8.
4.2 Methodology
The reduced form wage equations to be estimated are assumed to be derived from some 
underlying structural model of labour supply and demand. The widely applied reduced form 
Mincerian earnings function (see M incer (1974)) may be expressed as a function of schooling, 
post-schooling (or on-the-job) investment, and a vector o f personal characteristics. Algebraical­
ly, it may be given by (4.1) as:
ln(W .)-o , » M i  * W (4. 1)
where
Wi is the i*  individual's wage,
S, is years of schooling,
X, is labour force experience and
Zij is a vector of personal characteristics ( e.g. region of residence, occupation and industry etc.).
The theory predicts that in a long-run equilibrium with perfect labour mobility and perfect 
competition in the labour market, wages reflect an individual's characteristics in terms o f school­
ing. post-schooling investments and compensating differentials commensurate with differing job 
characteristics. In the context of firm specific training, human capital theory predicts short-run 
departures horn the above equilibrium condition. Individuals who obtain such training are 
awarded a remuneration initially above their marginal product during training and below it after 
its completion in order that firms may recoup their outlayed training costs. Because of this one 
might not expect young workers' wages to  be exclusively based on productivity variables particu-
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larly where firm specific training is involved.
Discriminatory practices can also be interpreted as inducing departures from a competitive 
equilibrium. As long as rigidities exist in such a way that the different sexes are paid different 
market prices for comparable productivity characteristics, then, in the long-run, females working 
in discriminating firms will be paid less than their marginal product. These discriminatory prac­
tices may take the form o f employer discrimination, employee discrimination (through monopo­
listic organisations e.g. trades unions) or consumer discrimination as explained in chapter two.
There exists an extensive literature on the calculation of the gender wage discrimination ef­
fec t The standard methodology employed was first suggested by Oaxaca (1973) and exploits the 
properties of index num bers19. The "index number" approach involves the estimation o f  separate 
gender wage or earnings equations. The calculation of the residual or unexplained difference 
between the two equations is assumed to provide an estimate of discrimination. However, since 
the effects of factors omitted from the equation are assigned to the residual its interpretation as an 
accurate measure o f wage discrimination may be inappropriate. Furthermore, since the estimated 
wage equations are, in general, reduced form it is impossible to disentangle demand and supply 
side effects. Since discrimination is ultimately a demand side phenomenon the interpretation of 
the residual as a discrimination effect relies on the strong assumption of supply side neutrality. 
The assignment of omitted factors and measurement error to the residual renders it impossible b 
priori to establish whether the residual estimate reflects an upper bound or a low er bound 
discrimination estimate. Despite these caveats the "index number" methodology has had an ex­
tensive application in the gender wage discrimination literature. The caveats outlined above 
should be borne in mind, however, when interpreting the results presented below.
Slightly modifying Becker (1971) the discrimination coefficient for each female20 individu­
al in the sample or population may be expressed as:
(tudiei of race and gender diKriminatioa that
in the (ample or population. However, under 
i would by definition be zero for each male in
Cain (1986) US
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(4.2)
where
D, is the i*  female’s discrimination coefficient.
W,° is the i*  female's non-discriminatory wage and 
W / is the «* female’s actual wage.
The female wage/ earnings equation may be expressed as:
where the X, 's  are vectors o f conditioning variables for each » individual and 0 is a vector of unk­
nown parameters with superscripts f  and m denoting female and male respectively.
Re-writing (4.2) gives:
If  in the absence of discrimination a male wage or earnings structure is assumed, 21 W f may be 
simulated for each female in the population or sample on the basis o f the P" coefficients and the 
female realisations of the X vector of characteristics. This simulated wage can under the assump­
tion set out above be interpreted as a non-discriminatory female wage. Taking logs of (4.5) and
11 The "index number- problem emerge* here. A» U well known the discrimination estimate i> contingent 
on w hat structure it  assumed to exist in the absence of discrimination. If one assumed a female structure, for 
example, a different estimate would emerge. This is further explored below.
(4.3)
The corresponding male wage/eamings equation is given by:
w r  -  e*rP" (4.4)
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using (4.3) and (4.4) :
liKl ♦ D.) -  X /p- -  X/p» (4.6)
or more compactly,
ln(l + D.) = X/ÀP (4.7)
where Afi « P" -  p* Thus for each individual in the population or sample a discrimination 
coefficient can be estimated. For the males this, will o f course, be zero but for the females the 
magnitude of the discrimination effect is determined by the differential in payment for a given set 
o f characteristics.
The vector of p  coefficients for both males and females can be estimated by OLS and as a 
summary statistic the discrimination coefficient can be evaluated at the means of the data. Thus 
(4.7) may be re-expressed as
where N  is the number of individuals in the sample. The empirical counterpart for the mean ex­
pression can now be expressed as:
where A0 is the difference between the male and female OLS coefficient estimates22. The calcu­
lation o f the asymptotic standard error follows Stewart (1987) where the variance may be ex­
pressed as:
var(y) -  X'VX''
¿ 2 X 1  ♦  D,) -  ¿ 2 S W (4.8)
¥  -  XfA0 (4.9)
where
23 D.the be interpreted u  e*1** -  1.
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V -  var($") + var^).
Since and $ r are estimated from separate non-overlapping samples no covariance exists 
between. The asymptotic standard error is thus given by Vvar(y). The resultant test statistic is 
asymptotically normally distributed23.
The remaining component o f the gender wage gap could be interpreted as that part ex­
plained by differing endownments. The two components are tied together in (4.10).
Aln(SV) -  AX$* + XrA0 (4.10)
where AX =* X“  -  Xf Thus the gender differential in the mean logarithm of wages can be decom­
posed into that part explained by the possession of differing endownments24 and that part ex­
plained by the payment of different prices for the same endownments. This latter part is, of 
course, the y  o f  (4.9).
Any genuine attempt at calculating the effects o f sex discrimination should focus on those 
males and females who could best be described as possessing a similarity in labour market attach­
ment. Greenhalgh (1980) attempts to estimate the magnitude of gender discrimination by refer­
ence to the unexplained differential between single men and single women. The underlying as­
sumption being made here is that both these groups are similar in terms of their labour market at­
tachment and hence in terms of their human capital investment. Though this may be interpreted 
as a relatively narrow wage discrimination definition a similar assumption to that o f Greenhalgh 
(1980) is followed here and in the subsequent empirical chapters.
A number o f problems are associated with the use o f the "index number" approach in calcu­
lating the effects of gender discrimination. Notable among these is the “index number” problem. 
This stems from the fact that the results based on the above approach are contingent on which
23 Thus the variances are calculated for the logarithm of one plus the discrimination coefficient and not for 
the discrimination coefficient itself. Furthermore, standard errors can be calculated for each individual in the 
sample.
24 The variance for this expression can be easily calculated as AXVAX' where V is given by var($").
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wage structure is initially assumed in the absence o f discrimination. The discrimination estimates 
reported here are based on an assumed male wage structure. This may be regarded as a relatively 
innocuous assumption since it could plausibly be argued that males are paid a wage that is non- 
discriminatory. The deterministic model outlined in chapter two could be invoked to support the 
validity o f this particular assumption.
As briefly alluded to above another problem lies in the fact that the estimated equations are 
reduced form. The discrimination estimate is taken as the unexplained differential that emerges 
after controlling for the standard set o f productivity and other relevant variables. The interpreta­
tion o f the unexplained residual differential as the pure discrimination effect is only valid if sup­
ply side factors e.g. female preferences for low paying occupations etc. do not impinge upon the 
unexplained differential. In the context of a reduced form equation it proves difficult to disentan­
gle the demand side discrimination from supply side preferences. The interpretation is also con­
tingent on a correctly specified equation and no measurement error in the explanatory variables 
that enter that equation, since, as surveyed in chapter two the effects of omitted variables and 
measurement error are assigned to the residual with a consequent effect on the discrimination 
coefficient.
Since the focus of this paper is wage discrimination, defined as differences in pay given oc­
cupations, the potential discriminatory effect that arises through occupational segregation is ig­
nored. This may be viewed as an unsatisfactory approach assuming, as it does, that there exists 
no discriminatory restrictions on access to certain occupations. It might be argued that if most 
gender discrimination is occupation based, then, the above framework is clearly lacking. Brown 
et al. (1980) argue that if the same characteristics that determine wages also determine occupa­
tion, then, the "index number" approach may be viewed as an appropriate methodology. In gen­
eral, they argue that this is not likely to be the case and propose controlling for occupations by in­
corporating an occupational attainment model into the analysis o f wage differentials as a method 
o f  overcoming this problem. This particular issue is more extensively explored in chapter six.
For the purposes of this study two "second best" alternatives are presented. Firstly, occupa­
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tions and industries are controlled for in the standard manner through the use of dummy vari­
ables. This approach implicitly treats the occupational distribution of males and females as exo­
genous and ignores the potential endogeneity o f occupational attainment Regardless of whether 
the potential endogeneity is a consequence o f  sample selection on the part o f employers or self­
selection on the part o f workers a potential bias is likely in the estimates. Furthermore, the inclu­
sion o f occupation dummies will also lead to an understatement of the returns to formal educa­
tional qualifications since access to certain occupations is contingent on possessing certain formal 
qualifications. Though this simplistic treatment o f occupations and industries is accepted as un­
satisfactory a failure to control for occupations or industries leads to a confusion between the ef­
fects o f discrimination and those of a compensating differential.
The second alternative is to estimate the wage equations excluding the occupation and in­
dustry dummies. The potential endogeneity problem associated with occupations and industries 
is thus by-passed in a rather ad hoc manner. T he consequent estimates o f sex discrimination are 
overstated but the returns to the formal educational qualifications are not under-stated as is the 
case when occupations are included23. Therefore, the results of section 4.S contain estimates ob­
tained from models that both include and exclude occupation and industry controls.
4.3 Data
The data used in this study are obtained from an EEC commissioned survey carried out by 
the Economic and Social Research Institute in 1982 and titled " Youth Employment and the Tran­
sition from Education to Working Life”. The target group in the survey were males and females 
between the ages of 15 and 24 who had left full-time education and were either actively engaged 
in employment or actively searching for work. The sub-sample employed in this analysis is com ­
posed o f those single individuals in the survey w ho defined their main economic activity as either 
working for payment or profit in non-agricultural activities. The total number o f such cases for 
which no missing values are present is 1022 (449 males and 573 females).
23 However, if educational qualification! are choaen endogenously there is latitude for iclectivity bias in 
this regard and the returns to educational qualifications (with or without occupation and industry dummies) 
are potentially biased.
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The variables used are:
Wage: The natural logarithm of the average net hourly wage (ln(W,)). This variable excludes ab­
normal hours worked and over-time payments.
Labour force experience: This was calculated as the aggregate duration o f all jobs (including the 
current job) held by the i*  individual. The unit o f measurement used for the experience variable 
is, in this case, years. Since this is a precisely calculated variable the usual errors-in-variables 
problem that characterises similar studies does not exist in regard to this particular variable. 
Educational Qualiflcatk>ns:Three (0,1) dummies for the highest educational qualifications ob­
tained by the individual. T hese qualifications are the
(a) Intermediate Certifícate,
(b) Leaving Certifícate,
(c) University Degree or its equivalent.
Individuals who have commercial course diplomas are allocated to either the intermediate or the 
leaving certifícate category depending on whether they possess one or other o f these public exam­
inations. In terms of estimation the obvious reference group in this case are those individuals in 
the sample who have no such qualifications.
Vocational Qualifications:
(a) A (0,1) group certificate dummy variable adopting a value o f 1 if  the individual possesses 
such a certificate, 0  otherwise.
(b) A (0,1) apprenticeship dummy variable adopting a value of 1 if  the individual successfully 
completed an apprenticeship scheme, 0  otherwise.
(c) A (0,1) basic training qualification dummy variable adopting a value o f 1 if the individual 
successfully completed such a qualification, 0  otherwise. These training qualifications refer to 
formal instruction outside the context of the educational system leading to formal qualifications. 
Promotion: A (0.1) promotion dummy adopting a value of 1 if  the individual received promotion 
on the cunent job, 0  otherwise.
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Firm  Size: Four (0,1) dummy variables designed to capture the effects o f variation in firm or or­
ganisation size. The four categories are firms with less than fifteen individuals (including the 
proprietor), firms with fifteen and over but less than fifty individuals (including the proprietor), 
firms with fifty and over but less than a hundred individuals (including the proprietor), and firms 
with a hundred or over individuals (including the proprietor). The dummy variable adopts a 
value of 1 if  the individual falls into any of these mutually exclusive categories, 0 otherwise. The 
reference group in terms of this set of dummy variables is the first category of less than fifteen in­
dividuals. Obviously, the coding of this variable relates only to those individuals at work.
Urban: A (0,1) urban dummy variable adopting a value of 1 if  the individual resides in a town of 
1000 or more, 0  otherwise.
Industry: Eight (0,1) industry dummies which are:
(a) Energy, water, extraction and processing of non-energy-producing minerals and derived pro­
ducts and chemicals.
(b) Metal manufacturing (mechanical, electrical and instrument engineering).
(c) Other manufacturing industries (food, drink, tobacco, leather, footwear and clothing, textiles, 
timber and wooden furniture, paper and paper products, printing and publishing, rubber and plas­
tics).
(d) Building and civil engineering.
(e) Distributive trades, hotels, catering and repairs.
(0  Transport and communication.
(g) Banking and finance, insurance, business services and renting.
(h) Other services (public administration, education, research and development, medical and oth­
er health services, government recreational services and personal services).
In terms of estimation the reference group for this set of dummies is the distributive trades indus­
try group.
Occupation: Eight (0,1) occupational dummies which are:
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(a) Professional,
(b) Self-Employed ( employs others) and Managers,
(c) Salaried employees, i* . insurance and financial agents, auctioneers and valuers, ships’ 
officers and pilots etc.
(d) Intermediate non-manual,
(e) Other non-manual,
(f) Skilled manual workers,
(g) Semi-skilled manual workers,
(h) Unskilled.
In terms of estimation the reference group for this set o f dummies is the unskilled category. 
Region: Five regional dummies which are:
(a) Dublin County.
(b) North-West (Counties Sligo. Mayo. Roscommon, Donegal, Leitrim. Monaghan, Cavan and 
Galway).
(c) Southern (Counties Cork, Waterford, Limerick, Kerry, Tipperary and Clare).
(d) Midlands (Counties Carlow, Laois, Kilkenny, Kildare, Westmeath and Offaly).
(e) Rest o f Leinster (Counties Wicklow, Wexford and Louth).
In terms of estimation the reference group for this set o f dummies is the North-West region.
Appendix A1 provides information on the means o f the continuous variables and the pro­
portions o f individuals in the relevant binary variable categories etc. for males and females.
4.4 Estimation
Linear equations are estimated separately for both single males and females in the sample. 
In the estimation o f standard wage functions quadratic terms in labour force experience are intro­
duced allowing for the effects o f such experience to vary over its own range. In the context o f the 
labour market for young workers it may be unreasonable to impose b  priori such a restrictive
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fiinctional form on the data. In view of this, linear splines (following Stewart and Wallis (1981), 
pp.201-204) are constructed from the labour force experience variable. This allows for returns to 
experience to vary over different ranges of an individual’s labour force experience. The choice of 
the appropriate nodes for the linear splines was determined by using standard F-tests. These tests 
suggest for the male equations the inclusion o f two linear splines, one for less than or equal to 
five years o f experience, the other for more than five years o f experience26.
In general, the estimating equation may be expressed as27:
ln(W,) is  the natural logarithm of the net hourly wage defined above. EXP1 and EXP2 are the 
linear splines in experience. The labour force experience variable is defined as above and is pre­
cisely calculated in contrast to the proxy constructs used in Oaxaca (1973) and Greenhalgh 
(1980) which could be interpreted as possessing a greater potential for measurement error. DUM­
MIES represents the controlling educational qualifications, firm size, promotion, occupational, in­
dustrial and region of residence dummies and u, is an error term for which assumptions are made 
below.
Alternatively, experience may be expressed in terms o f (0,1) dummies. Eight such dum­
mies are also constructed from the experience variable for each of the eight potential years o f la­
bour force experience. Though the results o f this analysis are not recorded extensively here, this 
alternative specification is used for purposes of comparison in terms o f the diagnostics of section 
4.6.
26 The null hypo th em  in this c u e  is  the male equation strictly Unear in experience. Thi* nuU ii (ejected 
in favour o f  a  piece-wise linear alternative having a five year iplit by an F s tan su c  o f  5.256 distributed as 
F(1,417). T h e  associated critical value is 3.840 at the 5% level o f significance. For the female equation the 
null hypothesis o f  linearity in experience cannot be rejected in favour of piece-wise linearity with a five year 
split. The com puted F( 1,541) is 3.170. The vaUdity of choosing a similar cut-off point for both males and fe­
males may. therefore, be justifiably questioned. However, in term s of this analysis, it is necessary far obvi­
ous reasons to  estimate comparable m ale and female equations.
27 Since estimation is based on those individuals who are currently working another potential selectivity 
bias problem  should be noted. However, this w u  not found to  be a  problem as one would expect in a sample 
o f young single workers.
(4.11)
where
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Retum ing to equation (4.11) it should be noted that the standard assumptions are made con­
cerning the error terms:
(i) E(u,) -  0  (an assumed mean o f zero).
(ii) E(iij*) =  o 2 (constant variance).
(iii) E(u< X i ) = 0 (the explanatory variables are assumed to be exogenous and omitted variables are 
assumed orthogonal to the included ones).
(iv) The parameters are assumed constant
(v) u, is assumed normally distributed.
T he violation of the first assumption may occur through equation mis-specilication thus in­
ducing b ias in the coefficient estimates. Since these coefficient estimates are used in quantifying 
the magnitude of discrimination the correct specification of the equation is of crucial importance. 
Biases m ay lead to inappropriate conclusions in regard to the nature and magnitude of any 
discrimination element.
A prio ri one would expect violation o f the second assumption. In the presence o f heteros- 
cedasticity OLS provides unbiased coefficient estimates but a biased and inconsistent covariance 
matrix estim ator. Since consistent standard errors are required for hypothesis testing White’s 
(1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator is employed. The White estima­
tor possesses the appropriate asymptotic properties for hypothesis testing.
D eparture from the assumption of normality must also be viewed with some concern. Such 
a departure may be indicative o f some form of mis-specification and may also vitiate the use of 
standard statistical tests ( e g. the t-statistics and the F-statistics etc. ) which are based on the 
normal distribution. Nevertheless, the OLS estimator is relatively robust to departures from nor­
mality.
In view  o f the foregoing and the need for some confidence in the results, section 4.6 con­
tains a num ber of diagnostic tests that statistically test for model mis-speciflcation. heteroscedas- 
ticity and the underlying assumption o f normality.
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4.5 Results
Tables 4.1 to 4.4 contain the male and fem ale regression estimates for the single individuals 
based on equation (4.11). The first two tables contain estimates based on the inclusion o f occupa­
tion and industry dummies. The latter two tables contain estimates based on the exclusion of 
these controls. For purposes o f comparison O LS and White-adjusted standard errors are reported 
in these tables with inference based only on the W hite standard errors.
Since the dependent variable is in logarithmic form and the explanatory variables are either 
in levels (the splines) or expressed as (0,1) dum m ies, some caution must be exercised in their 
respective interpretations. The coefficients o f the experience variables (the splines) are defined as 
the proportional returns to having an additional year of labour force experience. The dummy 
coefficients possess a slightly different interpretation. The estimates, themselves, give the dif­
ferential effect o f being in the included category relative to the excluded categoiy ( i.e. the refer­
ence category). Since the dependent variable is expressed in logarithmic terms, the dummy 
coefficient is interpreted as e*'.
As tables 4.1 and 4.2 indicate, the returns to  labour force experience do indeed vary over an 
individual’s work experience. This is confirmed by  examining the coefficients on the splines in 
both equations and testing to ascertain whether they are statistically different from each other. 
For both equations this is found to be the case28. The actual annual returns to labour force ex­
perience are found to be higher for the males in the first five yean, 7.5% as compared to 6.3% for 
the females. For the subsequent y ean  the fall is m ore dramatic for the males declining to around 
1% on average for the yean after the fifth year o f  experience. The decline for the females is less 
dramatic. They record returns o f 2.5% on average for each year subsequent to the fifth. In both 
cases, however, the higher returns to on the job training in the early y ean  (leading to a steeper 
wage profile in the initial yean o f experience) is a finding compatible with the predictions o f hu­
man capital theory.
(where • • •  denotes 1% and • •  denotes 5% significance). «« “ I»« equaUoa 2.35
V
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The educational dummy coefficients allow for some conclusions to be drawn concerning re­
turns to educational qualifications. It should be borne in mind that the inclusion of the occupa­
tional dummies leads to an understatement of the returns to the formal educational qualifications. 
It is clear from the results o f tables 4.1 and 4.2 that possessing an Intermediate Certificate as 
one’s highest qualification has an effect that is not significantly different from zero for either 
males or females. The returns to  a Leaving Certificate are on average higher for males than for 
females, however, in both equations the coefficients are neither well determined nor statistically 
significant from zero. On the other hand, returns to a university degree or its equivalent are quite 
large and in the case of the males statistically significant. In this case the returns are o f the order 
o f 33.6% as compared to the females' 24.8%. These relatively large effects should be treated 
with some caution given the relatively small number o f individuals in each category. In general, 
therefore, males appear to gain more from educational qualifications in relation to unqualified 
males than do females in relation to their unqualified counterparts. This is in direct contrast to  
the Greenhalgh (1980) findings in regard to returns to educational qualifications. In a sub sample 
of single males and single females under the age o f thirty derived horn the 1973 UK General 
Household Survey (GHS) Greenhalgh found that the returns to educational qualifications were, in 
general, higher on average for the single females. The reverse findings obtained here may be in­
dicative of traditional discriminatory practices operating within the Irish educational system 
which affect the subject uptake o f  females at secondary and hence tertiary level.
At this point it would be o f  interest to contrast these results with returns based on the 
specification excluding occupation and industry dummies. The exclusion o f this set o f control 
variables provides a more realistic interpretation o f the returns since the possession of formal 
educational qualifications is a pre-requisite for admission to certain occupations. As Greenhalgh 
(1980) points out the inclusion o f  occupation dummies leads to an understatement of the returns 
to these qualifications.
For both males and females (Tables 4.3 and 4.4, respectively) the returns to a Leaving 
Certificate and a university degree are more well determined than in the larger specification o f  
Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The annual returns to a male holder of either a Leaving Certificate or a
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university degree is 8.5% and 42.3% respectively. The comparable fem ale figures are 7.2% and 
32.1%. In both cases these are greater in magnitude than those from the larger specification with 
again the female returns being on average lower than the males.
The use of educational qualifications as opposed to years in education (as some studies have 
employed) is based on a desire to control for the qualitative aspects o f  years in education. How­
ever, specifications using years in post-compulsory education as an explanatory variable in the 
wage equation have also been estimated. Though the full set o f results is not reported here the 
findings are broadly consistent with those obtained from the reported specifications. The returns 
to an additional year in post-compulsory education for males and females, when industries and 
occupations are included, are 4.3% and 1.4% respectively. The com parable returns when exclud­
ing these controls are 5.2% and 2.3%.
The above discussion concerning the returns to education is contingent on the assumption 
that any variables omitted from the specification are orthogonal to the included ones. In terms of 
education and unobserved ability this may not necessarily be the case. I f  ability is positively 
correlated with education and determines wages then OLS yields an upward biased estimate of 
the returns to education29. Taubman (1976) using US survey data on tw ins (in an attempt to con­
trol for environmental and genetic factors) found that failing to control fo r ability causes a large 
upward bias on the educational coefficients. Hausman and Taylor (1981) exploit the use o f US 
panel data to econometrically control for individual-specific unobservable effects which are as­
sumed correlated with explanatory variables in their wage equation. In m arked contrast to Taub­
man (1976) their empirical results suggest that econometric methods w hich control for correla­
tion with the latent individual effects increase the schooling coefficient On the other hand, 
Chowdhury and Nickell (1985) also use US panel data and extend the Hausman and Taylor 
(1981) econometric methodology but are unable to obtain any precise estim ates for the schooling 
coefficients. The empirical evidence is clearly divided as to whether controlling for ability leads 
to an increase or a decrease in the returns to education. Since no attempt is  made in this study to
29 This follows directly from the form ula for omitted variables outlined in Yule and K endall (1930).
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control for unobservables the cross-sectional estimates on returns to education reported here 
should be interpreted in a cautionary context
Returning now to the remaining results o f Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The effects o f the vocational 
training qualifications are also recorded in tables 4.1 and 4.2. The three examined are the Group 
Certificate, apprenticeship qualifications and basic training qualifications30. In all three cases the 
female coefficients are badly determined and statistically insignificant This is in part due to the 
small number of females in these particular categories. In terms o f the males the returns to the 
above are 5.3%, 6.5% and 7.1% respectively.
Variables controlling for firm size were also allowed to enter the analysis. It might be ar­
gued that this variable acts as a proxy for unionisation. The larger the firm size the more likely is 
the possibility o f union influence in regard to, for example, pay31. The reference group in terms 
o f this set o f dummies is firms with less than fifteen individuals. Thus, the coefficients of these 
dummies should be interpreted in relation to this reference group. It’s  evident from the results 
that being employed in a firm with more than one hundred employees has a large wage effect re­
lative to a firm with less than fifteen. The effect is o f the order of 25.0% for both males and fe­
males. One surprising feature o f this set o f results is the fact that the wage effects for males 
working in the medium sized category o f firm is less than the effects associated with working in 
the smaller sized category. This finding is not however repeated for females where the effects are 
found to increase directly with firm size.
Promotion on-the-job is also deemed as having a positive and statistically significant effect 
on wages. In terms of their magnitude the effects are not much different across the sexes record­
ing returns of 7.7% and 7.0% for the males and females respectively.
The inclusion of occupation, industry and regional dummies facilitates a ranking of these 
categories in terms of their effects on wages. The top occupational category for males is salaried
30 The basic training is the initial training which provides an individual with the means to  exercise a  par­
ticular trade or profession. This might include, for example, basic training programmes which enable an indi­
vidual to  become an electrician, carpenter, computer programmer e tc . Thus, the variable used here records 
any qualifications received for this particular purpose.
11 I t could, o f  course, be the case that large firms pay higher wages in order to discourage unionisation.
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employees. The differential for this category relative to the unskilled reference group is o f the 
order o f 12.3%. The salaried employees category also ranks top for the females. The estimated 
differential between this group and the unskilled reference group is of the order of 42.8%. 
Skilled manual workers are anchored near the bottom o f both the male and female occupational 
rankings. This may be viewed in terms of the him  specific human capital theory alluded to 
above. It might be argued that skilled workers in the youth labour market are in receipt of a  rela­
tively low wage in order that firms can recoup their cost outlays associated with training and this 
may explain the poor ranking for both sexes.
The industry rankings indicate that males in public administration are better off than in any 
other industry. The differential here relative to the distributive trades reference group is o f the 
order o f  11.1%. The top-ranking industry for females is the banking and insurance category. In­
dustries with a large concentration of new foreign firms, e.g. those in chemical type industries, 
feature prominently in the top half o f the industry rankings supporting the notion that jobs in 
these industries are relatively well paid for both males and females32.
Reference to the coefficients on the urban and regional dummies suggest some dramatic re­
gional differences in wages. Residing in an urban area with one thousand or more individuals is 
recorded as having a statistically significant effect for both males and females, 10.2% and 6.2% 
respectively. Furthermore, being resident in Dublin county relative to the North-West is worth a 
differential o f nearly 13.3% for the males and 10.4% for the females with the most disadvantaged 
region in wage terms being the reference group itself, the North-West. This finding reflects the 
more favourable labour market conditions obtaining in Dublin relative to the rest o f the country 
and could be attributed to the large number o f public administration employees in this area. This 
finding is resonant o f one of the Walsh and Whelan (1976) findings.
In general, the remaining results that feature in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 are broadly in agreement 
with those obtained from the larger specification and require no further comment. 12
12 The industry and occupation dummies ate statistically tested on the basis o f F-tests far both the nude 
and female equations. The F-test associated with the male equation is 1.989 •*  and that o f  the female equa­
tion 4.33« • • •  (where • • •  denotes 1% and • •  denotes 3 »  significance)
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Tabic 4.1.
Variable Coefficient OLS s.e. White s.e
Constant 0.0219 0.0977 0.1138
Experience (5 or less yrs.) 0.0748*** 0.0132 0.0158
Experience (more than 5 yrs.) 0.0125 0.0186 0.0131
Intermediate Certificate -0.0406 0.0438 0.0406
Leaving  Certificate 0.0424 0.0508 0.0475
University Degree 0.2899** 0.1160 0.1425
G roup  Certificate 0.0517 0.0489 0.0554
Apprenticeship 0.0631* 0.0400 0.0370
B asic Training Qualification 0.0688* 0.0364 0.0353
15 £  Firm < 50 0.1664*** 0.0479 0.0534
50  ü  Firm < 100 0.0968* 0.0587 0.0528
F irm  2 100 0.2260*** 0.0422 0.0474
Prom otion on Job 
O enipitinns
0.0743*** 0.0323 0.0320
Professional 0.0531 0.1081 0.1094
Self-employed -0.0697 0.1110 0.1987
Salaried employees 0.1157 0.1386 0.1363
Intermediate non-manual -0.1867 0.0847 0.1179
O th er non-manual -0.2174* 0.0961 0.1112
Skilled manual -0.1509 0.0778 0.1035
Semi-skilled manual 
In d u stries
-0.1188 0.0950 0.1069
B uilding & Engineering 0.0753 0.0538 0.0491
Transport & Communication 0.0927 0.0705 0.0615
B anking & Insurance -0.0561 0.0805 0.0555
P ublic  Admin, etc. 0.1055 0.0648 0.0803
M etal Manufacturing 0.0492 0.0568 0.0575
O th er Manufacturing -0.0221 0.0540 0.0563
Extractive & Chemicals 0.0886 0.0726 0.0648
D ublin County 0.1270*** 0.0573 0.0490
Southern Counties 0.1112** 0.0532 0.0521
M idlands Counties 0.0319 0.0571 0.0624
Leinsterfexcl. Dublin) 0.1334* 0.0681 0.0686
U rban
R 2
Standard Error 
N um ber of Cases
0.0968***
0.312
0.319
449
0.0394 0.0362
Statistical Inference Is based on the W hite standsrd errors. Two-tailed
test o f  significance are employed and denotes significance at the 1%
T able 4.2.
Variable Coefficient OLS s.e. White s.e.
Constant -0.0611 0.1884 0.0738
Experience (5 or less yrs.) 0.0631*** 0.0078 0.0077
Experience (more than 5 yrs.) 0 .0247 0.0176 0.0165
Intermediate Certificate -0.0653 0.0419 0.0422
Leaving Certificate -0.0194 0.0417 0.0393
University Degree 0 .2218 0.1194 0.2261
Group Certificate -0.0524 0.0837 0.1143
Apprenticeship -0.0111 0.0521 0.0576
Basic Training Qualification 0 .0017 0.0244 0.0244
15S Firm < 5 0 0.1385*** 0.0348 0.0367
50S Firm < 100 0.1491*** 0.0428 0.0449
Firm i  100 0.2222*** 0.0293 0.0302
Promotion on Job 0.0675*** 0.0220 0.0244
Professional 0 .0640 0  1896 0.0765
Self-employed 0.1227 0.2018 0.1495
Salaried employees 0.3567* 0.2351 0.2027
Intermediate non-manual 0.0534 0.1836 0.0594
Other non-manual -0.1122 0.1863 0.0815
Skilled manual -0.0590 0.1880 0.0664
Semi-skilled manual -0.0688 0.1830 0.0531
liwtiiatriM
Building & Engineering -0.0283 0.0914 0.0888
Transport & Communication 0 0 6 8 2 0 0 5 8 6 0.0487
Banking & Insurance 0.1594*** 0.0349 0.0350
Public Admin, etc. 0.1090*** 0.0338 0.0343
Metal Manufacturing 0.1213*** 0.0501 0.0465
Other Manufacturing 0.0289 0.0431 0.0400
Extractive & Chemicals 0.1382*** 0.0648 0.0436
Dublin County 0.0992* • • 0.0397 0.0354
Southern Counties 0.0647* 0.0380 0.0350
Midlands Counties 0.0498 0.0459 0.0392
Leinaterfexcl. Dublin) 0.0051 0.0551 0.0547
Urban 0.0600** 0.0282 0.0270
F* 0.391
Standard Error 0.247
Number of Cases 573
Statistical Inference Is based on the W hite standard errors. Two-tailed
test o f significance are employed and • • •  denotes significance at the 1%
u un ut* am,____
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Tabic 4 J .
Male W age Equation Estimates (exd. Occupations & Industries )
Variable Coefficient OLS s.e. W hite s.e.
Constant -0.1059 0.0650 0 6 9 0 0
Experience (5 or less yrs.) 0.0808* •• 0.0131 0.0157
Experience (more than 5 yrs.) 0.0080 0.0188 0.0132
Intermediate Certificate -0.0287 0.0439 0.0426
Leaving Certificate 0.0815* 0.0475 0.0486
University Degree 0.3528*** 0.116 0.1335
Group Certificate 0.0518 0.0491 0.0562
Apprenticeship 0.0465 0.0389 0.0349
Basic Training Qualification 0.0709* * 0.0355 0.0327
15 s  Finn < 50 0.1485*** 0.0474 0.0520
5 0 s  Fitm < 100 0.1063** 0.0568 0.0523
Firm i  100 0.2289*** 0.0377 0.0395
Promotion on Job 0.0619** 0.0319 0.0298
Dublin County 0.1239** 0.0566 0.0515
Southern Counties 0.1236** 0.0526 0.0542
Midlands Counties 0.0505 0.0574 0.0638
Leinster(excl. Dublin Co.) 0.1287* 0.0687 0.0692
Urban 0.0954*** 0.0396 0.0357
R 2 0.290
Standard Error 0.324
Number of Cases 449
Statistical inference is based on the White standard errors. Two-tailed
test o f significance are employed and •* •  denotes significance at the 1%
level, • •  at tbe 5% level and * at the 10% level.
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Female Waae Equation
Table 4,4.
Estimates (excl. Occupations and Industries)
Variable Coefficient OLS s.e. White s.e.
Constant -0.0544 0.0575 0.0605
Experience (5 or less yrs.) 0.0643*** 0.0079 0.0076
Experience (more than 5 yrs.) 0.0298* 0.0178 0.0173
Intermediate Certificate -0.0236 0.0420 0.0429
Leaving Certificate 0.0697* 0.0390 0.0396
University Degree 0.2784 0.1212 0.2369
Group Certificate -0.0279 0.0861 0.1380
Apprenticeship -0.0544 0.0513 0.0607
Basic Training Qualification 0.0293 0.0242 0.2406
15S Firm < 5 0 0.1243*** 0.0351 0.0372
50 s  Firm < 100 0.1364*** 0.0430 0.0447
Firm 2 100 0.2300*** 0.0281 0.0284
Promotion on Job 0.0736*** 0.0226 0.0214
Dublin County 0.1287*** 0.0405 0.0363
Southern Counties 0.0677* 0.0392 0.0381
Midlands Counties 0.0477 0.0474 0.0428
Leinster(excl. Dublin) 0.0114 0.0367 0.0375
Urban 0.0599** 0.0290 0.0277
R2 0.340
Standard Error 0.256
Number o f Cases 573
Statistical inference is based on the White standard errors. Two-tailed  
test o f significance are employed and • • •  denotes significance at the 1%
Hals ** j | M  gft isrti i l  * tttot m  UnL______ _ _
4.6 Diagnostic Tests
The existence of specification error in any of the above equations has serious consequences 
for the coefficient estimates and hence the discrimination coefficients as estimated below. This 
would be particularly so if the misspecification were due to the om ission o f relevant variables. 
The prime example in the literature o f such an omitted variable is the motivation for work or abil­
ity which does not explicitly enter the estimating equations.
In order to have confidence in the discrimination estimates it is important to test the under­
lying equations. The purpose of this section is to present an array o f  diagnostics that explicitly 
test the underlying assumptions of the estimated models. These assumptions are the standard
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oncs of the classical linear regression model as referred to in section 4.4. The error terms are as­
sumed to have a zero mean, a constant variance and are normally distributed. The statistical tests 
employed here provide tests o f these assumptions.
Tables 4.S and 4.6 report the diagnostics’ results for the male and female equations respec­
tively. For each sex four equations are estimated and compared in terms o f these diagnostics. In 
these tables (A) and (C) refer to equation (4.11) with and without the occupation and industry 
dummies respectively. The results o f these estimated models have been the subject o f extensive 
discussion in section 4.5. (B) and (D) refer to an alternative version of equation (4.11) that uses 
dummy variables for the different years o f labour force experience instead of splines. The former 
includes occupation and industry dummies and the latter excludes them33.
The first diagnostic to be examined is the J-test developed by Davidson and MacKinnon 
(1981) and suggested by the authors as a specification test. It is a non-nested test procedure and 
is interpreted in the context o f augmenting the conditional mean (see Pagan (1984)). The proxy 
variable used in this case is based on predictions from the alternative or competing model. The 
validity o f the null hypothesis (H ,) is evaluated in terms of the t-statistic associated with the 
proxy variable. If H« is true, the coefficient on the proxy variable will not be significantly dif­
ferent from zero. This can be tested by a simple t-statistic. As Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) 
point out the t-statistic which is valid for testing the truth o f H . is not valid for testing the truth of 
H|. Thus the roles o f H . and lit are reversed and the test is carried out again. Thus it is possible 
that both hypotheses may be rejected or both not rejected or one not rejected over the other. The 
J-tests recorded in tables 4.5 and 4.6 are the t-statistics associated with the proxy variables gen­
erated from the competing model. The null hypothesis alternates between the treatment of the la­
bour force experience variable in terms o f splines or in terms of dummy variables. The results 
provide unambiguous support in favour o f the specification using splines for the male equations. 
The female results are, however, more ambiguous. In general, however, one would expect the 
continuous spline variables to dominate the discrete dummy variables and the J-test results sim­
33 Though the coefficient 
able on requeat.
o f  these
- 7 8 -
ply confirm this.
The second specification diagnostic is the RESET test due to Ramsey (1969). As Pagan 
(1984) points out, it again can be interpreted in terms of augmenting the conditional mean with a 
proxy variable (or proxy variables) assumed to be closely correlated with the omitted part of the 
conditional mean. The proxy variables, in this case, are based on the predicted values o f the 
dependent variable from the original specification raised to a number o f arbitrary powers. Simu­
lation studies suggest that the optimal number o f powers is four. The RESET test then reduces to 
an F-test o f the significance from zero of the proxy variables. The success of the test is strongly 
dependent on the closeness of the correlation between these proxy constructs and the omitted part 
o f the conditional mean34.
In terms o f the male equations the null hypothesis that there is no omitted part of the condi­
tional mean cannot be rejected for two of the four estimated versions at the 1% level of 
significance. For the female equation the same null hypothesis is decisively rejected for all the es­
timated versions suggesting some form of potential mis-specification in the female equation.
The results o f the RESET tests again establish the necessity for exercising extreme caution 
in the interpretation o f  discrimination estimates. It is obvious that regardless of which wage 
structure is assumed in the absence of sex discrimination the potential bias in the female 
coefficients will impinge upon the discrimination estimates. It should also be pointed out, in the 
light o f the discussion in section 4.5, that the estimated returns to education and work experience 
for the female equations may also be rendered somewhat dubious.
The third diagnostic focuses on the assumption of constant variance33. The heteroscedasti- *1
M The k m  was originally described in terms of BLUS residuals by Ramsey (1969) but it was subsequent­
ly shown by Ramsey and Schmidt (1976) that this was equivalent to carrying out die above F-test in terms of 
the OLS residuals.
1S It m ight be argued that the appropriate test statistic to  use in this context i t  one derived from W hite's 
(1982, a) information matrix le s t This information matrix test provides a  lest of the information matrix iden­
tity. Since LR tests. LM tests and Wald tests (which are related to F tests and t-iests) are derived under the 
assumption that this identity holds. White (1982, a) suggests that the information matrix test should be used 
as a preliminary lest to inference. Hall (1987) provides a  decomposition of the information matrix test into 
the sum o f  three independent X2 variates. The first o f  which is White s (1980) direct test for hetrroscedasnci 
ty with the remaining tw o components independent test statistics for skewness and kunosis. However, the 
computation o f  the White heseroscedasticity test involves, for the largest specification reported here ( that of 
table 4.10), the estimation o f  an auxiliary regression with a  prohibitive number of explanatory variables. In 
view o f  this the mote easily computable Bit  use b-Pagan LM  test is instead used.
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city test em ployed here is the Lagrangean Multiplier (LM) statistic developed by Breusch and 
Pagan (1979). This again may be interpreted in the context of augmenting a conditional moment 
of the original specification. In this case the conditional variance. The potential heteroscedastici- 
ty to be tested  is of the form :
a,2 = G, a (4.12)
where
a?  * the variance and
G< * is a m atrix  o f variables, the first column o f which is ones. In the context of this study the G 
matrix is sim ply  composed of all the variables from the original specification.
The test statistic is calculated by first obtaining the OLS residuals from the original equation. 
The squared residuals from this equation are then deflated by the Maximum Likelihood estimate 
of the error variance from the original regression. This newly constructed variable is then re­
gressed on the G variables and the actual test statistic is half the explained sum of squares from 
this regression. The resultant LM statistic is a x 2 variate with k -  1 degrees of freedom where k is 
the number o f  parameters from the original equation.
The resu lts of the Breusch-Pagan tests indicate a general rejection o f the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity for most of the estimated equations. Since the standard errors employed in the 
analysis are the White adjusted standard errors this need not present a problem in the context of 
inference. T h e  decisive rejection may be related more to  mis-specification. However, due to the 
limitations o f  the data set employed obtaining a handle on a more appropriately specified model 
has proved alm ost impossible. The models estimated represent the best description of the data 
given this s e t o f  limitations.
A further test also aimed at detecting mis-specification has been proposed by Kiefer and 
Salmon (1983). Like the RESET test its advantage lies in its ease of computation but unlike the 
RESET test it  focuses on departures from the normality assumption. This specification test is 
based on an Edgeworth expansion and is written as :
s -  t <Ai - W  + £-<H. - «|ki * V (4.13)
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where N  is the number of observations and the fa 's  are the estimated sample moments based on 
the residuals. Following Davidson and MacKinnon (1985) the estimated sample moments are 
standardised by the Maximum Likelihood estimate o f  the standard error from the original regres­
sion. The test statistic is composed of the sum o f tw o  asymptotically independent x2 variates 
each with one degree of freedom. The test statistic has the advantage that attention can ex­
clusively focus on either the third moment (the first part o f (4.13)) or the fourth moment (the 
second part o f (4.13)) or both. Thus one can examine the null hypothesis o f skewness which has 
a z? distribution independently of the null hypothesis o f  kurtosis (which also has a %f distribu­
tion).
In terms o f the Kiefer-Salmon normality test the female equations perform better than the 
male equations. Skewness is upheld for all the estimated female equations but rejected for two of 
the four male equations. The imposition of the restrictions on the occupation and industry dum­
mies leads to an increase in the skewness and kurtosis tes t values. This is as one would expect if 
these restrictions are invalidly imposed. The joint test o f  normality is. however, clearly rejected 
for all equations.
The violation of the normality assumption has clear implications for the reliability of the 
classical statistical tests (t-tests and F-tests) which are based on the normal distribution. The 
coefficients, however, remain unbiased. Accepting this, however, the violation o f the kurtosis as­
sumption may be again reflecting some underlying mis-speciflcadon. In terms of the normal dis­
tribution the fourth moment is equal to three times the square of the second moment (the vari­
ance). The decisive rejection o f kurtosis may thus be suggestive of some underlying heteros- 
cedasticity again supporting the findings of the Breusch-Pagan test.
The performance of the estimated equations in term s o f the diagnostics is clearly mixed. In 
view of this, caution should be exercised in the interpretation and use o f the parameter estimates. 
This cautionary note should be borne particularly in m ind in the context o f the following section.
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Diagnostic
Table 4.5.
s  for Male Equations.
Test (A) (B) (C) (D)
J-test 1.354 2.355 * 1.535 2.827 ••
RESET 2.765 • 3.377 • • 1.396 1.203
Breusch-Pagan 171.053 •* 187.555 • • 95.101 113.132
Skewness 1.721 2.093 5.412* 5.695*
Kurtosis 788.880 •* 686.165 ** 862.732 •• 783.078 •*
(A) and (C) refer to the estimated equations, using splines in 
experience, including and excluding occupation and industry 
dummies respectively. (B) and (D) refer to the estimated equa­
tions, using dummies in experience, including and excluding 
occupation and industry dum m ies respectively. The non-nested 
J-test value is interpreted as a  t-statistic. The values for RESET 
mis-specification test is interpreted as an F-test with three and 
N  -  k  degrees o f freedom. T he Breusch-Pagan test for heteros- 
cedasticity is interpreted as a  x2 variate with degrees of freedom 
equal to the number of parameters estimated in the original equa­
tions less one. The normality tests of skewness and kurtosis are 
based on the Keifer-Salmon test statistic and are interpreted as x2 
variates with one degree o f  freedom each. ** and * denotes 
significance at the 1% and 5%  level of significance respectively.
T .W .4 .*
Diagnostic, for Female Equation._______  _ __
Test (A) (B) (C) (D)
J-test 1.429 1.483 2.304* 1.041
RESET 8.698 •* 8.084 • • 5.582 •* 4.760 • •
Breusch-Pagan 149.649 * 156.552* 112.673 112.528
Skewness 0.004 0.001 0.553 0.853
Kurtosis 88.426 ** 78.011 *• 169.106** 142.407 *•
See Table 4.5 for a füll description of these tests. ** and •
denotes significance at the 1% and 5% level o f significance
respectively.
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4.7 Discrimination Estimates
Section 4.2 outlined in detail the methodology to be adopted in estimating the wage effects 
o f sex discrimination. A male wage structure is assumed to best characterise the conditions that 
obtain in the absence o f gender wage discrimination. Estimates o f the explained and unexplained 
portions of the differential are calculated for the models including occupation and industry con­
trols and for those excluding these controls. Standard errors are also calculated for both parts of 
the observed gender differential.
The observed gender wage differential in logarithms is 0.1037 at the mean suggesting that 
young males earn on average 10.9% more than young females. The unexplained part due to 
differing characteristics ( XfA$ ) is 0.0305. This constitutes a little under 30% o f the observed 
differential. Thus the greater proportion o f the wage differential is explained by the possession of 
differing characteristics with a relatively small amount due to the presence of unexplained factors 
which is taken, in terms o f this analysis, to be wage discrimination. The asymptotic standard er­
ror associated with 0.0305 is 0.0389 suggesting that the unexplained differential is not statistical­
ly significant. That part o f the observed differential explained by characteristics ( AX$" ) is 
0.0732 and its associated standard error is 0.0300. The explained differential is clearly different 
from zero at the 5% level of statistical significance.
Examining the average may provide a misleading picture o f how the differential behaves 
across different types or categories of individuals. Following Stewart (1983) table 4 .7  contains 
differential calculations based on a male wage structure for different stylised female workers. 
The first such stylised individual falls into the base group ( l.e. has an amount o f labour force ex­
perience equal to the female mean in the sample and scores zero on all the binary variables con­
trolled for in the analysis). The differential due to discrimination in this case is estimated at 
12.9% but again is not recorded as being statistically significant The remainder o f the table re­
ports deviations from this base set o f characteristics. Each deviation is examined by itself alone 
with the objective o f trying to establish whether there exists a large variation in the differential 
across differing characteristics. Asymptotic standard errors are also recorded to establish statist!-
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cal significance. Though the variation is found to be large in regard to some characteristics all 
but one is found to be statistically insignificant The differential is seen to decline with labour 
force experience. The more experience an individual possesses the smaller is the unexplained 
differential. Again, however, this effect is not found to be statistically significant.
The only significant (and the largest) unexplained differential is obtained for the Leinster 
region (excl. Dublin Co.). The differential is o f the order of 28% and its magnitude is explained 
by the vast difference between the male and female coefficients associated with this regional 
dummy. This large differential could be explained by the fact that males resident in the Leinster 
region are more able to commute to well paying jobs in Dublin county than are females residing 
in this region. This, however, can only be offered as a tentative explanation for what is a rather 
odd result.
Another interesting feature o f table 4.7 is that there exists some evidence o f "reverse" 
discrimination in terms o f three occupational categories; the self-employed, salaried employees 
and the intermediate non-manual categories. In terms o f the self-employed discrimination usual­
ly takes the form of consumer motivated discrimination. An interpretation for the result recorded 
here is that consumers are more likely to discriminate against young self-employed male workers 
than their female counterparts. The magnitude of the effect in this case is a little under 7% but is 
not statistically significant
The negative effect in the intermediate non-manual category (an effect o f over 11% in 
favour of the females) helps explain the relatively low average value recorded in the first row of 
table 4.7. Since the mean discrimination coefficient, in this case, is the difference in coefficients 
weighted by the female mean characteristics, the mean estimate will clearly be influenced by the 
proportions in certain categories. Since over 70% of all the females in the sample are in the inter­
mediate non-manual category this clearly has a dampening effect on the mean estimate. This 
clearly highlights one of the dangers associated with using this approach.
Table 4.8 contains calculations of the gender wage differential based on the estimated 
models of tables 4.3 and 4.4 ( i.e. those excluding the occupation and industry dummies). As an­
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ticipated in section 4.2 the mean estimate of the unexplained differential increases dramatically 
and becomes statistically significant The ln(l + D) estimate is 0.0847 and with a standard error of 
0.0264 is statistically different from zero at the 1% level of significance. The portion o f the dif­
ferential explained by characteristics falls and becomes statistically insignificant. This clearly il­
lustrates the role played by the occupation and industry compensating differentials. Failure to 
control for these effects clearly distorts the wage discrimination estimates. In view of this, the 
more realistic estimates of discrimination are assumed obtained from the larger 
occupation/industry specification36.
As in table 4.7 base calculations and deviations from the base are also reported. Again, 
despite the significance o f the mean differential, none of the remaining set of calculations is sta­
tistically significant The findings of table 4.7 are, more or less, repeated here. However, in con­
tras t it appears evident that the larger the firm size the less likely is there o f a wage differential in 
favour o f males. Furthermore, the Leinster region differential though still relatively large be­
comes statistically insignificant
in regard to <
— ------------------------------------------î T b i r r r
Characteristic bi(l ♦ D) 1 + D ASE of /n il + D)
Mean 0.0305 1.0310 0.0389
Base 0.1212 1.1288 0.1252
Intermediate Certificate 0.1459 1.1571 0.1267
Leaving Certificate 0.1829 1.2007 0.1317
University Degree 0.1892 1.2083 0.3004
Group Certificate 0.2253 1.2527 0.1706
Apprenticeship 0.1954 1.2158 0.1477
Basic Training Qua]. 0.1882 1.2071 0.13581¿
15S Firm < 5 0 0.1490 1.11607 0.1291
50S Firm < 100 0  0689 1.0713 0.1351
Firm 2 100 0.1250 1.1331 0.1381
Promotion on Job 0.1280 1.1365 0.1349
Occupations
Professional 0.1103 1.1166 0.1136
Self-employed -0.0713 0.9312 0.2158
Salaried employees -0.1198 0.8871 0.2309
Intermediate non-manual -0.1190 0.8878 0  1065
Other non-manual 0.0159 1.0160 0.1066
Skilled manual 0.0292 1.0296 0.1080
Semi-skilled manual 0.0711 1.0737 0.1098
liwtnatriM
Building & Engineering 0.2248 1.2521 0.1469
Transport & Communication 0.1341 1.1567 0.1341
Banking & Insurance -0.0943 0.9100 0.1316
Public Admin, etc. 0.1176 1.1248 0.1280
Metal Manufacturing 0.0491 1.0503 0.1266
Other Manufacturing 0.0702 1.0727 0.1292
Extractive & Chem icals 0.0716 1.0742 0.1286
Dublin County 0.1489 1.1606 0.1277
Southern Counties 0.1677 1.1826 0  1204
Midlands Counties 0.1033 1.1088 0.1270
Leins terfexcl. Dublin) 0.2495* 1.2834 0.1296
Urban 0.1379 1.1710 0.1239
Five years 0.1418 1.1523 0.1300
Six years 0.1296 1.1384 0.1291
Seven years 0.1174 1.1246 0.1315
Eight years 0.1053 1.1110 0.1372
See Table 4.8 for •  füll explanation. • • •  denotes significance at 1 «  level.
• •  significance at the 5 *  level and • significance at the 1 0 «  level.
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Table 4.8.
Gender Differential Eatlmale» lead. O ccnpatto—  and Indmlrka)___
Characteristic * • ( ! ♦ « 1 + D ASE o f /n i l  +D)
Mean 0.0847*** 1.0884 0.0264
Base 0.0016 1.0016 0.0800
Intermediale Certificate -0.0035 0.9965 0.0781
Leaving Certificate 0.0133 1.0134 0.0806
University Degree 0.0759 1.0788 0.2768
Group Certificate 0.0613 1.0847 0.1313
Apprenticeship 0.1025 1.1079 0.0916
Basic Training Qual. 0.0432 1.0441 0.0860
Job U u ra c le r litk s _______
15 s  Firm < 5 0 0.0257 1.0260 0.0806
50 s  Firm < 100 -0.0285 0.9719 0.0843
Firm 2  100 0.0004 1.0004 0.0781
Promotion on Job -0.0101 0.9899 0.0787
Dublin County -0.0033 0.9967 0.0854
Southern Counties 0.0574 1.0591 0.0872
Midlands Counties 0.0044 1.0044 0.0949
Leinster(excl. Dublin) 0.1188 1.1261 0.0995
Urban 0.0370 1.0377 0.0781
Work K tftrkiM »-------------
Five years 0.0301 1 0306 0.0889
Six years 0.0083 1.0083 0.0854
Seven years -0.0136 0.9865 0.0872
Eight years -0.0354 0.9652 0.0943
records the differential estimate for an Individual with a base set of
characteristics. The third and aubaequent row« record deviationa from 
the base characteristics and are allowed to occur singly. The fourth 
column in the above table reports the asymptotic standard errors (ASE) 
o f the estimated differentials. • • •  denotes significance at th e 1% level, • •  
significance at the 5% level and * significance at the 10% lavai.
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It might be asked how these estimates compare with the UK evidence. Since Greenhalgh 
(1980) employed a roughly similar methodology37 to the one adopted in this chapter the esti­
mates contained therein will be used for comparison purposes. The data set used was the 1975 
GHS and the closest comparable group Greenhalgh examined of interest in terms of this study is 
the under thirty single men/single women subset In the context of this group an unexplained 
residual estimate o f 10% was obtained. However, no standard errors were calculated for this or 
any other of the estimates recorded there. Since this is a 1975 estimate and is based on a group 
with an older terminal age than the one employed here a cross country comparison between the 
two must remain at least tentative and at most crude. It must remain a matter of conjecture as to 
how much of the seven percentage points that separate the two estimates could be explained by
(i) the passing of time and the influence of equal pay legislation, (ii) differences in the structure of 
the Irish and UK labour markets and (iii) the fact that the specification estimated here controls ex­
plicitly for certain job characteristics ( e.g. firm size and on-the-job promotion) in a way that the 
Greenhalgh study did n o t One may speculate but it would be a major surprise if  more recent UK 
estimates didn’t more closely mirror the Irish estimates.
In general tables 4.7 and 4.8 reveal little statistical difference between the coefficients o f the 
male and female equations. In the light of this a more parsimonious model using the pooled sam­
ple o f males and females with a sex dummy is estimated. The sex dummy adopts a value o f 1, if 
male and 0 otherwise38. The full sample specification is estimated with occupation and industry 
controls and the results o f this exercise are contained in Table 4.9. Most o f the coefficient esti­
mates are in line with those reported in tables 4.1 and 4.2. The coefficient of most interest in 
table 4.9 is the sex coefficient This suggests that males on average earn 7.5% more than females. 
O f the full set o f interactions attempted only two are statistically significant at conventional lev-
including occupation and industry dummies and excluding these controls are calculated. The null hypotheses 
are the sex dummy constrained models. The resultant F-tests are 1.046 (F (31.958)) and 0.643 (F(17,986)). 
Neither of the null hypotheses can be rejected.
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els o f significance. As table 4.10 indicates the two significant interactive terms are sex and the 
Banking and Insurance industry category and sex and the intermediate non-manual occupational 
category. The coefficients o f the interactive terms are interpreted as the ceteris paribus differ­
ences between the male and female coefficients for the given categories. For both the categories 
in question the female coefficients are statistically and significantly larger than the male 
coefficients. In terms of table 4.7 above a similar finding is reported for these two categories with 
the effect, however, statistically insignificant The difference in statistical significance is due to 
the fact that the results of table 4.7 explicitly assume a male wage structure. For completeness, 
diagnostics for these two equations are reported in table 4.11.
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Table 4.9.
Variable Coefficient OLS »-«. White s.e.
Constant 0.0022 0.0762 0.1041
Sex 0.0722** 0.0257 0.0282
Experience (5 or less yrs.) 0.0651*** 0.0069 0.0074
Experience (more than 5 yrs.) 0.0217** 0.0123 0.0099
Intermediate Certificate -0.0316 0.0293 0.0304
Leaving Certificate 0.0284 0.0307 0.0312
University Degree 0.3049*** 0.0798 0.1166
Group Certificate 0.0*71 0.0372 0.0465
Apprenticeship 0.0560* 0.0278 0.0292
Basic Training Qualification 0.0424** 0.0197 0.0196
Job Char act eriatka_______
15S Firm < 5 0 0.1465*** 0.0284 0.0322
50 S Firm < 100 0.1255*** 0.0347 0.0344
Firm ¿  100 0.2251 * •• 0.0242 0.0263
Promotion on Job 0.0682*** 0.0185 0.0183
Professional -0.0636 0.0745 0.1034
Self-employed -0.0472 0.0823 0.1644
Salaried employees 0.0997 0.1044 0.1353
Intermediate non-manual -0.1120 0.0654 0.1035
Other non-manual -0.2507** 0.0699 0.1034
Skilled manual -0.1420 0.0636 0.0953
Semi-skilled manual -0.1520 0.0704 0.1004
Induitrk i________________
Building & Engineering 0.0776* 0.0407 0.0405
Transport & Communication 0.0792* * 0.0445 0.0378
Banking & Insurance 0.1224*** 0.0326 0.0312
Public Admin, etc. 0.0894*** 0.0304 0.0329
Metal Manufacturing 0.0683* 0.0364 0.0365
Other Manufacturing -0.0032 0.0334 0.0342
Extractive & Chemicals 0.1199*** 0.0469 0.0397
Dublin County 0.1174*** 0.0329 0.0299
Southern Counties 0.0893*** 0.0311 0.0312
Midlands Counties 0.0463 0.0356 0.0371
Leinster(excl. Dublin) 0.0805* 0.0427 0.0457
Urban 0.0762*** 0.0231 0.0220
R 2 0.357
Standard Error 0.281
Number of Cases 1022
Statistical inference is based on the White standard errors. Two-tailed
test of significance are employed and • • •  denotes significance at the 1 %
at the 10% level.
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Tabic 4.10.
Variable Coefficient OLS s.e. White s.e.
Constant -0.0646 0.0784 0.1018
Sex 0.1434*** 0.0330 0.0333
Experience (5 or less yrs.) 0.0660*** 0.0069 0.0074
Experience (more than 5 yrs.) 0.0215** 0.0122 0.0099
Intermediate Certificate -0.0375 0.0292 0.0299
Leaving Certificate 0.0220 0.0307 0.0303
University Degree 0.2831** 0.0796 0.1165
Group Certificate 0.0411 0.0371 0.0465
1 Apprenticeship 0.0619** 0.0279 0.0298
Basic Training Qualification 0.0320 0.0198 0.0199
15 s  Firm < 5 0 0.1480*** 0.0283 0.0318
50S Firm < 100 0.1244*** 0.0346 0.0339
Firm £ 100 0.2264*** 0.0241 0.0262
Promotion on Job 
Occupations
0.0705*** 0.01838 0.0181
Professional -0.0023 0.0759 0.1003
Self-employed -0.0181 0.0825 0.1599
Salaried employees 0.1559 0.1051 0.1292
Intermediate non-manual -0.0368 0.0701 0.0988
Other non-manual -0.2082** 0.0706 0.1005
Skilled manual -0.1395 0.0633 0.0945
Semi-skilled manual 
Industries
-0.1208 0.0707 0.0980
Building & Engineering 0.0704* 0.0405 0.0405
Transport & Communication 0.0781** 0.0442 0.0374
Banking & Insurance 0.1451*** 0.0351 0.0335
Public Admin, etc. 0.0945*** 0.0303 0.0329
Metal Manufacturing 0.0714** 0.0362 0.0361
Other Manufacturing -0.0017 0.0332 0.0340
Extractive & Chemicals 0.1166*** 0.0467 0.0392
Dublin County 0.1207*** 0.0328 0.0295
Southern Counties 0.0939*** 0.0310 0.0307
Midlands Counties 0.0460 0.0354 00368
Leinsterfexcl. Dublin) 0.0806* 0.0425 0.0450
Urban
Interaction Termi________
0.0783*** 0.0230 0.0220
ScxxBanking & Ins. -0.1688** 0.0573 0.0685
SexxlnL non-manual
if*
Standard Error 
Number of Cases
-0.1361***
0.364
0.279
1022
0.0501 0.0525
Statistical inference is based on the White standard errors. Two-tailed
test o f significance are employed and *** denotes significance at the 1 «
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T able 4.11.
Diagnostics for Pooled Wage Equations
Test (A) (B) (C) (D)
J-test 0.688 2.483 • • 0 .315* 2.782 • •
RESET 8.740 • • 9.656 ** 8.022 *• 8.824 *•
Breusch-Pagan 301.398 • • 326.377 *• 319.699** 345.164 • •
Skewness 3.646 3.467 2.713 2.506
Kurtosia 1403.277 •* 1402.493 • • 1316.547 • • 1081.530**
(A) and (C) refer to  the estimated equations using splines in experience with 
occupation and industry dummies. The results for which are reported in tables 
4.9 and 4.10 respectively. (B) and (D) refer to the estimated equations using 
dummies in experience with occupation and industry dummies. The results for 
which are not reported here but are available on request. The non-nested J-test 
value is interpreted as  a  t-statistic. The values for the R ESET mis-specification 
test is interpreted as  an F-test with 3 and N -  k degrees of freedom. The 
Breusch-Pagan tes t for heteroscedasticity is interpreted as a %2 variate with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of parameters estimated in the original 
equations less one. T h e  normality tests o f skewness and kurtosis are based on the 
Keifer-Salmon test statistic and are interpreted as %2 variates with one degree of 
freedom each. ** an d  * denotes significance at the 1% and 3% level res pec- 
tivel> ______________________________________________
4.7 Conclusions
The estimation of individual level wage equations has provided an opportunity to examine 
the returns to both labour fo rce  experience and educational qualifications. By and large, the 
results are broadly com patible with the predictions o f human capital theory. The returns to on- 
the-job training are greater fo r  young males in the first five years of labour force experience than 
for young females. However, the returns are found to diminish for the males by a more dramatic 
amount in the subsequent y ea rs  than is the case for the young females. Returns to educational 
qualifications are on average higher for males than females and this might be interpreted as 
reflecting some form of discrimination in terms of female access to certain subjects within the Ir­
ish educational system. The differences in returns to educational qualifications are not found to 
be statistically significant.
The general view that em erges from the above exercise is that the data do not provide any 
convincing evidence in support o f wage discrimination in the context o f the labour market for 
young workers. This should n o t be interpreted as suggesting that sex discrimination per  re  is an 
absent phenomenon from the Irish labour market for young workers. It can be stated that the
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results o f the above analysis provide scant statistical evidence in support o f a  discrimination ef­
fect that originates through wage differences. However, the approach adopted would not be ex­
pected to detect forms o f sex discrimination that occur through, for example, th e  existence of bar­
riers to occupational entry or employer motivated discrimination in terms o f  on-the-job promo­
tion offers. One may conjecture that the small magnitude recorded for the unexplained wage dif­
ferential may be attributable to the success o f equal pay legislation. Wages are the one obvious 
variable that can be easily regulated by anti-discrimination legislation. Introducing and imple­
menting legislation to remove wage discrimination may be a far easier task than removing certain 
other forms o f employer motivated discrimination that manifest themselves through, for example, 
promotional offers to females. Failure to detect sex discrimination in the form  o f  wage effects 
does not necessarily imply the absence o f sex discrimination in its other forms.
Therefore, the results obtained cannot claim to represent the definitive statement on sex 
discrimination in the labour market for young workers in Ireland. Since the focus o f attention has 
been young single workers the discrimination effect measured here does not re la te  to any discrim­
ination that may occur as a  consequence o f female labour force intermittency. N or has the focus 
here been on other forms o f  discrimination that may arise as a consequence o f e ith e r occupational 
segregation or unequal access to promotion. The absence o f wage sex discrim ination cannot be 
interpreted as prima facie  evidence against the existence of any of these other types o f discrimi­
nation.
In the light of these findings the subsequent chapters attempt to treat occupations in a more 
sensitive fashion than has been the case in this chapter. In particular the issue o f  occupational 
endogeneity is more extensively explored in the following chapter and in chapter six the wage ef­
fects o f occupational segregation is assessed. The sample employed in this chapter is also ex­
panded in order to facilitate a more worthwhile analysis of occupational wage effects. This inev­
itably means that certain variables for which there are too few observations m ust be dropped. 
These include the vocational training variables and the promotion variables.
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Chapter Five
Gender Wage Discrimination with Endogenous Occupations
5.1 Introduction
Chapter four focused on gender wage effects treating the occupational levels of males and 
females as exogenous. As stated in that chapter, and also in chapter two, the literature is replete 
with examples of such studies where the unexplained differential between two reduced form 
wage equations is assumed to approximate a wage discrimination effect. One of the major limita­
tions o f  such studies is that the occupational effects are controlled through intercept shifts in the 
wage equation. The estimation o f separate occupational wage equations allowing for differing re­
turns to characteristics across occupations represents a clear advance. This is particularly so if 
there is suspicion that the mean discrimination effect conceals the presence of a larger intra- 
occupational effect.
However, a major problem posed by the estimation o f occupational wage equations relates 
to the possible existence o f some selection process that determines the observed occupational 
sample. If the disturbances in the occupational wage equations are correlated with the distur­
bance term in the occupational selection equation then conventional estimation techniques, like 
O LS, provide biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. This has clear implications for the es­
timated discrimination effects. Methods designed to correct for such selectivity bias have been 
suggested in the literature and applied to the area of labour supply, migration (Robinson and 
Tomes, (1982)) and union endogeneity (Duncan and Leigh (1980)). Few studies have analysed 
the effects of selectivity bias on the discrimination estimates3 9  bearing particular emphasis on the
w  Zabalza and Anufat (1983) and Dolton and Makepeace (1986 and 1987, a) are notable exceptions in 
the field o f  sex discrimination w ith Reimers (1983) providing an exception in a race discrimination study.
The form er three studies focus on the sample selectivity effects o f  labour force participation.
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effects of occupational selection. Dolton, Makepeace and Van der Klaauw (1987) have examined 
occupational wages and the effects of sample selectivity in a polychotomous occupational frame­
work but without explicit reference to intra-occupational wage discrimination effects.
One of the main objectives of this chapter is to explore gender and occupational wage dif­
ferentials within a dichotomous non-man ual/manual framework and to establish the effects, if 
any, o f occupational sample selectivity on sex discrimination estimates. A second objective is to 
statistically test the proposition of occupational exogeneity.
Two contrasting econometric methods are employed to control and test for the potential en­
dogeneity o f occupational status. One is an Instrumental Variable (IV) estimator proposed by 
Dubin and McFadden (1984) and refined for use by Duncan and Leigh (1985) in the context of 
union endogeneity. The other is the widely used two-stage selectivity bias correction method 
based on the M ill's ratio and proposed by Heckman (1976). Testing for occupational exogeneity 
in the former case is effected through the calculation of a Hausman test (see Hausman (1978)). In 
the latter case the statistical test for endogeneity is derived from Melino (1982) who provides a 
Lagrange multiplier test based on the t-statistic o f the predicted selectivity bias term.
The econometric issues raised by the analysis should not hide important economic policy is­
sues. Foremost among these is the question o f whether the magnitude o f the unexplained gender 
wage differential varies markedly across manual and non-manual occupational sectors. A second 
question relates to the age o f the sample o f workers used in the analysis. Some theoretical 
models highlight the role played by female labour force interruption and subsequent skill depreci­
ation in providing an explanation for female wage disadvantage.40  In the context o f young work­
ers of single status one may be surprised to find evidence o f wage based discrimination in any oc­
cupational sector. The detection of such an effect has clear and disturbing implications for the 
transition o f young female workers into the adult labour market.
Finally, though not the major objective o f this chapter the framework employed implies the 
existence of a structural occupational model. The estimation of this, it is hoped, will provide
40 Sec Mincer and Polachek (1974) and Poiachek (1981).
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some evidence as to the key determinants o f non-manual occupational attachment and establish 
the role played by the non-man ual/manual wage gap.
It should, o f course, be stated that the manual/non-manual split may not be the most satis­
factory categorisation to employ. However, breaking the occupational groupings down into a 
finer classification would have implications for both the sample size in each category and the IV 
econometric technique proposed for use in this chapter. A finer classification is employed in 
chapter six.
The layout of the chapter is as follows: sections 5.2 to 5.4 outline the methodology to be 
employed and provide a comparison of the different econometric methods to be used. Section 5.5 
deals with the data set to be used and sections 5.6 to 5.8 concentrate on the wage equation estima­
tion and the exogeneity results. Section 5.9 compares the unexplained gender wage differentials 
and section 5.10 provides the structural estimates of the occupational model. Section 5.11 offers 
some conclusions.
5.2 Methodology
The model describing the determination o f non-manual and manual occupational attach­
ment and wages is given by the following set o f equations.
Y ,-K ,Y + *  (3.1)
w« = X* p , + q*  (5.2)
w * -  X* + n *  (5.3)
where
f-1 .........,T,
T  -  the number of individuals,
n and m subscripts refer to non-manual and manual occupational categories respectively.
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Y, is the latent variable for the i*  individual capturing the determinants o f occupational attach­
ment,
w, is the natural log of the net hourly wage for «* individual,
Xt is a vector o f characteristics that determines the i*  individual’s net hourly wage,
K, is a vector o f characteristics that determines the i*  individual’s occupational attachment and 
e, .T)M and q*, are error terms.
Y, is an unobserved latent dependent variable in the reduced form criterion function that 
predicts occupational attachment The criterion function itself is obtained by substituting the re­
duced form wage equations of (S.2) and (5.3) into a  structural occupational attachment equation 
where the non-manual/manual wage differential enters as an explanatory variable. Thus, since 
wages are assumed to determine occupational attachment all the explanatory variables that 
influence the individual’s wage also influence occupational attachment through a reduced form 
equation. Though a structural occupational equation is to be estimated equation (5.1) is the re­
duced form occupational attachment equation and not the structural equation of the model. In 
terms o f the above equations all the variables in the X, vectors of equations (5.2) and (5.3) are 
contained in the K, vector of equation (5.1) which also includes additional variables from the 
structural occupational equation.
The dichotomous realisation o f the unobserved Y< is assumed to be a dummy indicator vari­
able, I*. If Ii -  1, then, the observed individual is in a non-manual job and if I, = 0, the worker is 
attached to a manual job. Invariably occupational attachment is described in terms of utility gain. 
O ne would expect, ceteris paribus, that if  an individual’s utility gain associated with non-manual 
work exceeded that associated with manual work the individual would select a non-manual job. 
However, in the presence of job rationing, barriers to occupational entry and other forms of 
discrimination etc. this need not necessarily be the case. Thus, for an individual drawn at random 
from the population as a whole if Y< £ 0 one observes the non-manual wage and sum s; otherwise 
one observes the manual wage and status.
Equations (5.1) to (5.3) represent the model to be estimated. The empirical implemenution
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of this model is effected by two contrasting econometric techniques. These techniques are to be 
described in the subsequent sub-sections.
5 J  Heckman Procedure
The wage equations o f (5.2) and (5.3) cannot be validly estimated separately by OLS since 
estimation would be on the basis of a truncated sample. The truncation of the sample follows
from the fact that the non-manual wage is unobserved for the manual worker and vice-versa. As
Duncan (1983) points out if both manual and non-manual wages are observed for each individual 
drawn at random from the population, then the application o f OLS (with the standard set o f 
caveats) is valid. In reality such circumstances rarely, if  ever, occur and in the presence o f such 
truncation OLS is invalid. However, Heckman (1976 and 1979) provides a method for estimating 
in the presence of such truncation. The regression equations o f (5.2) and (5.3) may be expressed 
as
Eíw* I X„,Y, 2 0 )« X .f c  ♦ E d u  1 Y, 2 0 ) (5.2*)
Eíw«, I X*.Y, < 0 ) -  X «JL  ♦ K i t*  I Y, < 0) (5.3*)
where all the elements are as defined above w ith E () depicting the expectations operator. Heck­
man (1979) points out that the straight application o f OLS to such cases as those depicted in (5.2) 
and (5.3) suffers from two sources of misspecifrcation; one due to omitted variables, the other to 
helero sc edasticity. Heckman proposes the use o f  proxy constructs designed to take in to con­
sideration the truncated nature of the error term s depicted in (5.2*) and (5.3*). The regression 
equations (5.2*) and (5.3*) may then be restated as:
E(w- I X*.Y< 2 0 ) - ♦  • . JU  (5.4)
Efw* I X*.Y, < 0 )-  XMp . + S . L .  (5.5)
where
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9 <) and 0 ( ) are the density and distribution functions of a standard normal variable.
Olsen (1982) highlights the necessity of imposing some form o f structure on the problem of 
correcting for selectivity bias without which, he argues, the problem is insoluble. T h is raises the 
issue o f identification of the selectivity effect In the context of the empirical union endogeneity 
literature identification creates a clear problem. All variables that influence the wage also 
influence union attachment and identification of the selectivity effect relies on the functional 
form. Since, the M ill's ratio is a non-linear function of the exogenous variables in  the probit 
equation the same set o f regressors can be used in (5.1) as in (5.2) or (5.3) without encountering 
collinearity. However, a condition required for the identification of the selectivity effect in the 
two-step framework outlined is the availability of some variable that shifts the probability of ob­
serving the dependent variable without shifting the mean o f the dependent variable. F o r the pur­
poses of this study a set of parental background dummies are included designed to sh ift the pro­
bability of occupational attachment but do not enter the wage equation.4 1  An alternative solution 
to the identification problem lies in the use of non-linearities in the exogenous variables, eg . 
squared or interactive effects, in order to identify the relationship. Since, an investigator rarely 
possesses any intuition regarding the appropriate functional form Olsen (1980) dism isses this ap­
proach as relatively unappealing.
The standard approach to estimating the above model in the Heckman two-stage framework 
is to apply probit4 2  43analysis to the reduced form criterion function o f (5.1) yielding estimates y. 
Insert these estimates into (5.6) and (5.7) to obtain proxy constructs designed to control for the 
truncated nature of the error terms in the non-manual and manual wage equations. T he second
41 However, studies examining the wage effect» of parental background are not uncommon and to m e
have uied  father'» occupational statu* as an explanatory variable in wage equations in order to assess d iffer­
ences in the private rates o f return to education across socio-economic groups (see Papanicolaou and 
Psacharopoulos (1976)).
43 A good survey o f  the properties o f  probit models is given in either Ametniya (1981) or Maddala (1983).
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stage of the procedure involves the application of OLS to the heteroscedasdc regression equations 
o f (S.4) and (5.5). All that is required to obtain consistent estimates o f the parameters is that the 
error term in the reduced form of (5.1) is Gaussian and that the expectations ( conditional on e, ) 
o f the error terms of the wage equations are linear (see Olsen (1980) or Duncan (1983)).
The estimated variances used for inference purposes in terms o f the Heckman procedure are 
corrected to take into consideration the fact that the proxies used are estimated and not actual. 
Maddala (1983) demonstrates how ignoring the fact that y  is estimated leads to an under­
estimation of the true variances. The correction required is due to Lee e t al. (1980) and is given 
in the appendix to chapter eight of Maddala (1983). However, in terms o f this chapter's estimates 
little difference was noted between the OLS variance and the true variance calculated as in Mad­
dala (1983).
The interpretation o f the coefficients associated with (5.6) and (5.7) is always difficult. As 
Lee (1978) points out the 0 , and the 0* coefficient estimates can be analytically shown to 
represent the covariances between the reduced form error term and that of the relevant non- 
manual and manual wage equations. Therefore, these terms may not be amenable to an explicit 
economic interpretation. However. Dolton and Makepeace (1987, b) offer some insight into the 
economic interpretation o f such effects and a wider discussion of this is avoided until the results 
section.
The statistical test for exogeneity in this framework is provided by Melino (1982) who 
shows that the Heckman test is equivalent to a Lagrange multiplier test o f the null hypothesis of 
no sample selection bias. The LM test is derived as the square of the t-statistic on the selectivity 
bias term using the uncorrected OLS variance which is consistent under the null hypothesis of no 
sample selection bias. The resultant test statistic is a  xJ variate with one degree of freedom.
This two-step procedure has not been free of criticism. In particular Lee (1982) suggests 
that the imposed normality assumption on the error term of the criterion function may have seri­
ous implications for the detection of selectivity bias. A failure to detect such bias when present 
may be related to a misspecification o f  normality in the error term. Lee (1983) suggests a selec­
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tivity bias correction method that allows for more general distributional assumptions. However, 
the problem o f having to make some distributional assumption is not avoided. It is this particular 
problem which has forced attention to turn towards distribution free estimators among which is 
included the IV estimator of the following section.
5.4 IV Procedure
The IV estimation technique employed here follows closely that proposed by Duncan and 
Leigh (1985) which provides an extension o f the Dubin and M 'Fadden (1984) methodology. Re­
taining the notation used above the full sample wage equation may be written as
w, = I,w * + (1 -1 , )w* (5.8)
Substituting in for the non-manual and manual wages using (5.2) and (5.3) yields
w, -( I ,X .)& . ♦ ( ( ! -I ,)X « )f t . +V, (5.9)
w, -  Z „p . ♦ Z .  p .  + v, (3.10)
-  M b  ♦
and the error terms are assumed to have the following properties:
(3.11)
var(v^) -  o f (3.12)
The fully interactive model suggested by (5.9) or (5.10) allows returns to the variables to 
vary across occupational sectors. However, the use o f OLS in estimating (5.10) is invalidated by 
the fact that E((Z* :Z*)v<)* 0. As Duncan and Leigh (1985) show in order to estimate (5.10) us­
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ing the IV procedure the stringent condition that the joint density functions g(e, ) and g(e,. r t* ) 
are equal is imposed. This implies that the error generating process that characterises the wage 
equations in the two sectors is approximately the same for the first two moments of the distribu­
tion. This is necessary (as the authors show in an appendix) to ensure that the properties o f (5.11) 
and (5.12) are satisfied.
A necessary criterion for admissible instruments is high correlation with the regressor in 
question, i.e. occupation. Duncan and Leigh (1985) suggest that natural instruments to use in the 
IV estimation of (5.10) are the expected values of the explanatory variables, E fZ ^ l-P iX ., and 
E(Zmi) * ( 1  -  Pi)X*w where P, «= probfl, = 1 ) with Pi calculated from the reduced form o f  (5.1) us­
ing a probit. This is identical to the first stage of the Heckman estimator. Instruments are then 
formed by interacting the predicted probabilities P, with the actual X* and X*, variables. Define 
the instruments calculated in this manner by the matrix W and denote the vector of natural log of 
the net hourly wage by y. If the matrix (Z *:Z *) is denoted more simply by Z; then the well 
known IV coefficient estimator is given by
-  ( W Z r 'W y  (3.13)
The estimator for the variance is modified to take into consideration the presence of heteroscedas-
ticity.
var (fcv) -  C * r z r •'W 'aW (Z'W )-' (5.14)
where
Ù - d U iia j  -  Z 'ÎaO'U  -  Z "ftv »
This is the covariance matrix estimator based on White (1982, b) and is consistent under both the 
null hypothesis of homoscedasticity and the alternative of heteroscedasticity regardless of its 
structure.
The advantage the IV approach possesses over the Heckman procedure is the fact that no 
distributional assumptions enter the second stage of estimation. Though a normality assumption
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is necessary to obtain the predicted probabilities in the IV case this assumption does not enter the 
wage equation estimation as with the Heckman two-step procedure43.
T h e  statistical test for occupational endogeneity in the IV case is provided by Hausman 
(1978). This statistically compares an estimator (OLS) that is consistent and efficient under the 
null hypothesis of exogeneity but inconsistent under the alternative hypothesis o f endogeneity 
against an alternative estimator (IV) that is consistent under both the null and the alternative. 
H ow ever the IV estimator may be inefficient if  the correlations between instruments and the re­
gressors are weak.
5.5 Data
T h e  data used in this chapter are from the same survey as used in chapter four and described 
in chap ter three. The sub-sample employed in this analysis is composed of those individuals of 
single status who defined their main economic activity as either working for payment or profit in 
non-agricultural activities. Only those who classified themselves as full-time workers are includ­
ed.
T h e  sub-sample was allocated between the broad non-man ual/manual occupational 
categories on the basis o f the Census of Population Classification of Occupations (1981). Higher 
Professional, Lower Professional, Self-Employed and Managers. Salaried Employees, Intermedi­
ate Non-Manual Workers, and Other Non-Manual Workers (code nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6  and 7 respec­
tively) were allocated to the non-manual sector. Skilled Manual Workers, Semi-Skilled Manual 
W orkers and the Unskilled Workers (code nos. 8 , 9 and X) were allocated to the manual collar 
sector.
T h e  total number o f observations for which no missing values were recorded was 2827. O f 
these. 1566 were non-manual and 1261 were manual workers. In terms o f the males 568 were 
non-m anual and 937 manual and for the females the comparable split was 998 and 324.
43 A log it model could be used to obtain the predicted probabilities. However, in term« o f  this study the 
results a re  not substantially different under th ii alternative assumption.
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The variables used in the estimation o f  both wage and occupational equations are as fol­
lows:
Wage :Net hourly wage expressed in logarithms.
Experience: Total labour force experience expressed in years.
Previous Experience: Experience prior to the current job expressed in years.
Education: Number o f years in post-compulsory education. The school leaving age is fifteen. 
Occupation: A (0,1) dummy variable assuming a  value of 1 if the individual holds a non-manual 
job and 0  if  a manual job  is held. This variable serves as the dichotomous realisation of the latent 
dependent variable of equation (3.1).
Region o f Schooling: A dummy variable adopting a value of 1 i f  the individual’s region of 
schooling is in Dublin City or county and zero otherwise.
F irm  Size: A set o f three (0,1) dummies for the size o f the firm the individual currently works in. 
The three dummies are for firms less than fifty workers, firms with greater than fifty but with less 
than four hundred workers and firms with greater than four hundred workers. In estimation the 
omitted dummy is firms with less than fifty workers.
Unemployment: This variable is calculated as the number of months an individual has spent 
unemployed since leaving full-time education.
Move Residence: A (0.1) dummy adopting a value of 1 if the individual changed residence to 
take their current job.
Father’s Occupation: A set of two (0,1) dum m ies capturing the occupational status o f the 
individual’s father. The broad occupational categories are Non-Manual and Manual and the om­
itted category in estimation is agriculture.
A number of other variables were also used in estimation but failed to show a statistically 
significant effect. These include the number o f  jobs an individual held prior to the current one, 
the full set o f region of schooling dummies and a set of industry dummies. The latter set o f dum­
mies in particular proved sensitive to slight alterations in the specifications and are thus excluded.
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Finally. appendix A1 contains a set o f  summary statistics for the full set o f variables used in the 
estimation.
The sectoral wage equations could best be interpreted in terms o f an integrated human capi­
tal/ compensating differentials explanation of wage determination. The standard human capital 
variables of schooling and post-schooling investments are present. The education variable is ex­
pressed in terms o f years in post-compulsory education. As in chapter four the labour force ex­
perience variable is expressed in terms o f two linear splines. The nodes used are based on less 
than or equal to four years labour force experience and strictly greater than four years labour 
force experience. Since three contrasting econometric methods are used in estimation statistically 
testing for the optimal nodes would prove complicated and for this reason is avoided. However, 
the four year split provides a more reasonable fit to the data for the sample used here than the five 
year split used in chapter four.
A (tummy variable for whether the individual's residence of schooling was in Dublin city or 
county :■ also used in the wage equation and some justification for this particular variable must 
be provided. It could be argued that the residence of schooling variable implies more about the 
individual than the job the individual currently holds. Since both variables proxy different effects 
a strong argument exists for the inclusion of both. However, since the sample of workers are re­
latively young there exists a high correlation between residence o f schooling in Dublin and 
current residence in Dublin and for the manual female workers the correlation is perfect44. Thus 
inclusion of both variables is vitiated for at least one of the wage equations. The approach adopt­
ed in this study is to include the residence of schooling dummy and bear the above caveats in 
mind when interpreting the coefficient estimates.
Two further variables that may be interpreted as loosely proxying job search variables are 
also included. One is a dummy variable for whether or not an individual changed residence to
precise due inevitably to the high correlation».
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take up their current job and another captures the length o f unemployment in months experienced 
by an individual since leaving full-time education. A set of firm size dummies designed to ac­
count for the effects o f compensating differentials are included with the omitted reference group 
firms with less than fifty workers. A number of other variables that were also used in the analysis 
but to no effect were a set o f industry dummies that proved very sensitive to alterations in the 
specifications and the number of previous jobs held by the individual. Estimates based on the use 
of these variables are thus not reported45.
5.7 Wage Equation Estimates
Probit estimates for the reduced form occupational attachment equations are contained in 
appendix 5.A1 o f this chapter. Comment on the occupational equations’ results are reserved until 
discussion o f the structural models.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 contain OLS, IV and Heckman estimates for the male and female wage 
equations respectively. The coefficients on the experience variables appear relatively robust for 
both gender groups regardless of the econometric method used. The returns to labour force ex­
perience are. in general, greater in the early years in comport with human capital predictions and 
in the particular case o f manual male workers greater returns to firm specific investments are ob­
served.
The private rates o f return to education appear more sensitive to the econometric method 
used and this is especially so for the female manual workers. Rates o f 1.3% and 8.3% respective­
ly for the Heckman and the IV techniques are recorded for the female manual category as com­
pared to 3.6% few the OLS estimate. In both the IV and Heckman cases neither estimate is statist­
ically significant at a satisfactory level which is in marked contrast to the manual male estimates 
which appear almost identical using IV or Heckman. The contrast may be explained to some ex­
tent by the small number o f observations in the female manual category. The non-manual esti­
mates for private educational returns for both sexes are much more in agreement and are resonant
43 All o f  the empirical analyiii was carried out on the LIMDEP econometric package with the exception 
of the calculation* for the IV variance/covariancc matrices which were calculated using the SAS package.
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of similar findings in the human capital literature.
The estimated coefficients on the firm size dummies are. like the experience coefficients, re­
latively robust to the econometric technique. In most cases the returns are incremental with size. 
Though the manual female IV estimates are slightly out o f line with the other estimates in terms 
of magnitude. The small number o f observations in this category may be invoked to explain this 
particular phenomenon.
The coefficient on the schooling in Dublin dummy follows a similar pattern regardless of 
which estimator is used. As the discussion in section S. 6  indicated interpretation o f this 
coefficient is difficult since it proxies not only individual attributes but also job attributes. How­
ever, the clear pattern that emerges for both sexes is the contrast in manual and non-manual wage 
effects that exists for individuals whose residence o f schooling was in Dublin city or county. For 
manual workers from both sexes the effects are negligible in comparison to non-manual workers 
who record positive wage effects o f well over 10% in most cases. This could be interpreted in 
terms of the large number of non-manual jobs in Dublin city or county and since the probit esti­
mates suggest that young workers educated in Dublin are more likely to end up in non-manual 
jobs this need not emerge as a surprising result.
The unemployment variable included in the wage equations record some interesting results. 
At least two interpretations are possible for the results obtained for manual male workers. One 
interpretation of the positive wage effect is in terms of a premium for protracted job search. 
Another more plausible interpretation may be that employers do not use a manual male worker’s 
duration o f unemployment as a productivity proxy. The effects for non-manual males are statisti­
cally insignificant Thus, for those young male workers in employment in the sub sample experi­
ence o f unemployment does not possess a strong wage disadvantage. In contrast, most of the sta­
tistically significant female effects are negative in sign and operate through the non-manual sec­
tor. This a differential treatment of males and females in terms of unemployment and wages and 
may be interpreted as some indirect form of discrimination. Nothing o f note is reported for the 
other job search variable, the change of residence dummy.
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Table 5.1
Male Wage Coefficient Estimates.
Variable OLS std. error IV std.error Heckman std.erroi
Manual
Constant -0.2853*** 0.0356 -0.3810*** 0.0813 -0.3268*** 0.0387
Exp^4 yrs. 0.1510*** 0.0108 0.1750*** 0.0195 0.1505*** 0.0095
Exp.>4 yrs. 0.0568*** 0.0081 0.0294 0.0203 0.0537*** 0.0104
Education 0.0634*** 0.0086 0.0438** 0.0209 0.0418*** 0.0142
>0 s  Firm  < 400 0.1246*** 0.0261 0.1171** 0.0568 0.1311*** 0.0255
•Inn £ 400 0.1421*** 0.0258 0.2287*** 0.0605 0.1330*** 0.0266
Schooling in Dublin 0.0537** 0.0225 -0.0379 0.0666 -0.0021 0.0381
Unemployment(months) 0.0056*** 0.0437 0.0079*** 0.0020 0.0067*** 0.0015
Move Residence 0.0391 0.0437 0.1407* 0.0729 0.0247 0.0510
Selectivity Bus • - - 0.1621* 0.0854
Son-Manual - 0.1407 0.2020
Constant -0.1474*** 0.0437 - - •0.1119 0.1265
Exp.£4 yrs. 0.1003*** 0.0120 0.0565* 0.0294 0.0998*** 0.0122
Exp.>4 yrs. 0.0484*** 0.0140 0.0870** 0.359 0.0480*** 0.0141
Education 0.0683*** 0.0104
id
0.0248 0.0646*** 0.0150
JO i  Firm  < 400 0.1388*** 0.0337 0.1605 0.1081 0.1391*** 0.0343
Firm 2 4 0 0 0.1987*** 0.0309 0.0479 0.1102 0.1954*** 0.0328
Schooling in Dublin 0.1242*** 0.0267 0.1693** 0.0762 0.1158*** 0.0391
Unemployment (months) 0.0032 0.0024 -0.0023 0.0064 0.0034 0.0034
Move Residence 0.0723* 0.0427 0.0099 0.0820 0.0697 0.0498
Selectivity Bias 
Observations 1505 1505
- 0.0242 0.0808 
1505
denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, 
* denotes significance at the 10% level using two tailed tests.
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Table 5 J
Female Wage Coefficient Estimates.
Variable OLS «derro r IV Md. eiror Heckman itd. erro
Manual -
Constant -0.0316 0.0633 -0.5117** 0.1987 -0.0981 0.1098
ixp.^4 yrs. 
Exp.>4 yrs.
0.0616*** 0.0151 
0.0151 0.0106
0.1067*** 0.0251 
-0.0016 0.0259
0.0601***
0.0157
0.0127
0.0118
Education 0.0362*** 0.0126 0.0849* 0.0303 0.0157 0.0326
10 $ Firm  < 400 
"inn 400
0.1196*** 0.0403 
0.2820*** 0.0418
0.4865*** 0.1695 
0.6542*** 0.1689
0.1717**
0.3072***
0.0847
0.0550
Schooling in Dublin 0.0435* 0.0262 0.0270 0.0626 0.0229 0.0435
U nemploy ment( months) 0.0062*** 0.0019 0.0054 0.0044 0.0019*** 0.0007
Move Residence 0.1188** 0.0553 -0.0714 0.3396 0.1006 0.0863
Selectivity Bias - - - 0.0666 0.0999
Von-Manual - -0.1209 0.0704* - -
Constant -0.2298*** 0.0361 - - -0.2337*** 0.0534
ixp.s4 yrs. 
Exp.>4 yrs. 
Education o
 o
o
SS
I
s
i
1:
p
p
o 0.0734*** 0.0122 
0.0588** 0.0277 
0.0686*** 0.0140
0.0885***
0.0433***
0.0884***
0.0084
0.0117
0.0127
K)S Firm  < 4 0 0  
■ irm ¿ 4 0 0
0.1933*** 0.0244 
0.2714*** 0.0223
0.1036* 0.0571 
0.2151*** 0.0294
0.1888***
0.2698***
0.0424
0.0255
Schooling in Dublin 0.1391*** 0.0190 0.1575*** 0.0281 0 1
 • § • 0.0231
Unemployment (months) -0.0055** 0.0023 -0.0018 0.0036 -0.0014** 0.0006
Move Residence 0.0115 0.0378 0.0456 0.0474 0.0124 0.0338
Selectivity Bias - - - -0.0103 0.0779
Observations 1322 1322 1322
• •  denotes significance at the 1% level, • •  denotes significance at the 5% level, 
denotes significance at the 10% level using two tailed tests.
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5.8 Endogeneity o f Occupations
Two different approaches designed to test occupational exogeneity are examined. The first 
focuses on a modified statistical test based on the proxy variables of the Heckman procedure 
while the second uses the Hausman (1978) test as outlined in Duncan and Leigh (1985).
Melino (1982) provides a Lagrange multiplier test which is shown to be equivalent to the 
test o f Heckman (1979) but possessing more desirable asymptotic properties. The LM test sug­
gested is calculated as the square of the t-statistic associated with the proxy construct using the 
OLS variance-covariance matrix. This is consistent under the null hypothesis o f occupational 
exogeneity in this case. The resultant test statistic is asymptotically distributed as x2 with one 
degree of freedom. In terms o f the two-step Heckman procedure four independent x2 variates 
each possessing one degree of freedom are provided to statistically test the proposition of occupa­
tional exogeneity.
Hausman (1978) provides an alternative test for exogeneity based on the statistical com­
parison of the IV and OLS estimators. The test requires the comparison o f an estimator that is 
consistent and efficient under the null hypothesis (of exogeneity) but inconsistent under the alter­
native (o f endogeneity), i.e. the OLS estimator, with an estimator that is consistent under both 
hypotheses but inefficient, i.e. the IV estimator. The inefficiency of the IV estimator is due to 
the fact that the instrumental variables used may not be highly correlated with the corresponding 
independent variables. Consistency is thus bought at the co st o f a high variance.
The Hausman test statistic is calculated as follows. Define 
* $.» -  $**
V(«) -  V(fc.) -  V(fc»)
where V () the variance/covariance matrix o f the estimator in question. Then the test suds tic is 
given by
-1 1 0 -
■  -  «'(Ví*)]-1« (5.15)
where m is distributed as x 2 with k degrees o f freedom where k is the number of parameters es­
timated.
Attention now turns to the test results. The results based on the LM tests o f occupational 
exogeneity for the females in both the manual and non-manual sectors suggest little evidence of 
non-randomness in their allocation to either sector. In both cases the null hypothesis of occupa­
tional exogeneity is upheld by the data. Thus, the net hourly wage for a female with a given set 
o f personal characteristics selected at random from the population into the manual sector is no 
different from what it would have been i f  selected into the non-manual sector.
The comparable LM test for non-manual males also records little evidence o f selectivity 
bias. However, the LM test associated with the male manual sector fails to reject the null hy­
pothesis (the test value is just outside the 5% level but comfortably inside the 10% level). The 
interpretation of this result needs to be explained not only in the context of statistical significance 
but also in terms o f the direction that the selectivity bias operates. The signs on the estimated 
proxy variables provide information on the direction of the selectivity bias. As Lee (1978) points 
out the signs of the truncated effects can be analytically determined b  priori by the second mo­
ments o f the disturbances q * . i |M and 4 . (see Lee (1978) p.426). Due to the construction of the 
proxy variables (see (5.6) and (5.7) above) the positive coefficient implies negative selectivity or 
(truncation) in terms o f  manual jobs. The interpretation for this is that a male worker with a 
given set of characteristics selected at random from the population receives a lower wage if 
selected into the manual rather than the non-manual sector. In other words, on the basis of the 
male manual workers’ coefficient estimates the wage distribution actually observed for male 
manual workers is over 16% lower than the mean wage offer distribution estimated for the popu­
lation as a whole. Though the effect is only significant at a 10% level the result itself is large and 
requires some explanation. Chapter six using virtually the same sample suggests that the male 
manual selectivity bias effect operates through the skilled sector. This implies that a young male 
selected into the skilled sector earns a wage less than if selected into any other sector. This result 
is supported by the predictions of human capital theory which suggests that young workers
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sacrifice wages for training in return for greater life-cycle earnings. Though, in this study the 
manual category employed here is an amalgam o f skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers the 
greater proportion of males (70%) are in the skilled category and the interpretation offered is re­
garded as reasonably plausible4 *6.
The Hausman test results are in slight contrast to those obtained using M elino's LM test. 
The x2 statistics are 7.82 and 8 . 8 8  for the male and female equations respectively implying that 
the null o f exogeneity is upheld at any reasonable level of significance. Taking both sets of 
results together the data suggest little evidence of occupational endogeneity with the exception of 
the male manual category.
However, a number o f caveats need to be made regarding the reliability o f both sets of exo­
geneity results. Firstly, the LM test could be considered a test contingent on the assumption of 
normality being satisfied. If  the assumption of normality is violated the LM test is invalid. 
Departures from normality will induce inappropriate inferences regarding the LM test. Chesher 
and Irish (1987) provide a set o f easily computable diagnostics based on score tests for the probit 
and related models. Score tests for the null hypotheses of homoscedasticity, normality and of the 
information matrix idendty are easily computable for the probit. In terms o f the reduced form 
criterion function of (S .l) the null o f normality is decisively rejected by the data47. The magni­
tude of this rejection brings the validity of the score test somewhat into question and as in the 
case of the linear regression model may to some extent be explained by the test's poor finite sam­
ple properties. Chesher and Spady (1988) examine this particular issue in the context o f the 
linear regression model. If the score test results are valid and the distributional assumption of 
normality questionable Lee (1983) provides an alternative estimator that is consistent with more 
general distributional assumptions and suggests, for example, a logistic distribution48. However, 
this still possesses the limitation that a distributional assumption must be made. It is this distri-
44 The X2 statistics for the males are 0.088 and 3.482 for the non-manual and manual sectors respectively
and the comparable female estimates are 0.017 and 0.429 for non-manual and manual respectively. The
da ted  critical values we 6.63.3.84 and 2.71 for the 1%, 3% and 10% level of significance.
47 X2 statistics o f  636.6 and 846.3 are recorded for the male and female reduced form equations o f  (3.1) 
respectively. Both possess two degrees o f  freedom and the critical value at the 1% level is 9.21.
** Applying a logit to the reduced form o f  (3.1) makes little difference to the exogeneity results even if 
one accepts that the Lee test baaed on the I  variable (like Heckman's) possesses less desirable asymptotic
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butional problem that renders the IV estimator more appealing. However, the Hausman test 
possesses its own limitations. I f  the instruments are orthogonal to the regressor being instrument­
ed the power o f the test is zero and not rejecting the null when untrue is conceivable.
Therefore, both sets of results should be couched in terms o f the above provisos. Since the 
LM tests could be taken as slightly in conflict with the Hausman tests any conclusion regarding 
exogeneity/endogeneity must remain relatively neutral.
5.9 Wage Differentials
The interpretation of the IV and Heckman based wage differentials using the "index 
number" approach is slightly different from OLS. The "index number" approach hinges on the 
fact that the regression "line” passes through the means of the data. Although, OLS satisfies this 
property the IV estimator doesn’t  The IV based differentials are calculated in a similar manner to 
the OLS based differentials, i.e. by weighting mean characteristics by the appropriate IV 
coefficient estimates. The consequence of this, however, is that the explained and unexplained 
parts of the observed wage differential do not add up to the gross observed mean wage differen­
tial. Nevertheless, for purposes of comparison the IV based differentials are calculated in this 
manner.
In analysing wage discrimination it may appear more appealing to focus attention on the 
differential in wage offers that individuals drawn at random from the population face. A 
modification due to Reimers (1983) provides an alternative interpretation of the discriminadon 
effect based on the differences in wages corrected for selectivity bias. The gross difference in ob­
served wages for either occupadonal sector based on the two-step Heckman procedure is given by 
AW -  AX$" + XrA$ + -  d'X' (ignoring occupadonal subscripts). If that part of the observed
wage differendal attributable to selectivity bias is netted out the resultant differential, 
AW* -  AX$" + XrA$, represents the difference in wage offers. Thus, AW* is the observed wage 
differential adjusted for differences in selectivity bias between the sexes. and X ^  can be
interpreted as providing consistent estimates of the wage offers for males and females respective­
propenics than the Mahno LM test.
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ly, with mean characteristics, selected into either the manual or non-manual sectors. This wage 
offer differential, like OLS, may be broken down into explained and unexplained parts. From the 
point of view of discrimination, examining the gender wage offer differential provides an addi­
tional insight that focusing on the observed wage differential lacks. Thus, the Heckman based 
differential estimates reported are based on the observed wage corrected for selectivity bias, i.e. 
the wage offer.
The observed manual differential is quite small and suggests that on average male manual 
workers get 1.7% more than female manual workers. In contrast, the non-manual observed dif­
ferential is considerably larger and suggests that non-manual males earn, on average, 9.S% more 
than their female counterparts. Tables 5.3 to 5.5 report OLS, IV and Heckman based explained 
and unexplained differentials in an attempt to establish how much o f the gross differential is ex­
plained by characteristics and how much by differing coefficients49.
The OLS estimates o f table 5.3 reveal no evidence of a statistical difference between what 
males and females earn in the manual sector. To pre-judge tables 5.4 and 5.5 similar results are 
recorded for the IV and Heckman cases. However, as has already been alluded to, manual male 
workers may be sacrificing wages for training and any attempt to quantify wage based discrimi­
nation in a young sample o f workers, with a high proportion of skilled manual workers, may be 
inappropriate. The problem with interpreting the manual differentials is also compounded by the 
fact that there is a small number of females in the skilled occupational category. Though there 
may be econometric advantages with the dichotomous occupational breakdown employed, the 
problem the categorisation creates for interpretation is clear.
The overall picture is slightly different when the unexplained non-manual differentials are 
examined. The OLS estimates o f table 5.3 imply that males in the non-manual sector receive on 
average 5.9% more than females with comparable human capital and other characteristics. The 
differential in this case Is statistically significant at the 1 % level and could be interpreted as pro­
viding some evidence o f wage discrimination. The comparable IV based estimate is considerably
49 The uandard e rra n  reponed wv baied on Stew art (1987) and their calculation Is as in chapter four.
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larger suggesting a m ale mark-up of over 16%. However, a  cautious interpretation is suggested 
by its statistical insignificance. The gulf in estimates is surprising given the non-rejection of the 
null o f exogeneity by th e  Hausman test. I f  the consistent and unbiased IV estimates are based on 
the correct treatment o f  occupations then the statistical insignificance could reflect the fact that 
the consistency is bought at the price of efficiency. The high variances recorded for the estimates 
may reflect the use o f  relatively poor instruments which would also bring the validity of the 
Hausman test results back  into question. If  because of the poor set o f instruments used the Haus­
man test fails to detect endogeneity when present an explanation for the vast magnitude in esti­
mates could be provided. Duncan and Leigh (1985) suggest that in the presence o f endogeneity 
OLS based differentials should be different from IV based differentials since they represent the 
outcome of two conceptually different experiments. The form er represents a differential condi­
tional on an individual’s  occupational attachment and the latter represents a differential for an in­
dividual drawn at random  from the population unconditional on occupational attachment.
Table 5.5 reports estim ates of the explained and unexplained wage offer differentials using 
the Heckman procedure. The non-manual sector again indicates evidence of wage discrimination 
recording an estimate o f  8.5%  (significant at the 10% level). This could be interpreted as males 
in the non-manual sector receiving wage offers which are, on average. 8.5% more than what fe­
males are offered in the sam e sector with comparable endowments. Despite the slightly different 
interpretation the result is in line with the OLS based estimate which in the light o f the LM test of 
the previous section is as one would expect Since the selectivity effects for the female equations 
were both numerically sm all and statistically insignificant the comparability o f the OLS and 
Heckman based differential estimates (though admittedly measuring two different concepts) is 
not too surprising.
Three salient conclusions emerge from this section. Firstly, no evidence o f wage based 
discrimination exists in th e  manual sector. In the context o f this sample of young workers this 
need represent no surprise. A large proportion o f males In the manual sector are In the skilled 
category (70%) and in receip t of relatively low wages as Arm specific human capital suggests. 
Thus, the failure to detect wage based discrimination may be itself concealing more insidious
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forms o f  discrimination in, for example, female access to skilled training. If one accepted the 
above conjecture, then, wider manual differentials can be anticipated with the passage of these 
young workers into the adult labour market.
Secondly, regardless of the econometric method used there is strong evidence of wage 
discrimination in the non-manual sector. The estimates range from  between 6 % to 16% and 
should be interpreted as more disturbing in view o f the fact that o ver 75% of young females are in 
this particular sector and bearing in mind the single status and youth o f the sample. In the latter 
context, in particular, the magnitude of the differential in the non-manual sector could be con­
sidered inordinately high. The long term implications that this suggests for the transition of these 
workers to  the adult labour market should not be understated.
Thirdly, the low observed aggregate gender wage differential o f  2.8% provides a misleading 
figure and disguises vaster gender differences in wages by occupational sectors however broadly 
defined. Invoking the manual/non-manual framework allowed a m ore worthwhile insight into the 
detection o f unexplained gender wage differentials. This in itself m ay be interpreted as a vindica­
tion o f the exercise undertaken.
---------------------------------- TabkTS----------------------
____________ Heckman W w  Offer Differentials by Occupational Sector.
Sector______________ ¿ T ___________________ AXfl"
Non-Manual 0.1143 0.0323***
(0.0022)
Manual -0.0076 -0.0175
(0.0112)
AW'la the observed wage differential corrected for selectivity bias, i.e. the 
wage offer differential. Asymptotic standard errors in parenthesis. *** 
denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% 
k u l * titmnci mmnafitt »1 me IP* kycl uaing two HIM tan,
|j----------------------------------------------------------T S k s 3 ---------------------------------------------------------
Non-Manual/Manual Wage Differentials by Gender.
Gender OLS IV Heckman
Male 0.0324 0.2242 0.1550
Female 0.0074 0.1027 0.0994
0.0819*
(0.0471)
0.0099
(0.1059)
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5.10 Structural Model Estimates
Though the estimation of the structural model does not represent the major thrust o f this 
chapter estimates are reported for completeness sake. The estimates themselves may be viewed 
of some assistance in shedding light on the major determinants o f occupational attachment for 
young workers and in particular the role played by the non-manual/manual wage gap. Variables 
used in the estimation of the structural occupational model comprise all those used in estimating 
the reduced form o f (5.1) with the exception of identifying restrictions provided by the firm size 
dummies and the inclusion o f an appropriate experience variable and the wage gap term. In con- 
trast to the reduced form the experience variable used in the structural model is experience prior 
to the current job. It should be recalled that full experience entered the reduced form through 
substitution o f the wage equations into the structural occupational equation.
The wage gap variable is estimated as the difference between what an individual would earn 
if non-manual and what the same individual would earn if  manual. Since three estimators are 
used to estimate the wage equation parameters, three separate wage gap variables suggest them­
selves implying the estimation of three separate structural occupational models for each gender 
group.
The structural occupational model is estimated by a maximum likelihood probit estimator. 
In order to facilitate interpretation the maximum likelihood estimates are transformed into their 
marginal effects. Thus, the effect of the k* variable on the probability o f non-manual attachment 
is given by:
- l ) - , u * r v )  (5.16)
where r  is the matrix o f explanatory variables in the structural model. + ( ) is the standard normal 
density function and p t  is the k* coefficient of interest. The results reported in tables 5.7 and 5.8 
represent the marginal effects with associated maximum likelihood t-statistics in brackets.
As table 5.6 indicates the means of the occupational wage differentials vary surprisingly 
depending on which estimator is employed. The mean of the OLS estimate for the non- 
manual/manual differential is 3.3% for the males and just under 1% for the females. In control­
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ling for endogeneity the comparable figures using the consistent IV estimates are 23.1% and 
10.8% and using the consistent Heckman estimates 16.8% and 10.4%. A key question, therefore, 
is the extent to which the structural model estimates are sensitive to the wage gap term used in es­
timation. Inspection o f the results reported in tables 5.7 and 5.8 indicates that most o f the expla­
natory variables determining non-manual attachment appear relatively robust to the wage gap 
variable used. Where the contrast in estimates actually occurs is, in fact, in terms of the 
coefficients on the wage gap variables. However, before discussing the wage gap estimates them­
selves a brief discussion initially focuses on the effects o f the other explanatory variables on 
non-manual male occupational attachment.
Possession o f previous experience is negligible in terms o f  influencing non-manual attach­
m ent For young workers this need not be surprising since employers selection of non-manual 
young workers is more likely to be on the basis of their educational qualifications than on previ­
ous experience. In support of this it is clear that the more post-compulsory education one has the 
stronger is the probability of non-manual attachment On average, the estimates suggest that one 
additional year of education increases an individual’s probability of non-manual attachment by 
over 8 %. Having received one’s secondary education in Dublin city or county also has associated 
with it a remarkably strong effect However, this effect may be capturing the strong correlation 
between Dublin and non-manual jobs. In view of the youth o f  the sample and the consequent 
high correlation between residence of schooling and current residence it seems more likely that 
this strong relationship expresses more about non-manual jobs being Dublin based than it does 
about the individuals themselves. The well determined negative coefficient on the duration of 
unemployment is consistent with the belief that white collar employers use unemployment as ei­
ther a productivity index or a screening device in their allocation o f workers to non-manual jobs. 
Finally, the parental background variables assumed proxied by father's occupation appear to sug­
gest that, for males at least, possessing a non-manual father relative to an agricultural father in­
creases the probability of such an individual's non-manual attachment by over 20%. Comment 
on the wage gap term estimates Is reserved until later.
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All the above comments concerning the male estimates could be repeated for the female es­
timates of table 5.8. Prior experience doesn 't show statistically and the educational effect appears 
even more pronounced for the female equation. The Dublin schooling coefficient and the unem­
ployment variables both record effects similar to those reported for the male equation. However, 
the one interesting feature of the female equation, apart from the wage gap variable, is the paren­
tal background effects. They are, in general, either statistically insignificant or negative. This 
suggests that the female progeny o f the agricultural sector i.e. daughters of farmers fare at least 
as well as, if  not better than, other groups in securing non-manual employment. This effect 
could be explained by a combination o f  social conditioning and/or lack o f opportunity within the 
agricultural environment for females.
Attention now turns to an examination of the coefficients on the wage gap terms of the 
structural models. The male terms are all statistically insignificant and with the exception o f the 
IV based wage gap variable large standard errors are recorded. Thus, the tentative conclusion of­
fered for males is that wage gaps are not as important in determining non-manual attachment as, 
for example, is education, residence o f schooling, unemployment or parental background. The 
female estimates present a degree o f ambiguity. For the three wage gap variables in the female 
equation, all are statistically significant at the 5% level or better. However, while the OLS and 
the Heckman based estimates record negative effects, the IV based wage gap variable records a 
strong positive effect. While all those variables that are important for the males are also as im­
portant for the females the conflict in signs in terms of the wage gap variables and their statistical 
significance is worrying. No convincing interpretation for this particular result can be offered.
120
Ta Me 5.7
M arginal E ffec ts for the S tructu ra l M ale Eauationa
Variable OLS based IV based Heckman based
Constant -0.3930*** -0.3695*** -0.3950***
(12.337) (10.357) (11.332)
Previous Exp. 0.0154* 0.0137* 0.0159**
(1.936) (1.856) (2.016)
Education 0.0815*** 0.0822*** 0.0806
(9.446) (10.113) (7.889)
Schooling in Dublin 0.1614*** 0.1776*** 0.1576***
(5.477) (6.254) (4.542)
Move Residence 0.0855* 0.0618 0.0842*
(1712) (2.664) (1.674)
Unemployment (in months) -0.0047 -0.0057*** -0.0047***
(-2.322) (2.664) (2.261)
Father Non-Manual 0.1913*** 0.1910*** 0.1911***
(5.755) (5.754) (5.749)
Father Manual 0.0522* 0.0519 0.0522*
(1652) (1.643) (1.652)
Wage G ap (logs) -0.0060 -0.1038 0.0259
(0.0330) (1413) (0.140)
Dep.Var. (mean) 0.377 0.377 0.377
269.13*** 271.12*** 269.15***
»■ 0.133 0.136 0.135
Observations 1505 1505 505
Values in parentheses are |t| values. ••*  denotes significance a t the 1%
level, ** denotes significance a t  th e  5%  level, * denotes significance a t the
1 0 % level using two tailed tests. X2  tests for the ove rail significance o f the
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Tabi« 5.8
Marginal Effects for the S tructura l Female Eauations
V ariab le OLS based IV based Heckman based
C onstant -0.0827* • -0.0808*** -0.0112
(2.572) (2.642) (0.365)
Previous E xp. 0.0220*** -0.0041 0.0100
(2.904) (0.585) (1.252)
Education 0.1477*** 0.1205*** 0.1297***
(13.007) (13.432) (8.450)
Schooling in  Dublin 0.2135*** 0.0736*** 0.1595***
(7.316) (3.072) (4.755)
Move Residence -0.0369 0.0658 0.0517
(0.690) (1.396) (0.961)
Unemploym ent (in months) -0.0220* ** -0.0047* • -0.0035***
(7.476) (2.344) (4.051)
F ather N on-M anual 0.0008 0.0227 0.0051
(0.026) (0.746) (0.162)
F ather M anual -0.0836 -0.0626** -0.0838***
(3.101) (2.266) (2.936)
Wage G ap (logs) -1.1004 0.4642*** -0.4142**
(6.599) (9.040) (2.093)
Dep.Var. (mean) 0.755 0.755 0.735
x i 311.76*** 354.90*** 279.91 • • •
p* 0.212 0.240 0.185
1i0
1322 1322 1322
Value« In parentheses are |t| values. • • •  denotes significance a t the 1% level,
• •  denotes significance a t the 5%  level, * denotes significance a t the 10%
level using tw o  tailed tests. X2 tests for the overall significance of the slope
-1 2 2 -
5.11 Conclusions
A key issue addressed in this chapter has been the effect o f occupational endogeneity on 
both gender and occupational wage differentials. Two contrasting econometric methods were 
employed to control for the potential endogeneity and both produced contrasting results. Use of 
the IV procedure with the associated Hausman test provided no statistical support for the en­
dogeneity proposition in either the male or the female equations. In contrast the Heckman pro­
cedure provided some evidence of sample selectivity in terms of the allocation o f young male 
workers to the manual sector. The caution expressed in interpreting these results was prompted 
by possible departures from assumed normality in the Heckman procedure and by the orthogonal­
ity of instruments and regressors in the IV case. It has to be accepted that the rationalisations 
presented were conjecture and not based on convincing evidence one way or the other. Neverthe­
less, all the estimators agreed that there is little statistical evidence o f an unexplained gender 
wage differential in the manual sector and all agreed that the converse was the case for the non- 
manual sector. However, disagreement was recorded in terms the magnitude o f the latter non- 
manual effect with estimates ranging between just over 5% to under 16%. The finding for the 
non-manual sector is made all the more interesting by the fact that 75% of young females work in 
this particular category. Thus, it could be argued that in the non-manual sector females languish 
in lower paid jobs in comparison to their equally qualified male counterparts. It could further be 
tentatively suggested that the female wage disadvantage lies in the fact that they do not secure the 
more senior jobs in this sector. This could be due to the fact that career ladders are shorter and 
promotional prospects lower for females. The fact that such a differential should exist in a sam­
ple of workers who are single and relatively young is disturbing not least for the long term impli­
cations it suggests.
It is. in the light of the above discussion, difficult to rank in order o f preference the most ap­
propriate estimation procedure, and hence, the most convincing differential estimate. If one is 
prepared to accept that occupational endogeneity is not an issue in this study and invoke the weak 
statistical test results as supportive of this view. then, the OLS estimates may be interpreted as re­
latively sound. However, decisive rejections of the normality assumption in the reduced form oc-
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cupadonal attachment equations bring Into question the Melino LM test. The possible weak 
correlation between the instruments and the corresponding independent variables may cast doubt 
on the reliability o f the Hausman test. O iven both these caveats no decisive ranking o f estima­
tion procedures is possible or prudent
Structural models of occupational attachment were also estimated and some robust findings 
were detected. Education, residence o f schooling, unemployment and parental background all 
played a role in one way or another in the determination of male and female occupational attach­
m ent However, estimates of the male wage gap effect proved to be statistically insignificant 
with the comparable effect for females proving sensitive to the manner the wage gap variable was 
calculated. On balance it could be concluded that the effects of the non-manual/manual wage 
gaps are of less importance to young workers in the determination o f occupational attachment 
than, for example, is education, parental background and unemployment.
Finally, it is clear from the proceeding analysis that the occupational segregation o f females 
may explain some part o f their wage disadvantage. It’s clearly difficult to establish the gender 
wage effects that originate through occupational segregation on the basis o f framework used in 
this chapter. Greater insight into the segregation effect is likely to come from the use o f a finer 
occupational classification. Chapter six outlines a methodology designed to achieve this objec­
tive and quantify the gender wage effects associated with occupational segregation.
Appendix 5.A1
Table Sj U
Reduced Form Male and Female Probit
Variable Male
Constant -1.2403*** 0.3767**
(9.334) (2.260)
Exp^4 yrs. 0.0217 0.0396
(0.657) (0.969)
Exp.>4 yrs. 0.0366 -0.0205
(1.003) (-0.467)
Education 0.2487*** 0.4514***
(9.600) (11.780)
50 5 Firm < 400 -0.1135 -1.246***
(1.254) (11.879)
Firm * 400 0.1066 -0.5452***
(1231) (4.585)
Schooling in Dublin City & Co. 0.4744*** 0.5166***
(5.911) (5.028)
(Jnemployment(months) -0.0130** -0.0373***
(2.109) (4.381)
Move Residence 0.2252 0.2915
(1.456) (1406)
Father Non-Manual 0.5895*** 0.1170
(5.755) (0.884)
Father Manual 0.1547 -0.2765**
(1.589) (2.307)
Observations 1505 1322
Values in parentheses are |t| values. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, 
• •  denotes significance at the 5% level, * denotes significance at the 10% lev­
el using two tailed tests.
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Chapter Six
Gender W age Discrimination and Occupational Segregation
6.1 Introduction
The inclusion of exogenous occupation controls ignores, as Brown et al. (1980) point out, 
the existence of any potential discriminatory factors that may impinge on an individual’s access 
to certain occupations and treats the given occupational distribution as justified. The authors 
argue for a more integrated approach to calculating the wage effects o f gender discrimination and 
suggest a modification to the "index number" approach that allows for a decomposition of the 
gender wage difference into explained and unexplained occupational components. The approach 
merges aspects o f the wage differentials literature (examples o f which are cited in chapter two) 
and the occupational attachment literature (an example of which is provided by Schmidt and 
Strauss (1976)). The methodology allows not only for a decomposition o f the gender wage dif­
ferential into explained and unexplained parts within occupations (the intra-occupational effect) 
but also allows for gender wage differential effects that operate through differing occupational 
attainment (the inter-occupational effect). This latter effect can be further decomposed into 
effects due to differing characteristics and to those due to differing coefficients. This last term 
provides an estimate for the wage effects o f occupational segregation. Brown et al. (1980) and 
M iller (1987) have both employed this methodology in empirical work for the US and UK 
respectively since it allows not only for a direct treatment of occupational differences but also for 
a more sensitive treatment o f occupational wage differentials. As a consequence it is argued a 
more fruitful insight into discrimination effects is provided.
The methodology requires two distinct and separate steps. Firstly, the estimation of an 
occupational attachment equation in order to predict and simulate male and female occupational
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distributions and secondly the estimation o f  separate occupational wage equations. It is the latter 
step that provides for the isolation of a "cleaner" occupational wage discrimination effect How­
ever, as chapter five pointed out the problem  posed by the estimation o f separate occupational 
wage equations relates to the possible existence of some selection process that determines the 
observed occupational sample. If the disturbance terms in the occupational wage equations are 
correlated with the disturbance term in the occupational selection equation then conventional esti­
mation techniques provide biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. This has clear implica­
tions for the estimated discrimination effects. Methods designed to correct for such selectivity 
bias in a dichotomous context have been suggested in the literature by Heckman (1976 and 1979) 
and were applied in an occupational context in chapter five. However, little attention has 
focused on the problem as posed in the m ore valid polychotomous occupational framework51.
The clear deficiency of the Brown e t  al. (1980) and the Miller (1987) papers lies in a failure 
to take account o f the potential selectivity bias in occupational wage equations. An objective of 
this chapter is to integrate more effectively the information derived in the estimation of an occu­
pational attachment equation with the occupational wage equations in order to correct for the 
potential presence of selectivity bias in the latter. An approach first outlined by Lee (1983) and 
used by Trost and Lee (1983) and Dolton. Makepeace and Van der Klaaw (1987) is employed 
here.52 Though the "index number" decomposition modified by Brown et al. (1980) and used by 
Miller (1987) is contingent on the use o f  OLS an adjustment to take account o f  selectivity bias 
due to Reimers (1983) used in chapter five is also employed in this chapter.
The following section demonstrates how the observed mean wage differential may be 
decomposed into intra- and inter-occupational components. Section 6.3 explains the modelling 
and econometric methodology and section 6.4 provides a brief description o f the data set to be 
used. Sections 6.3 and 6.6 report and com m ent on the occupational and wage equation estimates 
Sections 6.7 and 6.8 calculate the empirical components o f the wage differential as outlined in
31 H«y (1980) and Doltoo, Makepeace Mid Van de r Klaaw (1987) provide an exception in this regard.
52 Though Dolton. Makepeace and Van der K laaw  (1987) examine the issue of ictecuvity bias in male 
and female wage equations an explicit examination o f  the effects o f  selectivity bias on the discrimination 
coefficient is avoided.
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section 6.2. Section 6.9 offers some conclusions.
6.2 Decomposing the Wage Differential
Following Brown el al. (1980) the mean gender wage differential can be decomposed into 
explained and unexplained inter- and intra-occupational components. The male and fem ale occu­
pational wage equations may be expressed as
* r - w » < r (6.1)
w; - z;p/ *«/ (6.2)
where the superscripts m and f  denote respectively male and female. W | (where k ■ m .f) denotes 
the wage for the J*  occupation expressed in logs. Zf  denotes a vector o f the standard produc­
tivity variables for the j*  occupational category, a  vector of unknown parameters for the 
males and females and t f  is an error term assumed to satisfy the standard set of assumptions.
The "index number" approach may be used to decompose the occupational w age differen­
tial into portions attributable to differing coefficients given the same endowments and to  differing 
endowments given the same wage structure. To obtain the overall mean wage differential in this 
context the above components must be weighted by the sample proportions of males and  females 
in each occupation. Denoting these sample proportions by and P] for the m ales and the 
females respectively, the overall mean wage differential may be written as33
A W .W --W , - ^ ( P r W f  -  r/WJ) (6.3)
However, information regarding the effect o f occupational differences can also be incorporated 
into the above decomposition. Manipulating some of the terms in the above equation allow s (6.3) 
to be re-written as
p/(*rir - *rSr<rr-?/> <«■«>
sod  M  equals the i ' o f occupational categories.
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Thus, the last term in expression (6.4) controls for the occupational distribution of women and 
captures the effect o f occupational differences on the wage differential. Wages can be decom­
posed in the normal way assuming that, in the absence o f discrimination, the male wage and 
occupational structure prevails. Expanding (6.4) further allows for the decomposition of the 
grand mean wage differential into its four component parts
(6.5)
»r<?r-f') wr<p'-F/>
where A$ = and PJ is the proportion o f females in the sample that would be in the j*
occupation if females were confronted by the same distribution of occupational opportunities as 
males. Thus, the grand mean wage differential may be decomposed into four constituent parts. 
The first and second terms are the unexplained and explained gender differentials in wages. The 
third term represents that part o f the overall mean wage differential attributable to the explained 
allocation of workers to the given occupational categories. The fourth and final term represents 
that part o f the differential in the mean wage due to unexplained gender differences in the struc­
ture o f occupational attainment. This may be interpreted as the effect of occupational segregation 
on the gender wage differential.
It should be pointed out that the results obtained are contingent on what assumption is made 
regarding the wage and occupational structure in the absence of discrimination34. For the pur­
poses of this analysis the structure prevailing in the absence of discrimination is assumed to be 
fully described by the m ale structure. As already mentioned in chapter four this assumption does 
not appear too offensive. Brown ei al. (1980) illustrate that the "index number" problem also 
applies in terms o f the assumed occupational structure with the results again hinging on which 
structure is assumed to prevail in the absence of discrimination. A taste based model of discrimi­
nation can also lead to occupational segregation of females holding identical characteristics as 
males. If, again, one assumes males are not subject to the exercise of an employer’s33
34 This is the well known "index number" problem a discussion of which appears in chapter four.
- 129-
discriminatory power then the male occupational distribution can be assumed to reasonably 
approximate a non-discriminatory occupational distribution.
T he 0  coefficient estimates for each occupational category presented in this chapter are 
obtained using the conventional OLS estimator and using a consistent estimator due to Lee 
(1983). The selectivity bias correction, as Reimers (1983) shows, has implications for the 
observed gender wage gap at both occupational and aggregate levels. Though all four com­
ponents o f  (6.3) can be isolated using the consistent estimator their interpretation is slightly dif­
ferent from OLS as was explained in chapter five.
6.3 Econometric Methodology
The theoretical background to occupational attachment is briefly sketched and follows in 
spirit the methodology outlined in both Hill (1983) and Trost and Lee (1983). Occupational 
attachment may be viewed in a utility based framework. Each individual is assumed to select 
from M  mutually exclusive categories. The individual is further assumed to compute the utilities 
attainable from each category and choose that one which provides the maximum utility level.
More conveniently it is possible to express the maximum attainable utility for each of the M 
alternatives in terms o f indirect utility functions. For the j *  occupational category, for instance, 
this may be expressed as
Vy -V (W ;.Y , T .Ky.R) (6.6)
where.
wy is the wage offer associated with occupation j  
Y is non-labour income,
T is the endownment of time,
Ky is a vector of job characteristics associated with occupation j ,  
and R is a vector o f exogenous variables. 3
33 The analysis is equally valid in i
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The utility based framework need not be interpreted as being inconsistent with labour 
market discrimination. For example, wj and/or the vector Kj m ay differ across gender due to, for 
example, an employer’s taste for discrimination. Lower wage offers and/or unfavourable job 
characteristics may reduce a female’s indirect utility and hence her willingness to select given 
occupations.
The indirect utility function may be decomposed into stochastic and non-stochastic parts. If 
\ j i  is the maximum utility attainable for individual < if  occupation j  is chosen then the indirect 
utility function may be expressed as
T he probability that the i*  individual chooses the j*  occupational category is given by
Assuming the stochastic components have independent and identical Weibull distributions then 
the difference between the error terms (■ * -■ > ) has a logistic distribution and the resultant 
model is the multinomial logit model due to M 'Fadden (1973). As is obvious from the above 
only binary comparisons are involved and this follows from the strong behavioural assumption of 
the independence of irrelevant alternatives which gives the logit model its form.
For estimation purposes if  S> is replaced by X,y, then the multinomial logit model may be 
expressed as
where X, is assumed to  capture all the relevant demand and supply effects contained in the 
indirect utility function and y  is vector o f unknown occupational coefficients. Schmidt and 
Strauss (1976) and Brown et ai. (1980) employed this particular model in estimating occupa­
tional attachment equations. Occupation is treated as a categorical, unordered, discrete polycho- 
tomous variable and the logistic approach is used to estimate the impact of a vector of explana­
V* -  Sx + «X (6.7)
** -P r[v j» > V * . tor* «•>. J  -  I ..... J#] (6. 8)
o r alternatively.
(6.9)
(6 . 10)
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tory variables on the probability of being in a particular occupation relative to another. The esti­
mation of a multinomial logit model o f  occupational attainment allows prediction o f an 
individual’s occupational level on the basis o f  that individual's set o f personal characteristics.
Miller and V olker (1983) suggest advantages for the use of an ordered probit approach and 
Miller (1987) uses this approach in an occupational application. However, for the purposes of 
this chapter the use o f  such an ordered approach is avoided for two reasons. Firstly, the sequen­
tial ranking of occupations should be on the basis of life-cycle earnings. In terms of the young 
workers used in this sample estimation o f life-cycle earnings is not possible and to the author’s 
knowledge no additional evidence on this particular subject is available for Ireland. Secondly, 
use o f the ordered probit approach may possess greater advantages if  the focus o f attention (as in 
the Miller and V olker (1983) case) is vertical occupational mobility. In the context of this 
chapter the occupational mobility of interest is o f the horizontal kind and this allows the unor­
dered framework provided by the multinomial logit to be exploited.
A reduced form equation is assumed which describes the interaction o f the relevant demand 
and supply conditions in  the labour market and determines an individual’s attachment to a certain 
occupation. Because o f  the reduced form nature of the estimating equations it is not possible to 
provide unambiguous interpretations for the coefficient estimates in terms o f explicit demand or 
supply side effects. A n eclectic theoretical view should be adopted in the interpretation of the 
coefficient estimates. In  terms of (6.10) above only the parameters o f h i - 1 o f the M  occupational 
categories can be identified. The following normalisation £  ym * 0 is used in estimation and 
(6.10) becomes
Alternatively the above expression may be expressed in terms of the log odds of being in a cer­
tain occupational category and this is a function that is linear in its parameters and is given by
( 6. 12) .
(6.11)
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A dummy variable is used to define the event o f an individual being in a certain occupation. 
ytJ -  1 if the i*  individual falls into the J*  category and -  0, otherwise. In this case the log 
likelihood function is given by
where N equals the number o f observations in the sample. M axim um  likelihood methods are 
used to estimate (6.13). As pointed out above in estimation the parameters of the AT* occupa­
tional category are normalised to zero. The interpretation o f  the estimated multinomial 
coefficients are therefore in relation to this omitted category. Furthermore, the inclusion o f  inter­
cept terms in the multinomial logit model ensures that the mean o f  the predicted probabilities 
equals the means o f the actual probabilities. This is important in term s of the "index number” 
decomposition.
The next step is to use the information concerning occupational attachment in the estima­
tion o f the occupational wage equation. If one starts by assuming that the market wage in the j*  
occupation is given by
where
W j is the logged market wage for the j *  occupation,
Zj  is a vector of exogenous variables assumed to determine the wage in the j *  occupation,
(J, is a vector of unknown parameters,
and t j  is an error term for which the usual properties are assumed satisfied.
If  a systematic process governs the observation o f the j *  sam ple o f wages and if  the error 
term in that process is correlated with t j  then the application of O LS to  the above equation leads 
to biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates. Following Lee (1983) the wage equation to be 
estimated may be modified to take into consideration the effects o f  th is occupational selectivity 
bias. As Lee (1983) shows the wage equation conditional on category j  being chosen is
(6.13)
(6.14)
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W; «  Zjfij -O j Pj (6.15)
where
+ is the standard normal density function,
J  is a strictly increasing transformation that transforms the random variable associated with the 
occupational attachment equation into a standard normal variate where J  » 0 " ‘F where O is the 
standard normal distribution function and F is the probability distribution function. Oj is the 
standard error o f the disturbance term e>, and p, are the correlations between e; and the error term 
from the occupational attachment equation for the i*  individual.
Estimation is carried out in a two step framework analogous to the Heckman procedure 
employed in chapter five. Firstly, maximum likelihood estimation is used to obtain estimates for 
X from (6.11). Then, these estimates are inserted into the wage equadon of (6.15) which may be 
re-written as
where F(XiY>) are the predicted probabilities from the multinomial logit model of (6.11). More 
conveniently this equation may be expressed as
cation of OLS to the above equation (6.17). The disturbance terms are obviously heterosce- 
dastic and Lee el al. (1980) outline an appropriate variance/covariance matrix in this regard36. 
However, this proved computationally difficult to calculate in the context of this chapter and so 
the W hite (1980) heteroscedastic consistent variance/covariance matrix is reported below for the 
occupational wage equations. Though the White variance/covariance matrix corrects for heteros- 
cedasticity in the regression model it doesn’t take into consideration the fact that a predicted 56
56 See Chapter Five. *ectma 5.3.
(6.16)
where everything is as above with the exception of
(6.17)
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selectivity bias term is used in estimation. Nevertheless, though the variance/covariance matrix 
reported may be inappropriate differences are not anticipated to be large and as Maddala (1983) 
points out little is even lost in the use the OLS variance/covariance matrix. However, for the pur­
poses of this chapter the White (1980) consistent variance/covariance matrix estimates are 
reported for both the OLS and the selectivity bias corrected occupational wage equations of 
(6.14) and (6.17) respectively.
The inclusion o f the selectivity bias term has clear implications for the "index number 
decomposition". The modification suggested by Reimers (1983) and used in chapter five will 
also be used in this chapter. Thus, in summary, occupational attachment equations and wage 
equations are estimated for each gender. On the basis of the male occupational equation estimates 
female occupational distributions are simulated in order to obtain a handle on the occupational 
segregation effects. In addition female wages will be simulated on the basis of male wage struc­
tures for each occupational category to ascertain explained and unexplained wage effects within 
occupations. The analysis is presented for both observed wages and the wage offers associated 
with the consistent estimator.
In terms of the dependent polychotomous variable five relatively broad occupational 
categories are assumed. These are
(a) Professional and Managers,
(b) Clerical and Intermediate Non-Manual.
(c) Other Non-Manual,
(d) Skilled.
(e) Semi and Unskilled.
The five-way categorisation is dictated by the need to have a sufficient number o f observa­
tions in all the relevant groups. A finer classification would lead to a reduction in the number of 
observations in particular estimating cells and would place the results in a somewhat dubious 
light. Too few females in the semi-skilled occupational category prevented a wider categorisa­
tion. However, it is felt that the classification used is broad enough to allow for some confidence
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in the estimation results and fine enough to examine the issue of within occupation wage discrim­
ination.
Finally, the omitted occupational category in terms of estimation is the Semi and Unskilled 
category. Thus all the occupational equation coefficients should be interpreted in relation to this 
particular category.
6.4 Data
The number o f individuals used in the analysis in this chapter is the same as chapter five, 
however, some of the variables used are slightly different. The sub-sample was allocated across 
the five occupational categories outlined in section 6.3 on the basis o f the Census of Population 
Classification of Occupations (1981). Higher Professional, Lower Professional, Self-Employed, 
Managers, Salaried Employees were allocated to  (a). Intermediate Non-Manual Workers to (b), 
and Other Non-Manual Workers were allocated to (c). Skilled Manual Workers were allocated to 
(d) and Semi-Skilled Manual Workers and the Unskilled Workers were allocated to (e).
The full set o f variables used in the estimation of the reduced form occupational equations 
for both gender groups are
(i) An education variable defined in terms o f the number of years spent in post-compulsory edu­
cation.
(ii) A previous experience variable defined as the time spent working in jobs prior to the current 
one. The unit of measurement is years.
(ill) A set o f residence of schooling dummies controlling for the area of an individual's last 
school prior to leaving compulsory education. The three estimated dummies are Dublin city and 
county, the east and midlands and the southern region with the omitted category schooling in the 
north-west
(iv) A duration of unemployment variable defined in terms of the aggregate number of months of 
unemployment experienced by an individual since leaving school.
(v) A change of residence dummy set equal to 1 if  the individual changed residence to take up
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thcir current job.
(vi) A set o f Father’s occupational dummies designed to capture parental background influences 
on occupational uptake. Two such dummies are defined, one for non-manual and another for the 
manual category. The agricultural category is treated as the reference category in estimation.
The occupational wage equations are estimated using variables (i), (iv) and (v) above in 
addition to
(vii) A full experience variable defined in terms of two linear splines with a four year sp lit
(viii) A set of two firm size dummies (see chapter five).
(ix) A set of four current region of residence dummies. The four estimated dummies are Dublin 
city and county, the east, midlands and the southern region with the omitted category current 
residence in the north/west57.
A number of other variables were also used in estimation but to little statistical effect Industry 
dummies were used in the wage equations but proved sensitive to alterations in the specification 
and thus are not included. For the occupational equation Father’s occupation was broken down 
into a finer classification but some o f the estimated coefficients possessed high standard errors. 
The number of jobs held by the individual since leaving school was also used in both occupa­
tional and wage equations but again to little effect.
The total number o f observations for which no missing values are recorded is 2827, of 
which 1505 are male and 1332 female. Appendix A1 contains a set o f summary statistics for the 
full set o f variables used in the estimation.
6.5 Occupational Equation Estimates
The maximum likelihood multinomial logit estimates for males and females appear in 
tables 6.1 and 6.2 respectively with their associated asymptotic standard errors. The coefficient 
estimates themselves are not amenable to a ready interpretation. Schmidt and Strauss (1976) 
point out that the coefficients on the explanatory variables for the relevant categories present the
”  For,
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difference in coefficients between the category in question and the omitted category. It may be 
convenient to rank the estimated coefficients in order of size. Thus, the larger the coefficient esti­
mate the greater is the impact o f  th e  associated explanatory variable on being in a given category.
The male coefficient estim ates are broadly in line with one’s priors. The education 
coefficient increases in size m oving up the occupational ladder and reserves its largest effect, not 
surprisingly, for the professional category. The family background variables, in general, record 
statistically significant effects. Possessing a non-manual father relative to the agricultural refer­
ence group enhances one's probability of attachment to all occupational categories. The effect 
increases as one moves up the occupational categories providing the strongest effect for the pro­
fessional category. A strong significant relationship between Dublin schooling and non-manual 
occupational destination for young male workers is also noted. This may be related to the fact 
that schooling in Dublin is h ighly  correlated with current residence in Dublin which itself is 
highly correlated with the availability o f non-manual jobs. The duration o f  an individuals unem­
ployment since leaving school h as  a marked negative effect on attachment to all o f the occupa­
tional categories. The largest effec ts recorded are for the higher non-manual categories. Thus, 
the longer one’s duration of unemployment the larger is the probability that the individual will be 
attached to a semi or unskilled jo b . It could be argued that employers are using duration of 
unemployment as a productivity signal or screening device in the allocation o f higher grade jobs 
to young workers. The change o f  residence coefficient fails to show in a well determined way for 
most of the male categories with th e  notable exception of the clerical non-manual category. This 
could be explained by the migration o f individuals from outside Dublin into public service cleri­
cal jobs.
In terms of the female coefficient estimates o f table 6.2 most o f the estimates presented are 
broadly in line with those reported in  table 6.1. However, the education coefficient estimates are 
much more pronounced and well determined for all the occupational categories. The largest 
effect o f any variable in table 6 .2  is  the the change o f residence variable which records a solid 
positive effect for the female professional category. This may suggest that in order for females to 
pursue a professional career geographical mobility is necessary. Unemployment appears to play
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a  role in occupational attachment for young females though its effects are no t as pronounced as in 
the male equations and are more concentrated in the lower white collar categories.
The most surprising feature of the female coefficient estimates are those associated with 
Father’s socio-economic background. In general, the coefficients are badly determined in relation 
to non-manual family background and negative in relation to a manual fam ily background. This 
suggests that females from an agricultural background fare significantly be tte r than those from a 
manual family background in terms o f white collar occupational attainment. It should be noted 
that little statistical difference exists between possessing an agricultural o r a  white collar parental 
background. The different effects only enter in relation to the manual parental background. A 
number of tentative interpretations may be provided for this particular finding which was also 
observed in the structural model estimates of chapter five. One interpretation may lie in the 
existence of different sets of values across different parental backgrounds. If, for example, the 
daughters of farmers are encouraged to stay on longer in the education system  than those from a 
manual background due to, perhaps, a higher value being placed on education by farmers, then, 
this may explain their higher probability of non-manual attachment Alternatively, fanner's 
daughters may view urban areas as possessing greater opportunity58 and since there exists a high 
correlation between urban areas and non-manual jobs they may find them selves placed in non- 
manual jobs. On the demand side it may be that young females from rural backgrounds are 
viewed by non-manual employers as being more reliable than young females from manual back­
grounds. In this way they secure non-manual jobs through the prejudices o f  employers. The 
truth, however, is probably better represented by a combination of all the above.
In general, the large number of insignificant variables brings in to question the reliability of 
the predictions. In terms of goodness o f fit both occupational models poorly predict the alloca­
tion of individuals to their correct occupational groups. The poor predictive pow er of the occupa­
tional models has clear implications for the selectivity bias terms used in th e  estimation of the 
ocupational wage equations. The poor estimates of the occupational models could be explained
M Since their opportunities in agriculture «re limited.
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by the small number o f observations in some o f the occupational categories. Thus, the poor 
predictive power o f the occupational models it  the price paid for a finer occupational disaggrega-
tion than that o f chapter five.
Table 0.1
Reduced Form Male Occupational Estimates
Variable Prof.it Man. Cleric. Other Skilled
Constant -3.5865*** -1.2592*** -1.4011*** 0.9324***
(0.4456) (0.2955) (0.3406) (0.2147)
Previous Experience 0.1844** -0.0870 0.0601 -0.0908**
(0.0746) (0.0599) (0.0588) (0.0446)
Education 0.9009*** 0.4593*** 0.1337 0.0572
(0.0854) (0.0713) (0.0876) (0.0629)
Dublin City & Co. 0.8791** 1.0645*** 0.7732** 0.2352
(0.4117) (0.2970) (0.3355) (0.2413)
East & Midlands -0.1499 -0.1274 -0.1173 -0.1398
(0.2171) (0.3366) (0.2954) (0.4255)
South 0.0899 0.0867 -0.0618 0.1849
(0.2103) (0.3292) (0.2831) (0.4005)
Unemployment (months) -0.0856* • • -0.0936*•* -0.0262** -0.0578***
(0.0107) (0.0135) (0.0188) (0.0282)
Change of Residence 0.2114 1.1507** 0.5331 0.5091
Father's Orru|
(0.4082) (0.5379) (0.4330) (0.5618)
Non-Manual 1.6954*** 1.3191*** 1.0076*** 0.4365**
(0.3756) (0.2804) (0.3268) (0.2241)
Manual 0.0504 0.3127 0.3282 0.0257
(0.3787) (0.2554) (0.2947) (0.1827)
Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses and *** denotes significance 
at the 1% level, • •  denotes significance at the 5% level, * denotes 
significance at the 10% level using two tailed tests. The number of observa­
tions is 1505.
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Variable P rof-*  M an. Cleric. O ther
Constant -4.4131*** -0.5332* -0.9495*** -1.8426***
(0.5477) (0.2757) (0.3437) (0.4631)
Previous Experience 0.2518*** -0.0344 0.1151* 0.0182
(0.0884) (0.0553) (0.0652) (0.0901)
Education 0.1.1640*** 0.8566*** 0.4315*** 0.3008***
(0.1115) (0.0722) (0.0919) (0.1142)
Dublin City & Co. 1.5705*** 1.1196*** 0.5507 -0.0654
(0.4737) (0.2712) (0.3537) (0.5120)
East & Midlands 0.9301* 0.5646** -0.0239 0.2257
(0.4835) (0.2715) (0.3639) (0.4823)
South 0.8603* 0.6142** 0.5558* 1.1705***
(0.4515) (0.2605) (0.3271) (0.4213)
Unemployment (months) -0.0413 -0.0659* •• -0.0340* -0.0129
(0.0313) (0.0165) (0.0202) (0.0227)
Change of Residence 2.0012*** 0.3915 0.9071* 0.0972
(0.5185) (0.4622) (0.5156) (0.7434)
Non-Manual 0.1601 -0.0399 -0.3953 -0.3734
(0.4030) (0.2621) (0.3262) (0.4328)
M anual -1.1775*** -0.5704*** -1 0302*** -0.3040
(0.4092) (0.2362) (0.2992) (0.3698)
Asymptotic standard  erro rs are  in parentheses and  •* •  denotes significance
a t the 1% level, ** denotes significance a t the 5%  level, •  denotes
significance at the 10% level using two tailed tests. T he num ber o f observa­
tions is 1322.
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6.6 Wage Equation Estimates
Tables 6.3 to 6.6 report the coefficient estimates based on OLS and the consistent estimator 
outlined in section 6.3. Most o f the coefficient estimates appear robust to the estimator used with 
the exception o f the years in post-compulsory education variable. The contrasts between the set 
o f OLS and consistent estimates for this variable is most marked in those equations where there is 
strong evidence of selectivity bias. Since education appears as a strong determinant of occupa­
tional attachment (as the previous section outlined) this need not be interpreted as such a surpris­
ing result.
In terms o f an economic interpretation the wage equation estimates reveal little in the way 
o f surprise. The returns to labour force experience are steeper in the first years of labour force 
experience in comport with human capital theory. The returns to an additional year in education 
though varying across occupational categories are in line with the estimates in chapters four and 
five. Nevertheless, the variability in the female returns is much greater and in the skilled occupa­
tional category the returns to formal post-compulsory education are not statistically different 
from zero. For most of the male occupational categories residing in Dublin has a pronounced 
positive effect and also wages appear to increase significantly with increases in firm size. The 
same could in general be said for the female estimates though the incidence of significance on the 
Dublin coefficients are less. One other contrasting feature worthy of mention relates to the unem­
ployment variable. For all the male occupational categories a positive relationship exists between 
unemployment and the wage. This is a finding not inconsistent with the predictions o f neo­
classical job search theory. However, for the females a negative relationship is recorded for all 
three white collar occupational categories which suggests a differential treatment of females in 
regard to unemployment and wages. However, in terms of the consistent estimates only the cleri­
cal occupational category records a statistically significant effect.
Attention now turns to the selectivity bias terms and their interpretation. Though the 
asymptotic properties of the t-statistic associated with the —£  term are not well known59 they
59 This is in contrast to the H edunsn procedure where Melino (1982) provides an LM  test for exojenetty 
which was used in chapter five.
- 1 4 2 -
may be used as a rough guide to ascertain if there exists evidence of non-randomness in the allo­
cation of workers to occupational categories. The signs on the estimated proxy variables also 
provide information on the direction o f the selectivity bias. Due to the construction of the proxy 
variables a positive (negative) coefficient implies negative (positive ) selectivity or truncation in 
terms of the occupational category in question. The economic interpretation for this is that a 
worker with a given set o f characteristics selected at random from the population faces on aver­
age a lower (higher) wage offer distribution if  selected into that sector rather than any other sec­
tor.
For the male equations the strongest selectivity effect emerges for the skilled occupational 
category and suggests that for a young male worker drawn at random from the population with 
average characteristics the observed wage offer distribution is 15% less than the distribution that 
would be observed for the average male individual selected into any other occupational category. 
Human capital theory can again be invoked to provide an explanation for this particular finding. 
It suggests that in the context of firm specific human capital training young workers accept a 
wage less than their marginal product in order to share the costs o f training with employers and 
this will be particularly so for young skilled workers.
An even stronger selectivity effect in the female Skilled sector is recorded suggesting that 
on average the net hourly wage distribution is almost 30% less than the wage distribution 
observed for the same individual selected into any other sector. However, the small number of 
observations in this particular category suggests a cautious interpretation as the coefficients are 
not well determined for a number of key variables. The other strong selectivity effect recorded 
for the females is in terms of the clerical occupational sector. The coefficient here suggests that 
the wage offer distribution that is observed for the average female drawn at random from the 
population into this category is about 16% above what would be observed for the average female 
with the same personal characteristics selected into any other occupational category. Neither of 
these results should come as any surprise. Young females who end up in secure white collar cler­
ical jobs tend on average to do better than their peers. This is certainly the case in the context of 
young workers. It is clear that both these findings and that obtained for the skilled male category
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vindicate the use o f the consistent estimator.
A tentative test for the joint statistical significance o f the selectivity bias terms and hence 
occupational exogeneity is provided by a likelihood ratio te s t The %2 statistics with five degrees 
of freedom60 for the male and female equations are 7.00 and 7.37 respectively suggesting non­
rejection o f the null hypothesis of exogeneity. Nevertheless, the rejection of the joint significance 
of the selectivity terms conceals the individual effects which emerge strongly in the skilled occu­
pational categories for both sexes and the clerical category for the females.
The asiocuucd critical values are 1509 .11 .07  and  9.24 for the 1 * . 5 *  and 1 0 «  level o f significance.
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Occupational Wage Estimate» (ConsistentJ
Variable Semi A  Unskilled Skilled Other Clerical Prof.A Man
Constant -0.0983 -0.4715*** -0.1054 0.0559 -0.2118
(0.1091) (0.0504) (0.1158) (0.1898) (0.2128)
Exp. S 4 yrs. 0.1077*** 0.1708*** 0.0744** 0.1035*** 0.1104***
(0.0218) (0.0120) (0.0291) (0.0143) (0.0287)
Exp.> 4 yrs. 0.0351** 0.0604*** 0.0550** 0.0466*** 0.0556
(0.0146) (0.0098) (0.0223) (0.0181) (0.O444)
Education 0.0794*** 0.0459*** 0.0728*** 0.0321 0.0759***
(0.0258) (0.0133) (0.0215) (0.0204) (0.0281)
50 s  Firm <400 0.1565** 0.1127*** 0.1925*** 0.1274** 0.0672
(0.0587) (0.0286) (0.0533) (0.0555) (0.0688)
Firm 2 400 0.1977*** 0.1154*** 0.2930*** 0.2095*** 0.0794
r im a n i g  f i l i n i
(0.0426) (0.0309) (0.0589) (0.0429) (0.0789)
Dublin City & Co. 0.1236* 0.0617* 0.1086 0.0728 0.2591**
(0.0624) (0.0371) (0.0792) (0.0700) (0.1038)
South 0.0739 0.0992*** 0.1132 -0.0526 0.1426
(0.0649) (0.0338) (0.0764) (0.0712) (0.1049)
Midlands -0.0336 -0.0205 -0.0363 -0.0179 0.0409
(0.0571) (0.0356) (0.1305) (0.0656) (0.1626)
East 0.0240 0.1185*** 0.2268*** -0.0344 0.0213
(0.0936) (0.0453) (0.0803) (0.0696) (0.1320)
Unemployment (months] 0.0040* 0.0023 0.0038 0.0036 0.0103
(0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0033) (0.0043) (0.0091)
Change o f Residence 0.1432** 0.0553 0.1481 0.0362 0.0967
(0.0577) (0.0525) (0.1157) (0.0454) (0.1127)
" f -0.0848 0.1515*** -0.0544 -0.0729* -0.0070
(0.0668) (0.0579) (0.0286) (0.0935) (0.0637)
Observations 277 660 146 296 26
»tandard errors are in parenlbesis and are based on White (1980) and are 
leteroscedastic consistent *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, 
'• at the 5% level and * at the 10% level using two tailed tests.
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Variable Semi A Unskilled Skilled Other Clerical Prof.A Man
Constant -0.2049*** -0.3891••• -0.1921 -0.0757 -0.2347*
(0.0664) (0.0419) (0.1188) (0.0817) (0.1386)
Exp. $ 4  yrs. 0.1111*** 0.1714*** 0.0740** 0.1035*** 0.1112***
(0.0204) (0.0120) (0.0292) (0.0143) (0.0294)
Exp.> 4 yrs. 0.0344* • 0.0641*** 0.0528** 0.0444** 0.0555
(0.0145) (0.0096) (0.0223) (0.0173) (0.0447)
Education 0.0644*** 0.0639* •• 0.0605*** 0.0401** 0.0783**'
(0.0174) (0.0104) (0.0180) (0.0171) (0.0187)
SO S Firm <400 0.1564*** 0.1171*** 0.1937*** 0.1292** 0.0672
(0.0585) (0.0285) (0.0534) (0.0558) (0.0687)
Firm * 400 0.1956* 0.1136*** 0.3019*** 0.2154*** 0.0798
(0.0427) (0.0310) (0.0584) (0.0424) (0.0786)
Dublin City *  Co. 0.0884 0.1030*** 0.1186 0.1047* 0.2619
(0.0523) (0.0330) (0.0797) (0.0576) (0.1061)
South 0.0614 0.0943*** 0.1042 -0.0450 0.1443
(0.0614) (0.0339) (0.0762) (0.0692) (0.1078)
Midlands -0.0306 -0.0137 -0.0496 -0.0143 0.0406
(0.0573) (0.0353) (0.1310) (0.0664) (0.1618)
East 0.0256 0.1303*** 0.2274*** -0.0272 0.0195
(0.0940) (0.0450) (0.0800) (0.0699) (0.1287)
Unemployment (months) 0.0060* • • 0.0041 0.0047 0.0019 0.0103
(0.0016) (0.0028) (0.0032) (0.0043) (0.0088)
Change o f Residence 0.0953** 0.0546 0.1080 0.0561 0.1146
(0.0552) (0.0524) (0.1090) (0.0417) (0.1125)
Observations 277 660 46 296 126
Standard errors are in parenthesis and are based on W hite (1980) and i 
.............................— ....................................significance at the 1% le%
»• at the 5 «  level and •  at the 1 0 «  level using two ti
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Table 6 5
Female Occupational Wage Estimates (Consistent)
Variable Semi & Unskilled Skilled Other Clerical Prof *  Man
0.00173 -0.6847* -0.7640*** -0.0057 -0.2304
(0.0649) (0.4061) (0.1679) (0.0852) (0.3191)
Exp. £  4  yrs. 0.0557*** 0.0598 0.1758*** 0.0721 * • • 0.0833
(0.0123) (0.0463) (0.0264) (0.0084) (0.0476)
Exp.> 4  yrs. 0.0054 0.0492*• 0.0285 0.0442*** 0.0931
(0.0099) (0.0222) (0.0249) (0.0121) (0.0342)
Education 00466 -0.0225 0.0956*** 0.0444*** 0.1070
(0.0286) (0.0557) (0.0241) (0.0140) (0.0369)
»0 s  Firm  <400 0.1161*** 0.1523 0.3075*** 0.1691*** -0.0501
(0.0340) (0.1385) (0.0693) (0.0244) (0.0987)
Firm 2 400 0.2480*** 0.4150*** 0.3129*** 0.2419*** 0.2040—
(0.0369) (0.1186) (0.0767) (0.0205) (0.0915)
Dublin City & Co. 0.0597 -0.0260 0.1003 0.1813*** 0.1061
(0.0385) (0.1673) (0.0849) (0.0333) (0.0685)
South 0.0787 0.1601** 0.0355 0.0927*** 0.1316
(0.0382) (0.0988) (0.0750) (0.0341) (0.0854)
Midlands 0.0251 -0.0636 0.0585 0.0117 0.4988*
(0.0432) (0.1863) (0.1005) (0.0407) (0.2509)
East -0.0472 -0.0633 0.3931** 0.0582 0.3077
(0.0509) (0.1443) (0.1541) (0.0454) (0.1887)
Unemployment (months) 0.0056** 0.0122* • -0.0012 -0.0043 -0.0050
(0.0024) (0.0056) (0.0049) (0.0029) (0.0107)
Change of Residence 0.1223* 0.0788 0.0450 0.0152 0.0053
(0.0658) (0.0787) (0.0960) (0.0441) (0.1015)
- f -0.0321 0.2800* 0.0337 •0.1605** 0.0092
(0.0659) (0.1615) (0.0959) (0.0776) (0.0478)
Observations 251 73 145 771 82
standard errors are in parenthesis and are based on White (1980) and are
îeteroscedastic consistent * • •  denotes statistical significance at the 1% level,
** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level using two tailed tests.
___________1
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Table 6.6
(OLSJ
Variable Semi A  Unskilled Skilled Other Clerical Prof.A Man
Constant -0.0185 -0.1289 -0.7120*** -0.1614*** -0.1942
(0.0491) (0.1445) (0.0991) (0.0407) (0.2464)
Exp. £  4  yrs. 0.0556*** 0.0633 0.1741*** 0.0704*** 0.0816*
(0.0123) (0.0485) (0.0259) (0.0084) (0.0469)
Exp.> 4  yrs. 0.0053 0.0509* • 0.0274 0.0408*** 0.0962***
(0.0099) (0.0238) (0.0248) (0.0119) (0.0371)
Education 0.0341*** 0.0439* 0.1011*** 0.0676*** 0.1038***
(0.0111) (0.0263) (0.0181) (0.0072) (0.0288)
50 s  Firm <400 0.1145*** 0.1476 0.3063*** 0.1738*** -0.0507
(0.0337) (0.1403) (0.0697) (0.0240) (0.0992)
Firm 2 400 0.2480*** 0.3752*** 0.3110*** 0.2457*** 0.2038**
(0.0370) (0.1070) (0.0767) (0.0205) (0.0917)
Dublin City A  Co. 0.0487 0.1375 0.1081 0.2108*** 0.1017
(0.0310) (0.1040) (0.0781) (0.0306) (0.0651)
South 0.0716* • 0.0197 0.0376 0.0986*•* 0.1303
(0.0344) (0.1256) (0.0744) (0.0342) (0.0846)
Midlands 0.0210 -0.0476 0.0667 0.0291 0.5018**
(0.0414) (0.1872) (0.0949) (0.0399) (0.2397)
East -0.0503 -0.0671 0.4030*** 0.0777* 0.3067
(0.0508) (0.1374) (0.1495) (0.0453) (0.1898)
Unemployment (months; 0.0062* • • 0.0096** -0.0012 -0.0073*** -0.0051
(0.0021) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0025) (0.0107)
Change o f Residence 0.1068* 0.1418* 0.0330 -0.0268 -0.0013
(0.0622) (0.0655) (0.0943) (0.0368) (0.0964)
Observations 251 73 145 771 82
Standard errors are In parenthesis and are baaed on White (1980) and are 
leteroscedastic consistent •** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, 
at the 5% level and •  at the 1 0 «  level using tw o tailed tests.
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4.7 Occupational Wage Differential«
The mean observed gender wage differential across occupations is (in logarithms) 0.0282. 
In other w ords, males on average earn just under 3% more in wages than do females. The mean 
gender w age offer differential across occupations is less suggesting a negligible aggregate dif­
ferential a t 0.0012. These relatively low aggregate figures mask vast differences within given 
occupations as is evident from tables 6.7 and 6.8. The observed wage differentials range from 
close to zero  for the professional and managerial category to over 30% for the other intermediate 
non-manual category. The gulf in magnitude is even more dramatic in terms of the occupational 
wage o ffer differentials. These vary from 2.8% in the professional and managerial category to 
over 30% in  the skilled sector. As is recalled from chapter five focusing exclusively on the 
observed wage differences within given occupations obscures important effects if  the female 
equations are characterised by a strong selectivity effect. This is seen in terms of Table 6.8 where 
the widest wage offer differentials exist, not surprisingly, in those occupational categories where 
there is e ither strong positive selectivity effects in the male equations and/or strong negative 
selectivity effects in the female equations.
Using the wage equation estimates of tables 6.3 to 6.6 observed wage and wage offer dif­
ferentials by occupation can be decomposed into explained and unexplained pans. As Cain 
(1986) surveys both parts of the differential can be viewed as providing a handle on discrimina­
tion. The explained part o f the differential may be interpreted as representing the effects o f pre­
entry discrimination if females are assumed to encounter institution-related diacrimination in 
their procurement of productivity enhancing characteristics. For example, if females encounter 
discrimination in their subject uptake at the secondary education level than the explained part o f 
the differential may capture the pre-entry effect T he unexplained part is interpreted as the post­
entry labour market discrimination effect and most attention focuses on this particular com ­
ponent
As T able 6.7 highlights the unexplained differentials in observed wages record vast gulfs in 
magnitude with the largest and most significant effect obtained for the other intermediate non­
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manual category. However, when selectivity bias is accounted for the unexplained wage offer 
differential in this category increases from 21% to over 38%. Nevertheless, the most resounding 
increase is reserved for the skilled occupational category where the unexplained differential 
increases to over 30%. The relatively small number o f  observations in both the female skilled 
sector and the intermediate non-manual sector suggests caution in interpretation. Nevertheless, 
the results illustrate the importance of controlling for selectivity bias in occupational wage equa­
tions. Though tables 6.7 and 6.8 are dealing with different concepts it is clear that within given 
occupations the female disadvantage, however measured, is severe. This is particularly the case 
in the two occupational categories highlighted above. It could be argued that since only 16% of 
all females are in both of these occupational categories together, there need be little cause for 
concern. This is not a view that should be accepted too lightly, however. Accepting that both 
males and females are sacrificing wages, in the skilled sector, in order to undergo training it’s 
clear that the relative sacrifice is falling disproportionately on the females. As is clear from the 
selectivity bias coefficients and the wage offer differentials in the skilled category the sacrifice 
the female workers must make in wages in order to undergo training is nearly twice that for 
males. This has clear implications for females in terms o f  their willingness to undergo training 
and has long-term implications for their occupational segregation. It cannot be stated from the 
above that the vast wage offer differential relates to the type of skilled jobs females choose or to 
the inordinately higher cost imposed on females by em ployers in comparison to males. What­
ever the explanation it is clear from the analysis that the incentives for females to undergo train­
ing in the skilled sector are significantly less than for males.
It is also clear from both tables 6.7 and 6.8 that some of the differences in wages are 
explained by differing endowments. If discrimination exists in terms of access to these endown- 
ments these estimates could be interpreted as reflecting the effects o f some form of pre-entry 
discrimination. The strongest positive effects for this component of the wage decomposition 
come through in terms o f the clerical and the other intermediate non-manual occupational 
category. It could be argued that if males in both these categories have greater access to the 
qualifications necessary for securing promotion than females then these components could be
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interpreted as discrimination estimates. However, it cannot be unambiguously stated that this 
part o f the differential reflects discrimination. Nevertheless, failure to detect statistically 
significant unexplained differentials should not be interpreted as absence of explicit wage 
discrimination in given occupations.
Table 6.7
Gender W age Differentials by Occupation
Occupation AW/ i z . t r z l i t
Prof. & Man. -0.0014 -0.0275 0.0261
(0.0317) (0.0523)
Clerical 0.0586 0.0402*** 0.0184
(0.0080) (0.0219)
O ther White 0.2641 0.0520*** 0.2121***
(0.0167) (0.0415)
Skilled 0.0190 -0.0421*** 0.0611
(0.0108) (0.0414)
Semi & Unskilled 0.0196 -0.0179 0.0375
(0.0163) (0.0307)
Asymptotic s tandard  erro rs in parenthesis. • •*  denotes significance at
the 1% level, • • denotes significance at the 5%  level, • denotes
Table 6.8
Gender W age O ffer Differentials by O ccupation
Occupation AWf i z . t r Z l i t
Prof. & Man. 0.0280 -0.0285 0.0565
(0.0326) (0.1624)
Clerical 0.0392 0.0387*** 0.0205
(0.0080) (0.1312)
O ther White 0.4253 0.0426**• 0.3827*
(0.0187) (0.1845)
Skilled 0.4931 -0.0433*** 0.5364
(0.0108) (0.3705)
Semi & Unskilled 0.0969 -0.0223 0.1192
(0.0180) (0.1383)
Asymptotic s tandard  erro rs in parenthesis. • • •  denotes significance at
the 1% level, • • denotes significance at the 5%  level, * denotes
significance a t the 10% level using two tailed tests, c denotes corrected
6.8 Occupational Distributions
Table 6.9 provides actual and simulated occupational distributions for males and females 
across the five occupational categories considered. Column 1 gives the male means, column 2 
the female means and column 3 the female means if a male occupational structure is imposed. 
Column 3 is obtained by fitting the male occupational coefficients of table 6.1 to the female reali­
sations of the explanatory variables. The most obvious feature of the table is the dramatic shift of
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females away from the clerical occupational category to the male dominated skilled occupational 
sector. Furthermore, in the context of the above outlined scenario the female representation 
would rise from 6.2% to just under 10% in the professional and managerial category and the pro­
portion of females in the semi and unskilled category would fall from almost 20% to just over 
15%. The female representation within the other intermediate non-manual occupational category 
remains relatively stable with the imposition o f the male occupational structure. It is  clear from 
the above evidence that females are over-represented in the low skill, low pay sectors and under­
represented in the skilled and professional sectors
An index o f occupational dissimilarity proposed by Duncan and Duncan (1955) is used to 
provide some objective measure of occupational differences between young males and females. 
The index is defined, in general, as
and in this case gives the proportion of a group, male and/or female, that would have to shift to 
equalise the gender representation across occupations. A variant of this index is also calculated 
based on the female predicted outcomes in column three of table 6.9. This index may be given
by
As illustrated in table 6.9 the degree of dissimilarity suggested by the D index is reasonably 
high. It suggests that 40.5% o f either or a combination of both sexes would have to shift to 
equalise sexes across occupational categories. Not surprisingly, when D* is calculated only 4.4% 
of either sex would have to shift to effect gender equalisation. This suggests that only 11% of the 
observed disparity in occupational attachment is explained by characteristics or endowments with 
over 89% interpretable as demand side discrimination, supply side preferences or some indeter­
minate combination o f both.
Using tables 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9 the mean wage differential o f 0.0282 can be decomposed into 
inter and intra-occupational differences in wages. The intra-occupational effect is estimated as 
0.0678 and the inter-occupational effect as -0.0397. The sum o f the two unjustified components.
(6.18)
(6.19)
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wage discrimination and occupational segregation61, is 0.0121 which represents nearly 43% of 
the gross observed gender difference in wages. Thus, just over 1% of the average net hourly male 
wage may be interpreted as an occupation al/w age discrimination effect. This by any standards is 
small and though no standard errors are estimated for this effect its magnitude may not be 
deemed significant in an economic sense. The same exercise is performed for the consistent 
wage equation estimates with the results recorded in the second column o f table 6.10. Though 
the magnitudes are slightly different the same story holds. The greatest part o f the female wage 
disadvantage lies not in their occupational distribution but in their wage disadvantage within 
given occupations, for example, the other intermediate non-manual and the skilled occupational 
category
The significant finding o f  the above analysis is the effect o f the unexplained intra- 
occupational wage differences on the overall mean wage differential. This may best be illustrated 
by table 6.11. In addition to the mean male and female wages table 6.11 contains two predicted 
female wages based on the OLS and the consistent estimator. The first predicted wage (column 
three) simply allows female access to male occupations assuming the given female wage struc­
ture in these occupations. It is clear that allowing females access to male occupations has no 
significant impact on their relative wage position. In the OLS case cited here it actually leads to a 
decrease in their wage position. This is explained by the fact that the imposed male occupational 
structure allocates a large proportion of females to the lower paid skilled category. A similar 
finding and a more dramatic one is found for the consistent estimator. The relatively low 
predicted wage is explained here by the strong negative selectivity effect in this sector and the 
consequent low wage offer that confronts females in this male-intensive sector.
The second predicted female wage (column four) is obtained by imposing both a male 
occupational structure and a male wage structure and leads to a relatively dramatic rise in the 
female mean wage for both the OLS and the consistent estimates. This is in comport with the
61 Occupational segregation i t  interpreled a t unjustified in th it particular cate  tinea it rater* to the female 
occupational dittribution that i t  not justified. relative to the male occupational di t in  button, on the basis of the 
fem ale characteristics.
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findings of both Brown et at. (1980) and Miller (1987) and prompted the conclusion on both 
their parts for a more adequate anti-discrimination legislation aimed at promoting equal pay 
within occupations ra ther than aimed at gender equalisation across occupations.
Though the magnitude of the mean wage differences obtained in this chapter is relatively 
small in comparison to  the two studies cited above, this may be explained in large part by both 
the single status and th e  youth of the workers considered. Nevertheless, one clear conclusion 
emerges. The disadvantaged female wage position is not explained to any great degree by their 
occupational distribution. The greater weight o f evidence appears to suggest that the disadvan­
tage operates within th e  (albeit broadly defined) occupational groups and remedies aimed at 
ameliorating the promotional prospects of women as well as their training prospects within given 
occupations may be a m ore  effective policy than one designed at gender equalisation.
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T ab lt 6.9
Occupational Distributions and Dissimilarity Indice«.
O ccupation *  r i f P,f 1 rr-pfi 1 r r - f U
Prof. & M an. 0.0837 0.0620 0.0956 0.0217 0.0119
C lerical 0.1967 0.5832 0.2293 0.3865 0.0326
O th er W hite 0.0970 0.1097 0.0929 0.0127 0.0041
Skilled 0.4385 0.0532 0.4252 0.3833 0.0133
Sem i &  Unskilled 0.1841 0.1899 0.1569 0.0058 0.0272
D • - • 0.4050 -
D* • * - - 0.0443
Table 6.10
Wage Dernmposi I ion
Component W a r * Wage* Description
AW 0.0282 0.0012 Aggregate Difference
f a r i  a z ,  t r 0.0217 0.0189 Differing Characteristics
f c r l  z / A i 0.0462 0.1097 Differing Parameters
£  w r ( i r - i ' ) -0.0062 -0.0075 Differing Characteristics
£  w r < i ; - i / > -0.0335 -0.1199 Differing Parameters
a denotes estimates based on OLS procedure o f Tables 6.4 and 6.6. b 
denotes estimates based on the consistent procedure of Tables 6.3 and 6.5.
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T able 6.11
Wage tP  ir%r i/w i/w
OLS 0.4125 0.3843 0.3696 0.4279
Consistent 0.4069 0.4057 0.1338 0.4262
The main objectives o f  this chapter have been three-fold. Firstly, to provide estimates for 
some of the key determinants of occupational attachment for young workers in Ireland. 
Secondly, to use this information to correct for the potential existence of selectivity bias in occu­
pational wage equations and thirdly to quantify the gender differential in wages that operates 
through occupational segregation. In examining this last issue a distinction is made between 
observed differences in wages and differences in wage offers ( i.e. observed wages corrected for 
selectivity bias).
The first issue was addressed with the estimation o f the unordered multinomial logit using a 
five-way occupational categorisation. Education, residence of schooling, unemployment and 
parental background all featured as prominent determinants o f occupational attachment for both 
males and females. In terms o f one’s attachment to the non-manual occupational categories edu­
cation and schooling in Dublin were both found to play an important role. Unemployment played 
a stronger negative role in occupational attachment for males than for females. However, the big­
gest contrast in results occurred in terms of the parental background variable. A non-manual 
background is more likely to see a young male in a non-manual job with the reverse almost being 
the case for a young female.
The second issue addressed was that of selectivity bias in the occupational wage equations. 
Contrasting the OLS estimates with those from a consistent estimator revealed evidence o f selec­
tivity bias which was strongest in the skilled occupational category for both males and females. 
This had important implications for the discrimination estimates in the skilled category where the
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unexplained differential was found to contrast dramatically across the two estimators. It also sug­
gested the existence o f  a differential in incentives available to males and females in terms o f 
training in the skilled sector. This is seen has having long-term implications for the occupational 
segregation of females.
The third issue was the decomposition o f the mean wage differential (in both its forms) into 
its component parts. Neither mean differential was found to be large and the low mean effects 
were found to mask dramatic occupational wage differentials. The widest differentials were 
reported for the consistent occupational differentials and in particular for those categories which 
exhibited evidence o f  selectivity bias. In line with Miller (1987) and Brown el aJ. (1980) little o f 
either the aggregate wage offer differential or observed wage differential was found to be due to 
occupational segregation. In the vernacular o f Sloane (198S) partial segregation by occupation 
appears to explain a greater part o f the aggregate wage differential. In this case the female wage 
disadvantage operates through their segregation within given occupations rather than across occu­
pations. Policies designed at equalising gender representation across occupations may, therefore, 
be less effective than policies aimed at dismantling their partially segregated positions within 
given occupations. Increased access to training and promotion in such a way as to extend the 
career ladders confronting females may be a more potent measure in removing their disadvan­
taged status.
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Chapter Seven
Wage Differentials and the Dual Labour Market
7.1 Introduction
As chapter two surveyed neo-classical theory attempts to explain the existence o f wage dif­
ferentials by recourse to, inter alia, human capital theory. In this framework differentials in 
wages are explained by differentials in the accumulation o f human capital investment by the indi­
vidual. Labour market segmentation theory, on the other hand, attempts to explain wage differ­
ences on the basis o f the type of job an individual holds. A major limitation o f the labour market 
segmentation literature lies in the fact that it does not provide a single or unique explanation for 
the existence of wage differentials. This in some sense is reflected in the empirical work that has 
hitherto been characterised by a relatively ad hoc approach.
To test one o f the basic premises of segmented and dual labour market (SDLM) theory, that 
o f the existence o f two distinct wage-setting mechanisms, researchers invariably allocated work­
ers to primary/secondary jobs on the basis of their job characteristics and/or their industry and/or 
occupation depending on the segment of interest. A statistical test o f the difference between 
wage coefficient estimates provided the basic test An approach similar to this is adopted by Ost- 
erman (1975), Camoy and Rumberger (1980) and Zucker and Rosenstein (1981) in their empiri­
cal studies. Conflicting findings emerge from these studies. The conflict in results may be 
related to an inaccurate classification o f jobs. Since invariably the sample o f workers is divided 
into a high wage or a low wage sector the sample is inevitably truncated and the potential prob­
lem of selectivity bias emerges. However, in all the above studies this problem is conveniently 
overlooked. Heckman and Hotz (1986) provide an application in a third world context where 
poverty status is used as an allocating mechanism and selectivity bias is controlled. They, how­
ever, conclude that the dual labour market hypothesis provides insufficient structure to distin­
guish it from the market-clearing hypothesis. In view of this, they argue, the hypothesis o f dual­
ism is untestable.
Other studies have attempted to focus on another tenet o f the dual labour market theory, that 
o f inter-sectoral immobility. If primary jobs are rationed as dual labour market theorists suggest 
then upward mobility would be impossible. Leigh (1976) and Schiller (1977) both provide evi­
dence of upward mobility o f individuals and argue this as a refutation o f dualism. It could be 
argued that immobility is consistent with human capital theory predictions (him specific invest­
ments) while mobility is not necessarily inconsistent with the existence of career ladders and 
internal labour markets within the primary sector. Thus, testing for mobility sheds little light on 
the dual labour market hypothesis.
More recently Dickens and Lang (1985, 1987 and 1988) outline an alternative econometric 
approach that incorporates a formal test o f the rationing hypothesis. The econometric approach 
involves the estimation of a switching model with unknown regimes. The full model consists of 
two wage equations and an equation determining sectoral attachment. By using the standard sto­
chastic switching model (see Maddala (1983), pp. 283-286) no information on the sectoral attach­
ment of the individual is required. Thus no ad hoc allocation o f workers to sectors need be made. 
However, the statistical test outlined by Dickens and Lang (1985) to test for the existence of 
non-price barriers has been the subject of some criticism. Heckman and Hotz (1986) argue that 
the rejection o f the null hypothesis of no dualism by Dickens and Lang is uninformative since the 
rejection may be more related to departures from the strong assumptions made by Dickens and 
Lang.62 Moreover, Heckman and Hotz (1986) argue that the likelihood ratio test constructed by 
Dickens and Lang is in error since under the null o f no dualism the sectoral attachment probabili­
ties are not defined63. Though the view taken by Heckman and Hotz is that dualism is not a *61
62 Heckman and Hou argue (has the rejection may occur aa a consequence of.
(ii) agents may be utility maximiien rather than income maximiien,
(iii) inappropriate distributional assumptions.
(iv) coats of mobility across sectors.
61 Use of the Wald lest is inappropriate since the coefficient* on the switching equation are not identified.
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testable proposition the switching regression approach outlined by Dickens and Lang does pro­
vide an opportunity to assess at the very least the existence o f two distinct wage setting mechan­
isms which are consistent with the dual labour market description.
Neither of the two broad approaches outlined above could be deemed totally satisfactory. 
The ad hoc approach allocates individuals by brute force on the basis o f an investigator's priors 
with the consequent results invariably providing a self-fulfilling prophecy. The Dickens and 
Lang approach, on the other hand, places the allocation in the hands o f a stochastic switching 
regression model. Attempting to im prove on both approaches provides one o f the two motiva­
tions for this chapter. The alternative approach proposed merges aspects o f both the previous 
approaches. It is clear that some jobs are unambiguously primary in character and others secon­
dary. There are, however, another sub-set o f jobs for which a  high degree o f ambiguity attaches 
and hence creating an inability to allocate unequivocally to either sector. In the following section 
a maximum likelihood approach is outlined based on Stewart (1988) that allows for partial obser­
vability in the latent dependent variable and possesses the stochastic switching model employed 
by Dickens and Lang (1985) as a special case. The framework to be more extensively outlined 
below allows certain jobs to be allocated to either the primary or the secondary sector with proba­
bility one with the residual allocated on the basis of the stochastic switching model.
The second motivation, and a more important one, is to examine the evidence for the 
existence of a dual labour market for young workers in Ireland. The young workers labour 
market may be viewed by some as part o f  a labour market secondary to an adult-dominated pri­
mary market. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to dispute that within the young workers labour 
market there co-exists "good" and "bad” jobs. The proportion o f these jobs may be significantly 
different in the adult and young workers markets but it is clearly o f interest to see if the facts are 
in comport with the dual labour market paradigm as broadly defined. To assess the dual labour- 
market view inter-sectoral wage differentials are calculated under a number o f alternative 
hypotheses and a very informal test o f rationing is also provided to assess the degree of sectoral
would be required but the W ald teat is  no t invariant to tbe normalisation used.
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immobility.
The layout of the chapter is as follows: the following section outlines the econometric 
methodology and section 7.3 describes the data and the priors used in the allocation of jobs to 
sectors. Section 7.4 presents results based on the econometric model outlined in  section 7.2 and 
section 7.3 presents estimates o f the wage gap. Section 7.6 provides the informal test o f rationing 
and section 7.7 concludes.
7.2 Econometric Methodology
Following Dickens and Lang (1983) the system describing sectoral w ages and sectoral 
attachment may be expressed in terms o f the following set of equations:
(7.1)
w , - x , p . + « - (72)
y’  = Z ,Y+ e* (73)
where
p  denotes primary and s secondary sector,
Wj is the log of the net hourly wage,
X, is a  vector o f characteristics determining the wage,
Zt is a vector of characteristics determining sectoral attachment,
0 , .  0 ,. y  are vectors of unknown parameters 
tp, c , . e* are error terms and
y* is a latent dependent variable measuring sectoral attachment.
The vector of error terms are assumed to possess a trivariate normal distribution and are distri­
buted with a mean o f 0 and a variance given by the 3x3 matrix Q. Since the errors cannot 
validly be assumed independent the Q matrix is expressed as:
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where p ,o ,  and p,a ,  are the covariances between the error in the switching equation and the 
wage equations o f (7.1) and (7.2) respectively, aji is the error covariance of the j *  equation 
where j , l  - p , s  Since the wage equations are not observed simultaneously is not estimable. 
As Stewart (1988) points out since the scale and origin o f  y* is arbitrary a rescaling is effected 
such that the variance o f e* is normalised to unity. However, it is  not possible to simultaneously 
identify all the switching equation parameter estimates and its error variance64.
Though y,* is not observed it is assumed that if  y* > 0 the individual's wage is determined 
by (7.1) and if  y* SO it is determined by (7.2)®*. Thus if y* > 0 this implies
e*  > -ThI
and if  y* S 0, then
e*  S-Z(T
The conditional density for the switching equation’s error is given by
1 *> 1 -  p fl
and the required probabilities are given by
pro b ity  > k \tj]  -  
where in both cases j  ~ p j
The likelihood for the problem can now be expressed as
proto(«*< > - Z ,y  I Z(.X ,.e * ) .f(e „ )  + proto(e* S - Z I  Z(,X ,.* * ) .f(«*> (7.4)
- 163 -
where everything is as above and f( ) is the marginal density function of the associated error 
term. The likelihood for the /•* individual may now be written as follows
where * (  ) and +( ) are the cumulative normal distribution and density functions respectively.
For convenience denote
where L is the log likelihood and T is the number of observations and everything else is as 
defined above.
Maximum likelihood techniques are used in estimation and on the basis o f the y  vector of 
estimates unconditional ( ex ante ) probabilities and conditional ( ex p o s t ) probabilities o f sec­
toral attachment are obtained. The unconditional probability for the individual is denoted by 
♦(Z,y) and Bayes theorem is used to obtain the conditional probability for the primary sector ( 
conditional on the sectoral wage) for the i*  individual. In terms o f this analysis the conditional
Now the log likelihood may be written more compactly as:
(7.6)
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probabilities are given by
«  ♦  j(l - *(V«))-i!i!iJ
* ( v *)-ts g e i (7.7)
and may be calculated from the maximum likelihood estimates for each individual in the sample.
The above likelihood function is the standard stochastic switching model outlined in Mad- 
dala (1983) and used by Dickens and Lang (1983) in their application to dual labour markets. 
The advantages this estimation procedure possesses over the more ad  hoc procedures that have 
characterised the empirical dual labour market literature are clear. An individual’s sectoral 
attachment need not be observed by the investigator to obtain separate sectoral wage equation 
estimates. However, it is also clear that if  one uses occupations and/or job characteristics as the 
criterion for allocating individuals to the primary or secondary sector some jobs can unambigu­
ously be defined as primary and others as secondary. Though, there exists ambiguity for a large 
number o f individuals it would be inappropriate to throw away important information from the 
econometric point o f view if the likelihood function outlined above could be easily modified to 
take this information into consideration. Stewart (1988), in an application different from the one 
here, presents an extended likelihood function that treats the realisation of the latent dependent 
variable as trichotomous and partially observed. This extended likelihood function has the sto­
chastic switching model as a special case.
In the Stewart (1988) case D defines the trichotomous realisation of the latent dependent 
variable y*. I f  D -  1, the observation is in the primary sector, if 2 then the regime governing the 
observation is unknown and if 3 the observation falls into the secondary sector. The extended 
likelihood may be expressed as
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Thus, the log likelihood can be de-composed into the contributions made by the three different 
categories. The first part o f the log likelihood is that used in the Dickens and Lang (198S) appli­
cation and the latter two parts refer to the contributions to the log likelihood of the known pri­
mary and secondary sector's observations66. This likelihood is clearly much more general than 
the standard stochastic switching model and allows prior information to be used in the allocation 
of individuals to the given sectors. The prior information used to allocate individuals to the pri­
mary and  secondary sector is discussed in the following section.
73 Data
T he data used in this chapter are again obtained from a European Economic Community 
commissioned survey carried out by the Economic and Social Research Institute. Dublin and 
titled "The Transition from Education to Employment". The target group in the survey were 
young workers between the ages of 15 and 24 who had left full-time education and were either 
actively engaged in employment or actively searching for work. The sub-sample employed in 
this analysis is composed o f  those individuals o f single status who defined their main economic 
activity as either working for payment or profit in non-agricultural activities. Only those who 
classified themselves as full-time workers are included. The total number of observations for 
which no missing values were recorded was 2831. O f these 1505 were male and 1326 female. 
The variables used in estimation are as follows:
W age :N et hourly wage expressed in logarithms.
Experience: Total labour force experience expressed in years. Since the exact dates for starting 
and term inating jobs is known for each individual the experience variable can be calculated with 
a high degree of precision. For the wage equations this variable is expressed in terms of linear 
splines designed to capture differential returns over different pans o f an individual’s labour force 
experience. The experience variable that enters the switching equation, however, is the fall vari­
able.
It is  c lea r thsi the probabilities are defined only over the D - 2  cases.
Education: Number of years in post-compulsory education. Fifteen is the school-leaving age. 
C urren t Residence: A set o f three (0,1) dummies for an individual’s current region o f residence. 
Dummies for Dublin city and county, the southern counties, the midlands and the east are 
included with the omitted variable in estimation being current residence in the north-western
counties.
F irm  Size: A set o f three (0,1) dummies for the size o f  the firm the individual currently works in. 
The three dummies are for firms less than one hundred workers, firms with greater than one hun­
dred workers but with less than five hundred w orkers and firms with greater than five hundred 
workers. In estimation the omitted dummy is firms with less than one hundred workers.
Sex. A (0,1) dummy adopting a value o f 1 i f  m ale and 0  if  female.
Public. A (0,1) dummy that captures whether the individual is in a public sector job or not. The 
public sector definition used is relatively narrow and refers mostly to those employed as civil ser­
vants. This is due to the fact that it is not possible, on the basis o f the data, to allocate those 
working in education or health services conveniently into public or private categories67.
For the purposes of this analysis certain types o f  individuals are allocated to either the pri­
mary or the secondary sectors68 depending on their individual and/or job characteristics. The 
public sector variable, the firm size variables and the occupational information contained in the 
data set provide the prior information to be used for this allocation. These variables are used 
because it is felt that the more precise the dual labour market definition employed, the more pre­
cise will be the model's coefficient estimates. A strong argument must, however, be made for the 
use of industry information in the allocation o f  workers to primary and secondary type jobs since 
it is clearly the case that primary and secondary type jobs co-exist within a given industry. How­
ever. in the context of the public sector an exception can be made since it is clear that using this 
in line with occupational information a straightforward sectoral delineation can be made.
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The allocation of workers and the assumptions made to justify this allocation are as follows:
(i) All professional workers (as defined by the aggregate occupational codes 2, 3 ,4  and 3 in the 
Census of Population Classification of Occupations (1981)) are assigned with probability one to 
the primary sector. This is a relatively innocuous assumption since it is clear that most profes­
sional jobs satisfy the criteria for inclusion in the primary sector, i.e. high returns to education, 
high wages, subie employment and good work conditions etc.
(ii) All non-manual (excluding professional workers as allocated above) public sector em ployees, 
male and female, are also allocated to the primary sector. The justification for this is that for 
non-manual workers, in particular, public sector employment is characterised by a distinct carrer 
structure with internal labour markets etc. and readily fits most of the stylised facts of a prim ary 
labour market. Since most manual public sector employees are in refuse disposal, cleaning ser­
vices and the administration o f cerne tries etc. it would be inappropriate to allocate them to the 
primary sector. However, due to the existence of various fringe benefits for public sector 
employees it would be inappropriate to allocate them to the secondary sector. Consequently they 
are allocated to the unknown sector.
(iii) Only those skilled manual workers, male and female, who work in firms of greater than one 
hundred workers are allocated to the primary sector. The justification for this allocation lies in 
the fact that small firms are not viewed as being characterised by the type of internal labour m ark­
ets and promotional opportunities compatible with a primary sector classification. Though it can 
be argued that secondary jobs co-exist with primary jobs in large organisations skilled w orkers 
are more likely to hold down the "good" jobs within these firms. Furthermore, employment sta­
bility is more likely to characterise larger rather than smaller firms. Since it would be inappropri­
ate to allocate skilled manual workers to the secondary sector the residual is allocated to the unk­
nown sector.
(iv) All the unskilled manual workers are allocated to the secondary sector. A number o f  sem i­
skilled, intermediate non-manual and other non-manual jobs are also allocated to this sector. The 
semi-skilled occupational codes allocated to the primary sector are 290, 291, 292, 293, 313, 340
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and 342. The intermediate non-manual occupational code» allocated to the secondary sector are 
323 and 326 and the other non-manual codes are 330. 331, 336. 337 and 339*9 ^  semi-skilled 
workers allocated to the secondary sector include dock labourers, drivers' helpers and charwomen 
and cleaners etc. with the other semi-skilled and non-manual workers allocated to the unknown 
category* 70. Since an individual's sectoral attachment is on the basis of their characteristics and 
the characteristics of their job  all the variables that enter the wage equations also enter the sec­
toral attachment equation. However, the experience variable enters the switching equation as a 
continuous variable rather than as two piece-wise linear segments as is the case in the wage equa­
tions. Furthermore, in the case o f the two wage equations the sex dummy variable is allowed to 
interact with the experience splines. Other interactive effects were also used in estimation but 
with Unie effect71.
It should also be pointed out at this stage that the estimates reported in the subsequent sub­
section appear relatively robust to changes in the prior allocation of certain workers. Experimen­
tation involved reducing and increasing the firm size threshold for the allocation o f skilled work­
ers to the primary sector. O ther experimentation involved the allocation o f all pubUc sector 
employees as defined above to the unknown sector, the allocation o f all the semi-skilled workers 
to. in turn, either the unknown or the secondary sector. The allocation of non-manual female 
public sector employees to the unknown sector. The allocation o f all skilled workers regardless 
of firm size to the primary sector. The results obtained with the actual allocation reported above 
proved relatively robust to the above modifications.
7.4 Empirical Results
Table 7.1 reports the empirical estimation using maximum likelihood methods of equations 
(7.1) to (7.3). For purposes o f comparison with the wage equation estimates OLS estimates are
vsnts, street vendors. These codes w e contained In the Census of Population Classification of Occupations 
(1981) cited above and a more extensive treatment appears in appendix 7.AI o f  this chapter.
70 The final numbers allocated to the sectors we 694 id the primary sector. 619 to the secondary sector and 
1318 to  the unknown sector.
71 The other variables In the speciflcwlon that sex was interacted with but to  little statistical effect were 
Dublin, public sector employment and education.
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also reported. The OLS estimates refer to the estimates from a full sample equation that ignores 
the partition. Attention initially focuses on the switching coefficients. As outlined in section 7.2 
it is not possible to identify all the coefficients o f the switching equation and its error variance 
simultaneously. Thus a normalisation of unity is used. This has obvious implications for the 
interpretation o f the switching coefficient estimates. Since the signs o f these coefficients are not 
affected by the normalisation they are useful in providing information on sectoral attachment. 
All the variables’ coefficients are negative in sign. If the results are taken to suggest secondary 
sectoral attachment they are clearly consistent with one's priors regarding dual labour markets. 
The switching coefficients could be interpreted in summary to suggest that the more education 
one possesses, the larger the firm size one works in, being resident in Dublin, being in the public 
sector and being male all reduce the probability of secondary sector attachment. These findings 
could be interpreted as supportive o f the substantive predictions of the SDLM hypotheses. Furth­
ermore. some measure of comfort is provided by the lack o f conflict in these results.
A distinguishing feature between the estimates reported for the two sectors is the private 
rate o f return to education. As SDLM theorists suggest this should be higher in the primary rela­
tive to the secondary sector. This is indeed the case where the returns to education are 8.7% in 
the primary sector and only 3.1% in the secondary sector. The implications o f this set of esti­
mates for the wage differentials are discussed more extensively in section five72.
Though it is not possible to compare either the firm size or the regional coefficients across 
the two sectors it is interesting to note that secondary workers in terms o f both the firm and 
regional variables are better off than primary workers relative to their respective base groups. 
Both these sets of results could be interpreted as suggesting a wider variance in net hourly wages 
in secondary than in primary jobs. This could also be interpreted as suggesting that individuals in 
the secondary sector who work in the smallest sized firm and reside in the north/westem region 
are much worse off in relation to other secondary sector workers than are primary workers in 
these particular categories. The public sector coefficient in statistically significant in the primary
72 Suffice for it to  suae here that there appear» little evidence to luggeu  that the wage profile» in the 
tccoodary lector are flat in relation to year* in pott-compulw iy education.
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sector suggesting that individuals in primary public sector employment receive a wage that is 
11.0% higher than comparable individuals in the primary private sector earn.
Attention now turns to the interpretation o f the experience ternis. The linear splines allow 
for differential returns over two parts o f a young workers’ labour force experience. The interac­
tion o f sex with the linear splines allows for these returns to be decomposed by gender. The 
inclusion of the interaction terms alters the interpretation of the spline coefficients. These now 
represent the returns to females of the different years labour force experience and the coefficients 
on the interaction terms are the male/female differentials in these returns. The coefficient on the 
sex dummy now reflects the returns to being male at zero experience, ceteris paribus. It is clear 
on inspecting the results that the returns to female labour force experience in the first four years is 
only marginally higher in the primary sector and on the basis o f a t-statistic are not statistically 
different from the returns that obtain in the secondary sector. The same can be said, on the basis 
of a similar t-test, for returns in those years subsequent to the fourth. In the primary sector the 
gender differential in the first spline o f experience is statistically significant with the second 
spline less so. In contrast, neither of the interactive terms in the secondary sector’s wage equa­
tion are statistically significant. Again on the basis of t-statistics the gender differential in the 
first spline of experience in the primary sector is not found to be statistically different from that 
found in the secondary sector. No statistical effect is detected for the spline associated with the 
latter years of labour force experience73.
Interestingly enough, however, at zero labour force experience females employed in the pri­
mary sector earn approximately 17% more than comparable males, ceteris paribus. This clearly 
conveys something about the types of jobs males and females do in the primary sector and a 
rationalisation for this result may be found in chapters five and six. A large number o f the males 
allocated to the primary sector with probability one belong to the skilled manual sector. Since 
they undergo firm-specific training their starting wages are considerably lower than that for the 
average in the sample (see chapter six). Since females tend to do jobs in the primary sector that
73 The t-ttatutic* (in abeoluie values) for the tests o f  primary/iecoodary differences in labour force experi­
ence are the order o f  sequence cited in the text 1.057,0.3831,1.533 and 0.756.
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do not involve such short-term sacrifice their starting wages are likely to be higher. This result 
should not be interpreted as being inconsistent with the predictions of the dual labour market but 
as being more consistent with the fact that within the primary sector certain characteristics of 
male jobs are different from those o f females. In contrast starting wages for males in the secon­
dary sector are higher by nearly 7%74 75.
It may be more instructive to graphically illustrate the wage/experience profiles for both 
males and females in the primary and secondary sectors respectively. Figure 1 in appendix 7.A2 
of this chapter displays the male and female wage/experience profiles for the primary sector 
coefficient estimates. It obviously confirms most o f the interpretations cited above. For both 
sexes the returns to labour force experience are steeper in the early years of labour force experi­
ence. This fact has been noted in all o f  the previous empirical chapters. It is also clear from 
figure 1 that in the early years of experience the female wage profile is higher than the 
corresponding m ale profile. Job specific training on the part o f males may be offered as a 
rationalisation fo r this occurrence73. T he cross-over point is somewhere near the third year of 
labour force experience. Subsequent to this the male profile always exceeds the female profile 
and the perceptible gap between the tw o profiles is seen to widen with the addition of labour 
force experience. This could well be explained by the fact that males are more likely to gain pro­
motion and ascend much more rapidly than females the internal ladders assumed to characterise 
the primary sector. In fact after the fourth year of labour force experience the female profile has a 
relatively flat configuration. In summary figure 1 is not that much in conflict with the predictions 
of human capital theory.
Figure 2 tells a slightly different story for the secondary sector. In this case male wages are 
always higher than female wages and the gap in profiles is, as in the primary sector, seen to widen 
with the passage o f  labour force experience. As was pointed out above it is difficult to provide a
74 This could be indicative of discrimination effec ts operating in in the secondary labour m arket Howev­
er. there is a  view (see W achter (1974)) that secondary jobs are concentrated in those firms that possess in 
Becker's terminology low discrimination coefficients. If secondary sector wages are determined by competi­
tive forces Unie latitude exists for employers to  discriminate. Thus this result appears to mildly conflict with 
soins theoretical predictions.
75 See chapters».
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theoretical explanation for this result couched exclusively in  discriminatory terms. The predic­
tions of dualism that suggest a relatively flat wage profile in regard to experience are evidently 
not verified in the data provided by this particular sample o f  young workers.
On the basis o f the coefficient estimates and Bayes’ theorem outlined in (7.7) it is possible 
to allocate the 1518 unknown individuals to the primary and secondary sectors on the basis of 
their predicted conditional probabilities. Since the switching equation coefficient estimates are in 
line with predicting the probability of secondary sector attachment a conditional probability of 
greater than 0.5 allocates an individual to the secondary sector. I f  the predicted conditional pro­
bability is less than 0.5 the individual is allocated to the prim ary sector. On the basis o f this rule 
o f  thumb 49% from the unknown category are allocated to  the secondary sector with the 
remainder allocated to the primary sector. Thus as Table 7.2  indicates the total in the primary 
sector is now 1464 with 1367 in the secondary sector. Table 7.2  also contains the sample means 
for the variables used in estimation for the full sample and those allocated to the primary and 
secondary categories. An inspection o f table 7.2 reveals an observed wage differential between 
the two sectors o f over 30%. The sectoral gender wage gaps (featured in table 7.3) are 3.7% and 
2.0%  for the primary and secondary sectors respectively. T his compares with a gender wage dif­
ferential o f 3.0% for the sample as a whole. Labour force experience and education are on aver­
age higher in the primary sector and only 16% of secondary workers work in firms with more 
than one-hundred workers. The comparable primary sector figure is nearly 70%. Significantly 
more primary workers reside in Dublin and over 20% o f this sector's workers are in the narrowly 
defined public sector. The sectoral allocation by gender is. however, reasonably comparable.
Table 7.4 provides means for the primary and secondary sector broken down by gender. 
These means are not substantially different from those reported and commented on in table 7.2. 
However, one interesting feature o f table 7.3 is the fact that nearly 27% of all females in the pri­
mary sector are in public sector employment.
The single equation model reported in column 1 of table 7.1 is nested within the switching 
model. It is obtained by the imposition of the restrictions. 0 , ■ 0 , ,  af  * a, and p , ■ p , . A likeli­
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hood rado test may thus be used to statistically test whether these restriction are upheld by the 
data. Since several parameters are unidentified the calculation o f the appropriate degrees o f free­
dom is difficult. Goldfeld and Quandt (1976) suggest setting the number o f degrees of freedom 
equal to the number o f restrictions to be tested plus the number of unidentified parameters. In 
terms of table 7.1 this generates 26 degrees o f freedom for the x2 o f the likelihood ratio tes t The 
calculated test statistic is 273.6 and with a  critical value of 45.6 at the 1% level of significance the 
null hypothesis o f the single equation model is decisively rejected by the data76.
76 The null hypothesis in this case is that a  labour market is characterised by a continuum o f  jobs. T hu  is 
consistent with the competitive human capital model. The a lternuive hypothesis is a  labour market segment 
ed into primary and secondary sectors on the basis o f  the taxonomy outlined. It is clear that the degrees of 
freedom used provide a very stiff test for the hypothesis under consideration. Though this test has been used 
by Dickens and Lang (1989) it should be pointed out that under the null the p 's  are not estimated.
Table 7.1
Variable OLS Primary Secondary Switch
-0.1773*** -0.2340*** -0.2218*** 1.3418***
(0.0281) (0.0455)
0.0695*** 0.0869***
Constant
Education
100$ Firm <500
Firm  2500
Resident in Dublin
Resident in South
Resident in East & Mid
Public
Sex
Exper
Exper. $ 4 years 
Exper. > 4  years 
Sex xExper$4 
Sex xExper>4 
o
L
(0.0046) (0.0068)
0.1412*** 0.1528***
(0.0141) (0.0294)
0.1672*** 0.1823***
(0.0146) (0.0265)
0.1512*** 0.1304***
(0.0163) (0.0313)
0.0726*** 0.0725**
(0.0181) (0.0307)
0.0385** 0.0396
(0.0187) (0.0327)
0.1038*** 0.1047***
(0.0166) (0.0292)
-0.0844* • -0.1551***
(0.0336) (0.0462)
0.0837*** 0.0953***
(0.0080) (0.0129)
0.0310*** 0.0313
(0.0063) (0.0214)
0.0464*** 0.0508***
(0.0114) (0.0172)
0.0243** 0.0397*
(0.0106) (0.0253)
0.3003 0.3309
-604.93
(0.0071)
(0.0365) (0.3445)
0.0509*** -0.1358**
(0.0066) (0.0608)
0.1533*** -0.9137***
(0.0258) (0.2366)
0.1915*** -0.5373
(0.0248) (0.2441)
0.1706*** -0.4099***
(0.0274) (0.0269)
0.0746*** -0.0449
(0.0266) (0.2783)
0.0387* -0.0150
(0.0275) (0.2590)
0.0760 -1.4315*
(0.0468) (0.7722)
0.0669* -0.0390
(0.0377) (0.1807)
- -0.2184***
- (0.0495)
0.0769***
(0.0099)
0.0409***
(0.0096)
0.0150
(0.0141)
0.0172
(0.0128)
0.2663 «
(0.0062) -
-468.12
Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses and • • •  denotes significance 
at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, * denotes 
significance at the 10% level using two tailed tests. The number of observa­
tions is 2831 and bold #  denotes normalisation to unity, a  is the standard er­
ror o f the equation.
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Table 7 J
M eans o f Variables and Sectoral Allocation of W orkers
V ariable Full Sample P rim ary Secondary
Known - 694 619
Unknown - 770 748
Total 2831 1464 1367
Wage 0.3993 0.5499 0.2380
Experience 3.326 3.942 2.667
Education 1.902 2.222 1.559
100 £ F irm  < 500 0.1692 0.2725 0.0585
Firm  ¿500 0.2741 0.4296 0.1075
Dub” nCuT& *Co* 0.3497 0.4590 0.2326
South 0.2882 0.2541 0.3248
East & Mid. 0.1982 0.1667 0.2319
Sex 0.5320 0.5307 0.5333
Public 0.1194 0.2077 0.0249
Exper. £ 4 years 2.756 3.126 2.360
Exper. > 4 years 0.5704 0.8167 0 3066
Sex xExper£4 1.499 1.675 1.310
Sex xExper>4 0.3316 0.4837 0.1687
T he unknow n workers a re  allocated to the secondary sector on the basis
o f w hether the conditional probability (see equation (7)) > 0.5. The others
are  allocated to the p rim ary  sector.
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Table 7  J
Sectoral M eans by G ender
Variable P rim ary Male P rim ary Female Secondary Male Secondary Female
0.5672 0.5304 0.2474 0.2273
Experience 4.067 3.802 2.774 2.544
Education 2.071 2.393 1.362 1.784
100 < F irm  <500 0.2188 0.3333 0.0576 0.596
Firm  2500 0.4414 0.4163 0.0919 0.1254
Dublin City & Co. 0.4363 0.4847 0.2071 0.2618
South 0.2600 0.2475 0.3100 0.3417
East & Mid. 0.1828 0.1485 0.2483 0.2132
Skilled 0.4492 0.0684 0.4266 0.0407
Public 0.1532 0.2693 0.0302 0.0188
N um ber 777 687 729 638
T he unknow n w orkers a re  allocated to the secondary sector on the basis of 
w hether the conditional probability (see equation (7)) > 0.5. T he o thers are 
allocated to the p rim ary  sector.
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7.5 Dual Labour M arket W age Differentials
Table 7.1 highlighted some differences across the two sectors in terms of returns to key 
variables. This section attem pts to examine this issue in more depth by the examination of mean 
wage differentials. The differentials are calculated on the basis o f the means of the full sample of 
individuals. This seems an appropriate approach to adopt since it purports to ask the 
primary/secondary differential in wages that would confront an individual with a mean set of 
characteristics. On the basis o f equations (7.1) and (7.2) this differential may be expressed as
x$, (7.9)
where y  is the mean differential estimate with p  and s denoting primary and secondary respec­
tively, carats denoting estim ates and bars means. More conveniently (7.9) may be expressed as
¥  -  XAi (7.10)
The variance for this expression may be written as:
v a r(V ) -X 'V X  (711)
where
V ■ var ($ ,) + var (0 ,)  -  2co v (0 ,$ ,)
The asymptotic standard error is thus given by ^var(y ) and the consequent test statistic is asymp­
totically normally distributed under certain assumptions e.g. normally distributed errors.
The mean differential calculated as per (7.10) is reported in table 7.4 and suggests a dif­
ferential in favour of the prim ary sector of 3.6% which is also found to be statistically significant 
at the 10% level using a tw o-tailed test. This implies that given a mean set of characteristics their 
valuation is almost 4% higher in the primary relative to the secondary sector and suggests the 
existence of two distinct w age setting mechanisms that pay a given set o f characteristics dif­
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ferently. A differential for a stylised individual with mean labour force experience, mean educa­
tion and with a  base set o f the other characteristics77 is also calculated and is  reported as 12.5% 
and again is statistically significant
In order to assess how the differential varies across different categories differentials are also 
reported for the deviations from this base set o f characteristics. Firm size, being resident in the 
southern o r east and midlands regions and being in the public sector all record statistically 
significant effects which in most cases are well over 10%. However, surprisingly, being resident 
in Dublin and being male possesses no statistical advantages in terms o f th e  dual labour market 
differentials.
The m ost crucial variables to the SDLM story are the education and experience variables. 
Differentials by sector based on deviations from the mean by education and  experience are also 
presented in table 7.4. The stark feature of this table, but not surprising in v iew  of the coefficient 
estimates o f  tab le 7.1. is the effect o f education on the sectoral wage gap. F o r example, with six 
years post-compulsory education the differential reported is almost 20% confirming the impor­
tance o f this variable in the determination of a sectoral wage gap. The wage g ap  is seen to widen 
dramatically as the years in post-compulsory education increase. Incrementing the experience 
variable also has a widening effect on the differential, albeit less dramatic. Nevertheless, both 
variables confirm  a basic tenet of the dual labour market hypothesis i.e identical levels of educa­
tion and experience are remunerated at a significantly higher rate in the prim ary relative to the 
secondary sector. However, having said this it is also clear from the estim ates of table 7.1 that 
there is no evidence of a relatively flat wage profile in the secondary sector in terms of either 
experience o r education and thus a more important tenet of the dual labour market hypothesis is 
not confirmed by the data.
Finally, the last two rows of 7.4 examine the primary/secondary sector w age differential for 
a stylised m ale and female individual. For a male with five years work experience, five years 
post-compulsory education, working in the largest firm size, residing in D ublin  and working in
77 The stylised individual with mean education and experience in this case worits in the  sm allest sized 
firm, resides in the  nonhAvestem region, w orks in the private sector and is female.
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the public sector the calculated differential is 17.0%. T he estimate for a comparable female is 
23.5%. On the basis of this particular exercise it is clear that females in the secondary sector are 
at a clear disadvantage. As pointed out in discussing the results this may be explained by their 
relatively low pay status in the secondary sector.
T able 1 A
Primary/Secondary Wage D ifferentials by Category.
Variable XA0 ...... w
Mean 0.0353* 0.0178
Base 0.1175** 0.0490
100 s  F irm  < 500 0.1171•• 0.0576
Firm  ¿500 0.1084** 0.0576
Dublin City *  Co. 0.0773 0.0503
South 0.1154** 0.0426
Fast & Mid 0.1185** 0.0461
Sex 0.0184 0.0450
Public 0.1463** 0.0695
Deviations from Mean by Education
education -  1 year 0.0004 0.0199
Education = 2 years 0.0365** 0.0178
Education = 3 years 0.0725*** 0.0212
Education ■ 6 years 0.1807*** 0.0460
Experience *  5 years 0.0787*** 0.0246
Experience *  6 years 0.0811*** 0.0304
Experience = 7 years 0.0835** 0.0415
Male* 0.1587*** 0.0634
Female* 0.2114*** 0.0688
ase denotes asym ptotic e rro r, • •*  denotes significance a t the 1% lev­
el, ** denotes significance a t  the 5%  level, * deno tes significance at 
the 10% level using two tailed tests. A0 denotes d ifference between 
the prim ary  sector and secondary sector wage coefficient estimates. 
Deviations from  the base o r  mean occur singly. #  denotes five years 
work experience, five years of post com pulsory education , working 
in the largest firm size, residing in Dublin and w ork in g  in the public 
sector.
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7.6 An Informal Test of Rationing
As pointed out in the introductory section the formal test o f rationing proposed by Dickens 
and Lang (1985) has been criticised as uninformative and dismissed on econometric grounds by 
Heckman and Hotz (1986). In any event their test would be inappropriate in terms of the frame­
work employed here. Thus as a very informal test of rationing sectoral differentials are calcu­
lated for all individuals in the sample on the basis o f (7.10) with appropriate standard errors78. 
This allows those individuals allocated to the secondary sector (either by assumption or by the 
switching model) who have a positive and statistically significant y  to be identified. The 
existence of a positive differential for secondary workers may be viewed, if  one assumes supply 
side neutrality, as reflecting rationing behaviour on the part o f employers79. It is also clear that a 
similar exercise can be effected for the primary sector’s workers.
Table 7.5 reports estimates based on such an exercise with a critical asymptotic t-value of 
1.96 used as the cut-off point between statistical significance and insignificance. As column two 
of table 7.5 reveals 140 o f the 1367 individuals allocated to the secondary sector had a statisti­
cally significant y . These results suggest that over 10% of those in the secondary sector would 
cam more (on average 14.0% more) in the primary sector than what they actually earn in the 
secondary sector. An examination of the characteristics of this particular sub-set o f workers 
shows that they possess a mean education well above the average for the sample and that nearly 
all are female. A tentative dual labour market interpretation for this result is that employers use 
gender to restrict female entry into certain primary jobs. The result, however, is in no way incon­
sistent with a supply side interpretation that is explained in terms of female preferences for the 
non-pec uniary benefits o f secondary sectoral attachment. In other words females may prefer the 
flexible working arrangements, the low-level responsibilities and the temporary nature of secon­
dary jobs because o f their anticipated marginal adherence to the labour market. A similar exer­
cise is carried out for the primary sector workers revealing that nearly 14% o f these possess
71 T his informal leal is an extension of Stewwl (1983).
79 Though th ii assumption may be view «! as a  relatively strong one it is no stronger than the assumptions 
made concerning the empirical counterpart o f  die Becker discrimination coefficient in chapters four, five and 
six o f  this thesis.
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differentials that are statistically significant. The results of this informal test appear to suggest 
that the primary/secondary dichotomy only matters for less than 25% o f the total sample. For the 
remainder in the sample there exists a statistical indifference as to their sectoral allocation. That 
is to say over 75% o f the sample would be neither worse nor better off in primary as opposed to 
secondary (or vice-versa) job status.
Table 1 3
Sectoral Differentials by Individual
Variable ¥i >0* ¥« ><P
Wage 0.5310 0.3714
Experience 4.112 2.121
Education 3.347 3.093
100S Firm < 5 0 0 0.2764 0.0071
Firm 2500 0.3317 0.0357
Dublin City & Co. 0.3166 0.0786
South 0.3317 0.4143
East & Mid. 0.1960 0.2857
Sax 0.1206 0.0143
Public 0.0000 0.0000
¥ 0.1455 0.1316
Number 199 140
Standard errors are calculated as in the tex t The significance level 
chosen is 5% and using a two-tailed test the |t) value is 1.96. The pri­
mary sector is denoted by a and the secondary sector by b. Switch 
denotes the numbers allocated to the category by the switching
model
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7.7  Conclusions
This chapter has attempted to establish the existence o f two separate wage setting mechan­
ism s that are characterised by the predictions o f dualism. An endogenous switching econometric 
m odel with a trichotomous realisation of the latent dependent variable (and which possesses the 
stochastic switching model as a special case) was used in estimation. The single equation model 
was decisively rejected against the two sector alternative. Some of the results obtained could be 
rationalised in terms of what dualism predicts. A dramatic difference in the private rate o f return 
to education was observed across the two sectors. Education in particular was seen to play a 
strong role in the determination and widening o f the wage gap between the two sectors with 
labour force experience playing a less significant role. Nevertheless, no evidence of a flat wage 
profile with respect to either experience or education was detected for the secondary sector.
Tentative evidence of a male wage advantage in terms o f the primary and more strongly in 
term s o f  the secondary sector was detected. However, for those females in the unknown sector 
gender appeared to play an insignificant role in terms o f their sectoral allocation. The gender dis­
tribution across sectors was in line with the sample mean and there was no evidence that females 
w ere over-represented in the secondary sector. The youth and marital status of the sample may 
be invoked to provide a rationalisation for this particular result. For the UK Dex and Shaw 
(1986) and Stewart and Greenhalgh (1984) provide evidence o f downward female occupational 
m obility after labour force interruption. It could thus be suggested that the segregation of 
females into secondary type jobs would not be detected in a sample of females who have experi­
enced no such discontinuity in participation. Nevertheless, on the basis of an informal test of 
rationing the most disadvantaged group in the secondary sector was females. Nearly, all of those 
in the secondary sector who could earn significantly more in the primary sector were female.
From  the perspective of the sample o f individuals as a  whole only slightly under 25% had a 
statistically significant positive y . Thus, almost three-quarters o f the sample are indifferent to 
either a  primary or a secondary sector allocation. The youth o f the sample can again be invoked 
to provide an explanation for this particular result. It is well known that young workers in trying
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to establish their optimal job match sample a  number of jobs prior to settling down. They thus 
may straddle the primary/secondary sector divide. As highlighted in 7.4 the widest differentials 
only appear for those young workers who are near the terminal age for those in the sample. It is 
conceivable that some young workers are optim ising in terms of the short-run and thus take jobs 
in the secondary sector that have higher starting wages in preference to a primary job  that has 
better long-run prospects.
Since 73% of individuals are indifferent as to their sectoral allocation the effectiveness of 
the switching equation must also be brought into question. It could, however, be said that the 
task set the switching model is far too great given  the youth of the sample under consideration. If 
there is little evidence of dualism in the young segment of the labour market, the switching equa­
tion will have severe problems in successfully delineating the two sectors. The more appropriate 
question is whether the application of this theoretical model to the young workers’ labour market 
is valid. On the face of the results presented in this chapter little evidence of dualism can be dis-
cemed.
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Appendix 7.A1
O c cupation  and  Industry  Codes o f Allocated W orkers
The Census of Population Classification o f Occupations (Central Statistics Office, Dublin 
(1981)) is used to allocated th e  workers with probability one to either the primary o r the secon­
dary sectors.
The following occupational codes are allocated to the primary sector 329, 335, 337, 358, 359, 
360. 365, 366, 367, 369, 370, 373, 377. 378, 380, 381, 382, 383, 396, 384, 395, 356, 361, 368, 
371, 372, 374, 375. 376. 379, 385, 386, 388. 389, 390, 392, 393, 318, 319, 320, 321. 322, 323, 
333, 334, 344, 351, 352, 354. 394. 309, 324, 327,328, 332,363, 364, 397.
The following occupational codes are allocated to the secondary sector 290, 291, 292, 293, 313, 
340, 342. 294, 295, 296, 325. 326, 330,331, 336, 337, 339.
Furthermore, all non-manual public sector employees in industry codes (SIC) 911,912, 913 ,914 , 
915 ,919 ,921 ,922 .923 ,931 , 932 .9 3 3 ,0 0 0 ,9 5 1 ,9 5 2  are allocated to the primary sector.
In addition all those workers in the one digit skilled manual occupational category and w ho work 
in firms with over one hundred workers are also allocated to the primary sector.
All other occupational and industry codes not already classified are allocated to the unknown sec­
tor.
Figure 1.
Figure 2.
'  Fore« E n tra n ce .
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Chapter Eight
Condusions
It is a difficult exercise to draw the diverse strands o f the previous four empirical chapters 
together and present an overall set of conclusions. The exercise may, therefore, best be served by 
examining in turn the findings o f these chapters while identifying the linking themes.
Firstly, chapter four presented, to the author's knowledge, the first set of wage equation esti­
mates for young workers in Ireland. The equations estimated provided an opportunity to assess 
the wage effects of labour force experience, formal educational and vocational training 
qualifications. The results also provided an insight into the influence exerted on wages by certain 
job characteristics, occupation, industry and regional location. Most of the results reported were 
found to be consistent with one 's  priors.
A more important objective o f this particular chapter was the estimation of gender discrimi­
nation coefficients using the "index number" approach. Mean discrimination estimates ranged 
from a statistically insignificant 3% to nearly 9% depending on whether the equations in question 
conditioned on occupations and industries or not. Thus the larger estimates reported may say 
more about the effects of occupation and industry compensating differentials than about discrimi­
nation. The evidence presented in this chapter provided little indication of the existence of a 
gender based wage discrimination.
Chapter five provided an advance on chapter four in terms o f its treatment o f occupations. 
The previous chapter assumed occupational exogeneity and the estimates presented were based 
on this rather strong assumption. The main purpose of chapter five was an analysis o f the effects 
of occupational endogeneity on the wage equation estimates and hence the discrimination esti­
mates. In this chapter occupations were dichotomised on the basis o f non-manual and manual
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workers. Two contrasting econometric methods were employed to estimate the occupational 
wage equations. O ne was the standard Heckman two-step estimator and the other was a more 
recently developed distribution free instrumental variable (IV) estimator. Statistical tests for 
occupational exogeneity were provided using both these estimators and some conflicting results 
were reported. The IV  based Hausman test revealed no evidence of occupational endogeneity in 
either male or female equations. In contrast the Heckman based Melino test provided some evi­
dence of occupational endogeneity in the manual male equation.
Not surprisingly the gender wage discrimination effects proved sensitive to the estimator 
used. Both estimators revealed little evidence o f manual wage discrimination. This may be due 
to the large number o f  skilled male workers who in the early years o f labour force experience are 
assumed to sacrifice wages to undergo firm-specific training. However, the discrimination 
coefficients for the female intensive non-manual category suggested the existence of wage 
discrimination. The disagreement between the estimators occurred in terms o f the reported mag­
nitude which ranged between just over 8% to under 16%.
Finally, in this chapter estimates for a structural occupational model were also reported and 
suggested, in general, an unimportant role for the occupational wage gap variable in terms of 
non-manual occupational attachment O f much more importance for both gender groups were 
parental background, education, residence o f  schooling and to a lesser extent the duration of 
unemployment since leaving school.
A limitation in chapter five was the inability created by the very broad occupational dicho­
tomy to assess the effects of occupational segregation on the gender wage gap. Chapter six 
examined an extension to  the "index number" approach that allowed the gender wage gap to be 
decomposed into intra and inter occupational components. A five-way occupational categorisa­
tion was employed and the information obtained from estimating reduced form multinomial logit 
occupational models was used to correct the occupational wage equations for potential selectivity 
bias. Lee (1983) suggests an econometric methodology that provides consistent estimates in the 
polychotomous framework. These estimates were contrasted with standard OLS ones. Evidence
-188-
of the non-random allocation o f workers to certain occupations was detected for a number of 
categories for both gender groups. In particular a strong negative selectivity bias effect was 
detected for both males and females in terms of the skilled occupational category re-enforcing 
some of the results obtained in chapter five by the Heckman based Melino test
The methodology employed allowed for the calculation o f "cleaner" occupational wage 
discrimination effects based on a much finer occupational classification than those reported for 
chapter five. Discrimination coefficients for the OLS and the consistent estimates were calcu­
lated. As was made clear in both chapters five and six though the interpretation of the OLS and 
the consistent differentials are different some large intra-occupational differentials were detected. 
This served to illustrate how the mean estimate can obscure the existence o f relatively large dif­
ferentials within certain occupations.
Chapter six also simulated female occupational distributions assuming a male occupational 
structure. In general it found that females were over-represented in the low-skill, low-pay sectors 
and under-represented in the skilled and professional sectors. The major finding of chapter six, 
however, was that the occupational allocation of females was not the major determinant o f their 
wage disadvantage. In line with evidence presented by Brown et at. (1980) and Miller (1987) for 
the US and the UK respectively intra-occupational wage disadvantage was a much stronger deter­
minant of the gender wage gap than the occupational allocation o f females. The amelioration of 
the female position, it was concluded, could best be served by promoting equal pay within occu­
pations rather than designing policies aimed at gender equalisation across occupations.
The final empirical chapter, chapter seven, attempted to use inter alia occupational informa­
tion to help describe two sectors that embodied some of the characteristics of the segmented or 
dual labour market theory. An endogenous switching model with a Dichotomous realisation of 
the latent dependent variable was used to estimate the parameters o f the dual labour market 
model. Some o f the results could be rationalised in terms o f the predictions of dualism with edu­
cation in particular playing a major role in both the determination and widening of the sectoral 
wage gap. Though the gender wage/experience profiles in the primary sector conformed to
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theorctical predictions the comparable profiles in the secondary sector exhibited increasing 
returns. A discernible gender gap betw een the two profiles was also observed. Since secondary 
firms are assumed to be characterised by  competitive conditions the existence o f a gender wage 
gap in the secondary sector was, to say th e  least, surprising.
The role o f gender in the dual labour market was more extensively examined in the context 
o f an informal test o f rationing. R ationing of primary sector jobs is a basic tenet of dualism and 
the results reported suggested that m ost o f  those individuals in the secondary sector who could 
earn more in the primary sector were female. Though it is arguably the case that females may 
possess a greater preference for the low-skilled and low paid jobs in the secondary market the 
preferences of employers and their rationing behaviour cannot be over-looked. Nevertheless, a 
strong result o f chapter seven was the fac t that for over 75% o f the sample an indifference existed 
between primary and secondary type jo b s . This forces the conclusion that in a sample of young 
workers with limited work experience it  may be very difficult for all but a small sub-sample to 
delineate two distinct sectors.
One overall conclusion that em erges from an examination of chapters four, five and six is 
the sensitivity o f the discrimination estimate to occupational disaggregation. These three 
chapters could be viewed as an exercise in the progressive disaggregation o f the occupational 
variable. It is clear from a simple inspection of the OLS results that the highly aggregative treat­
ment of occupations can lead to m isleading interpretations regarding the magnitude of the 
discrimination effects. The negligible discrimination estimates of chapter four masked a rela­
tively large and significant unexplained differential in the non-manual sector, as detected in 
chapter five. This, in turn, masked an e v e n  larger unexplained differential, as observed in chapter 
six, for the non-clerical non-manual sub-se t o f workers. Thus, if one assumed away the potential 
problems associated with using OLS in  these particular instances, these results could be inter­
preted as providing worthwhile evidence as to the dangers associated with the use of highly 
aggregated occupational data.
However, the problems of occupational endogeneity cannot be conveniently assumed away.
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as the results of chapters five and six confirm. The evidence o f both these chapters indicated the 
sensitivity o f the discrimination estimates to the manner in which occupational endogeneity is 
controlled. The relative merits o f the IV and Heckman-type two-step procedures w ere explored 
in chapters five and six. Though the latter procedure provided an alternative interpretation for the 
unexplained differential, in terms o f unexplained wage offer differentials, decisions regarding the 
econometric advantages of one estimator over another remain unresolved. Finally, the evidence 
of chapter seven appears to suggest that the application of a dual labour market m odel, in the par­
ticular context o f young w orker^, may be an inappropriate exercise.
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Table Al.1.
Mean Value« o f Variable« for C h ap te r Four
Variable Male Female
In (Wage) 0.5866 0.5089
Experience in years 4.2820 3.2486
Interm ediate Certificate 0.3140 0.2112
Leaving Certificate 0.2683 0.6562
University Degree 0.0223 0.0087
G roup Certificate 0.1938 0.0192
Apprenticeship 0.3720 0.0558
B ask Training Qual. 0.4165 0.6771
Estab < 15 0.3318 0.3192
15 S Estab < 50 0.1626 0.1571
50 s  Estab < 100 0.0980 0.0890
Estab i  100 0.4076 0.5096
Promotion on Job 
Occu pa (ions
0.4632 0.4014
Professional 0.0512 0.0593
Self-employed 0.0312 0.0174
Salaried employees 0.0200 0.0052
Interm ediate non-manual 0.1559 0.7103
O ther non-manual 0.0757 0.0942
Skilled manual 0.5501 0.0349
Semi-skilled manual 0.0779 0.0750
Unskilled
Industries
0.0380 0.0037
Building & Engineering 0.1559 0.0140
Transport & Communication 0.0735 0.0454
1 Banking & Insurance 0.0557 0.2024
Public Admin, etc. 0.0891 0.2967
Metal M anufacturing 0.1336 0.0820
O ther M anufacturing 0.1693 0.1344
Ext. & Chemicals 0.0668 0.0314
Distributive Trades 0.2561 0.1937
Dublin County 0.3541 0.4537
North-West counties 0.1462 0.1153
Southern Counties 0.2695 0.2792
Midlands Counties 0.1470 0.0977
Leinster(excl. Dublin) 0.0846 0.0541
Urban 0.6147 0.6911
Observations 573 449
In term s o f dum m y variables the values reported  represent the sam -
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Table A1.2
Means for M ales and Females by Occupational Category In Chapter Five.
Variable M ale Male * F em ale Female*
In (Wage) 0.4853 0.3685 0.3949 0.3517
(0.3722) (0.4012) (0.3783) (0.2773)
Previous Exp. (years) 0.9854 0.9869 0.7834 0.9796
(1.584) (1.598) (1.936) (1.616)
Experience (yean) 3.322 3.517 3.105 3.482
(2.019) (2.127) (1.936) (2.258)
Education (yean) 2.310 1.376 2.407 1.139
(1.696) (1.288) (1.387) (1.215)
Schooling in Dublin 0.4577 0.2327 0.3717 0.2685
(-) (-) (-) (-)
50 S Firm <400 0.2025 0.2412 0.1974 0.5586
(-) (-) (-) (-)
Firm è 400 0.3556 0.2220 0.3026 0.1944
(-) (*) (-) (-)
Unemployment (in months) 2.838 4.009 2.173 3.887
(4.466) (7.268) (4.065) (6.521)
Move Residence 0.0792 0.0427 0.0922 0.0278
(-) (•) (-) (•)
Non-Manual 0.3627 0.4739 0.3687 0.5772
(-) (-) (-) (-)
Manual 0.4842 0.2391 0.3697 0.2346
(-) (-) (-) (-)
0.8560 -0.5213 0.2935 -0.9041
(0.3797) (0.2580) (0.2774) (0.5281)
Observations 568 937 998 324
a denotes the non-manual sector and b the manual sector, 
for the continuous variables are in parentheses.
Standard deviations
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Tabi« A l J .
Male Mean« by Occupational Category In Chapter Six.
Variable Semi & Unskilled Skilled Other Clerical Prof *  Man.
In (W age) 0.3724 0.3667 0.3986 0.4810 0.5961
(0.4046) (0.4000) (0.3658) (0.3497) (0.4047)
Previous Experience 1.210 0.8932 1.335 0.7786 1.066
(1.710) (1.540) (1.869) (1.330) (1.707)
Experience 3.452 3.544 3.728 3.197 3.144
(2.223) (2.087) (2.186) (1.928) (1.979)
Education 1.260 1.424 1.452 2.236 3.476
(1.273) (1.292) (1.375) (1.384) (2.023)
Dublin City & Co. 0.2058 0.2439 0.4178 0.4797 0.4524
(-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
East &  Midlands 0.2744 0.2258 0  3630 0.1622 0.1667
(-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
South 0.2960 0.3273 0.2260 0.2297 0.2619
FnrrMil »Miri
(•) (-) (-) (-) (*)
Dublin City & Co. 0.2022 0.2439 0.4384 0.3101 0.4603
(-) (•) (-) (-) (•)
East 00866 0.0667 0.0616 0.0574 0.0476
(-) (-) (*) (-) (-)
Midlands 0.1949 0.1621 0.1301 0.1013 0.1032
(-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
South 0.2924 0.1621 0.2260 0  2095 0.2778
(-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Unemployment (months) 6.201 3.089 4.361 2.296 2.347
(10.16) (5.377) (6.467) (3.337) (3.467)
50 £ Firm  <400 0.2996 0.2167 0.2466 0.1351 0.3095
(-) (-) (•) (-) (•)
Firm 2400 0.2167 0.2877 0.4426 0.2302
(-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Change o f  Residence 0.0289 0.0485 0.0479 0.0979 0.0714
(-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Non-M anual 0.1805 0.2636 0  3630 0.4831 0.6270
( ) (-) ( ) (•) (-)
Manual 0.5018 0.4621 0.4658 0.3682 0.2302
(-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
1.3643 0.8486 1.8694 1.3032 1.5826
(0.4643) (0.8486) (0.6502) (0.3391) (0.8152)
Observations 277 660 146 296 126
deviations for continuous variables are in parentheses.
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™ T a X
Fenmte M e m  by O ccupational Category In C hap ter St».
Variable Semi A  Unskilled Skilled Other Clerical Prof *  Man.
In (Wage) 0.3528 0.3477 0.1345 0.4224 0.5976
(0.2342) (0.3932) (0.4839) (0.3280) (0.3903)
Previous Experience 1.013 0.8652 1.142 3.049 3.292
(1.702) (1.283) (1.810) (1.875) (1.934)
Experience 3.458 3.564 3.297 3.049 3.292
(2.232) (2.359) (2.231) (1.875) (1 934)
Education 1.032 1.507 1.772 2.454 3.085
(1.099) (1.501) (1.490) (1 307) (1509)
Dublin City & Co. 0.3028 0.1507 0.3034 0.3826 0.3902
<-> (-) (-) (-) (-)
East & Midlands 0.2191 0.1644 0.1517 0.1946 0.1829
(*) (-) (-) (*) (-)
South 0.2869 0.5479 0.3448 0.2776 0.2805
(-) (-) (-) (-> (-)
Dublin City & Co. 0.3068 0.1507 0.3448 0.4137 0.5000
(-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
East 0.0717 0.0959 0.0345 0.0726 0.0488
(-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Midlands 0.1513 0.0822 0.0965 0.1076 0.0854
(•) (-) (-) (-) (-)
South 0.2829 0.5342 0.3448 0.2685 0.2561
(-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
50 S Firm  <400 0.5657 0.5342 0.1310 0.1984 0.3049
(-) <-) (-) (-) (-)
Firm ¿400 0.2072 0.1507 0.2345 0  3048 0.4024
(-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Unemployment (months) 4.041 3.360 2.807 2.022 2.470
(6.853) (5.231) (5.743) (3.683) (3.843)
Change of Residence 0.0239 0.0411 0.1034 0.0687 0.2927
* n
(-) (-) (*) (-) (-)
Non-Manual 0.2390 0.2192 0.3172 0.3696 0.4643
(-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Manual 0.5857 0.5479 0.3586 0.3865 0.2195
<-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
- t 1.1996 2.1526 1.7629 0.5882 1.9911
(0.4869) (0.4952) (0.3629) (0.2536) (1.0305)
1IO
231 73 145 771 82
deviations for continuous variables are In parentheses.
Table A 1J
Means of Variables by Gender In Chapter Seven
Variable Male Female
Wage 0.4124 0.3845
Experience 3.441 3.196
Education 1.728 2.100
100 s  Firm < 500 0.1408 0.2015
Firm 2500 0.2722 0.2762
Dublin City & Co. 0.3254 0.3774
South 0.2842 0.2928
East & Mid. 0.2145 0.1796
Public 0.0936 0.1487
I Observ-Uore __________ 1 » ________________________ U i i
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